Nachrichten Heute (Nachrichten Heute, Hintergrundinformationen und Berichte) : Rubrik:zeitgeschichte

Rückblick: Hans Müller - Arzt im kommunistischen China

onlinedienst — 2008-08-23T05:10:00Z

Dr. Alexander von Paleske ---- 23.8. 2008 --- China hat einen langen Weg hinter sich von einem der ärmsten Lander der Welt ohne nennenswerte Infrastruktur im Jahre 1949, als die kommunistische Partei unter Mao die Macht übernahm, bis zu einer der grössten Industrienationen und der Ausrichtung der olympischen Spiele jetzt.

Der nachfolgende Artikel berichtet über eine aussergewöhnliche Persönlichkeit, die an der Entwicklung des Gesundheitswesens in China entscheidend mitgewirkt hat, den deutschen Arzt Hans Müller und der Artikel hat meinerseits eine Vorgeschichte.

Letztes Jahr berichtete ich in einem Artikel ueber die deutliche Zunahme der sexuell übertragbaren Erkrankungen in der Volksrepublik China, die nach 1949 nahezu ausgerottet worden waren. Diesen ausserordentlich erfolgreichen Ausrottungsfeldzug leitete seinerzeit George Hatem, ein US-amerikanischer Arzt libanesischer Abstammung, der sich nach Abschluss seines Medizinstudiums in den USA, Beirut und Genf Maos Kommunisten angeschlossen hatte.

George Hatem war jedoch nicht alleine. Vielmehr hatte auch der deutsche Arzt Hans Müller einen grossen Anteil an der Entwicklung des Gesundheitswesens in China und der Ausbildung chinesischer Ärzte.

Dabei spiegeln sich in dem Schicksal des Arztes Müller all die Katastrophen und Krisen des vergangenen Jahrhunderts wieder, nämlich die Judenverfolgung mit dem Holocaust, der Kampf Chinas gegen die japanischen Truppen, der chinesische Bürgerkrieg, die Kulturrevolution, und schliesslich die Oeffnung Chinas.

Aber über Hans Müller ist zumindest in Deutschland so gut wie nichts bekannt. Dabei war Hans Müller, der von 1915 bis 1994 lebte und den grössten Teil seines Lebens als Internist in China verbrachte, in China eine weithin bekannte und hochgeachtete Persönlichkeit. Erst jüngst wurde ein Bildband über ihn herausgebracht, in welchem sein Leben dargestellt und seine Arbeit in China gewürdigt wird.

Hans Müller, Foto: Archiv Familie Müller

Ich versuchte mehr über Hans Müller zu erfahren und begab mich auf Spurensuche, die mich zunächst in das Internet und dann in die Schweiz führte, dort lebt mittlerweile seine Tochter Mimi als Computer-Software Spezialistin. Vergangene Woche traf ich sie in Zürich.

Mimi Müller - Foto: Dr. v. Paleske

Eine Reise nach Yenan
Hans Müllers Vater, Simon Müller war jüdischer Grosskaufmann in Düsseldorf. Seine Frau Henriette war die Nichte des jüdischen Hamburger Reeders Albert Ballin, seinerzeit Generaldirektor der HAPAG.Der Ballindamm an der Innenalster in Hamburg ist nach ihm benannt.

Simon und Henriette Müllers einziger Sohn, Hans Müller, am 13.1.1915 in Düsseldorf geboren, ging nach dem Schulbesuch 1933 zum Studium der Medizin nach Basel..

Simon Müller wurde in das KZ Theresienstadt deportiert, seine Frau liess man als Mischling ersten Grades und engem Verwandten von Albert Ballin, dem seinerzeitigen engen Freund und Berater des letzten deutschen Kaisers unbehelligt.

Hans Müller schloss sein Studium 1939 ab und promovierte mit Auszeichnung zum Dr. med. mit einer Arbeit über den plötzlichen Herztod nach Stromunfällen..

Eine Rückkehr nach Nazi-Deutschland kam für ihn nach Abschluss des Studiums wegen der drohenden Deportation in ein Konzentrationslager nicht in Frage. Ein Kommilitone aus China berichtete ihm über den Krieg gegen die japanischen Truppen in China, den langen Marsch von Maos Armee nach Yenan sowie dem dramatischen Mangel an Ärzten dort.
Hans Müller beschloss daraufhin, als Arzt nach China zu gehen und schiffte sich ein.

In Hong Kong traf er auf Madame Sung Ching-ling (die Witwe des buergerlichen Revolutionaers Sun Yat Sen), die ihn an Maos Verbindungsleute weiterempfahl. Im Herbst 1939 traf er in Yenan ein, wo sich Maos Truppen verschanzt hatten.

Er wurde auf eigenen Wunsch an die Front zur 8. RouteArmee zugeteilt, die unter dem Oberbefehl von Tsu Teh (Zhu De) stand, der selbst in Deutschland studiert hatte und sich mit Vorliebe mit Hans Müller in Deutsch unterhielt.

Weit ist der Weg nach Deutschland
Nach dem Ende des 2. Weltkrieges wollte Hans Müller in seine deutsche Heimat zurückkehren. Die Dixie Mission der US Armee (United States Army Observation Group), die als eine Art Verbindungsbüro nach Yenan im Jahre 1944 gekommen war, wurde 1947 abgezogen. Aber für ihn war in deren Flugzeugen angeblich kein Platz und so machte er sich, mit einem Empfehlungsschreiben Tsu Tehs versehen, zu Fuss auf den Weg nach Deutschland -soweit die Füsse tragen-.

Er beabsichtigte Deutschland über die Sowjetunion zu erreichen.
Weit kam er allerdings nicht, vielmehr traf er auf seine ehemaligen chinesischen Armeevorgesetzten, die ihn überzeugten in China zu bleiben und im chinesischen Bürgerkrieg (zwischen Mao und Chiang Kai-shek) als Arzt weiterhin zu helfen. Nach einiger Ueberlegung fasste Hans Müller den Entschluss, sein weiteres Leben in China zu verbringen.

China forever
Die Nachricht vom Tode seines Vaters, der das KZ Theresienstadt überlebt hatte und 1953 in Hamburg starb erreichte ihn ebensowenig wie die Nachricht, dass seine Mutter bis nach Schanghai gekommen war (besetzt von Chiang Kai-shek), ihm aber nicht nach Yenan folgen konnte (besetzt von Mao) und 1945 nach Deutschland zurückkehrte.

Hans Müller heiratete 1949 die japanische Krankenschwester Nakamura Kyoko. Sie war von den japanischen Truppen weggelaufen und hatte sich ebenfalls der 8. Route Armee angeschlossen.

Foto: Archiv Familie Müller

Nach der Machtübernahme Maos im Jahre 1949 wurde er im August 1949 Abteilungsleiter im Gesundheitsministerium und im Mai 1950 Präsident und Professor der Universität in Changchun. 1951 wurde Hans Müller chinesischer Staatsbürger. Schliesslich wurde er im Jahre 1962 nach einer schweren Herzerkrankung Professor am Pekinger Jishuitan Hospital und im Jahre 1972 Vizepräsident der medizinischen Universität von Peking.

Foto: Archiv Familie Müller

Professor Müllers Hauptinteresse galt der Gastroeneterologie und hier vor allem den Lebererkrankungen. Er trieb die chinesische Entwicklung von Impfstoffen gegen die Hepatitis B voran und kooperierte nach der Öffnung Chinas mit dem japanischen Professor Nishioka Kusuya und mehreren US-amerikanischen Universitäten.

Während der Kulturrevolution liess man Professor Müller weitgehend unbehelligt, er machte allerdings aus seiner Ablehnung dieser Entwicklung kein Hehl, hielt sich aber mit jedweden öffentlichen Stellungnahmen politischer Art zurück. Er setzte sich aber beispielsweise für den Sohn eines Freundes, der politisch verfolgt wurde, mit einem persönlichen Schreiben an Mao ein.

Reisen ins Ausland
Im Jahre 1971 beantragte Hans Müller erstmals für sich ein Visum für einen Besuch der Schwiegereltern in Japan, was damals aber von der japanischen Regierung abgelehnt wurde.

Erst ein Jahr später konnte er dorthin reisen. Auf der Rückreise durch Hongkong versuchte der britische Geheimdienst ihn zu überreden, nicht nach China zurückzukehren. Dieses Ansinnen wies er empört zurück.

1974 besuchte Prof. Müller erstmals nach fast 40 Jahren wieder Deutschland und traf in Hamburg mit den Ballin-Nachfahren zusammen. In den darauffolgenden Jahren war er mehrfach zu Besuch in Deutschland und in der Schweiz, seine Tochter Mimi hatte 1976 einen Schweizer geheiratet.

Keine Ehrung aus Deutschland
George Hatem wurde in den USA für seine Arbeit in China mit dem hochangesehenen Lasker Preis ausgezeichnet. Von einer wie auch immer gearteten Ehrung Prof. Müllers seitens seiner Heimatstadt Düsseldorf, der Bundesregierung oder der deutschen Ärzteschaft trotz seiner chinesischen Staatsangehörigkeit wurde er in China immer als Deutscher angesehen ist diesseits nichts bekannt.

Hilflos bei Infektionen - Antibiotika verlieren ihre Wirksamkeit

Irena Sendler saved 2,500 Jewish children from the Holocaust

sfux — 2008-05-26T06:52:00Z

David Dastych - Irena Sendler is not anymore with us. One could say the world suffered a great loss when an old lady on a wheelchair quietly pulled to the end of her long and painful but also charitable and glorious life. She passed away on the 12th of May in a Warsaw hospital, at the age of 98.

On the very day she died, a school in Warsaw was to be named Irena Sendlers Middle School No 23 and a ceremony occurred timely. Only her portrait was adorned by a black ribbon and so the schools banner, as students and teachers stood silent with tears in their eyes. Her funeral, on May 15, brought together hundreds of people, friends and admirers of Mrs. Sendler from Poland and from abroad. On that day, AP reporter Monika Scislowska reported: Pallbearers carried Sendlers coffin through the historic Powazki cementary. More than 40 children from the newly named Irena Sendler Middle School in the capitals Praga neighborhood looked on, each holding a yellow tulipFrederic Chopins Funeral March was played as Sendler was laid to rest and mourners gathered to hear a Catholic prayer.

Mother of the ghetto children: Irena Sendler

Jewish community leaders, Holocaust survivors, government ministers and the Israeli ambassador to Poland joined hundreds of other mourners in bright sunshine at Warsaw's Powazki cemetery to pay tribute to Sendler's life and achievements, wrote Reuters Gareth Jones.

"Poland, the Jewish people, the world has lost a person who simply fought her whole life... for what it means to help another person, fought for never being indifferent, for never dividing humanity but bringing it together," Michael Schudrich, Poland's chief rabbi, told Reuters at the funeral.

A Kadish prayer was also sung by a rabbi in Warsaw, and Max Zinger from Canada, one of the readers of Haaretz daily online posted his own Mourners Kadish for her, entitled We Lost a Great Human Being, an Angel!

Mother of the ghetto children
Who was Irena Sendler? For 60 years of her life in Poland, she was a no-person, a humble social worker, a mother and wife, who never publicly admitted to heroic deeds during the war.Irena Sendler was born in Warsaw in 1910, the only child of a Polish doctor Stanislaw Krzyzanowski. Later they lived in Otwock, a near by town, where her father had a reputation of the only doctor who would treat Jewish patients during typhoid epidemic. He himself died of the disease in 1917. Irena was brought up as a Catholic. But unlike other Polish children, she was not biased against Jews and she was allowed to play with Jewish children.

Later she recalled that her father had taught her that people can only be divided into good or bad; their race, religion, nationality dont matter. She was true to these principles for the whole life. She studied law and pedagogy. During her higher studies in Warsaw, she opposed discrimination against Jews and defended her Jewish colleagues. Before the outbreak of the war, she married Mieczyslaw Sendler and became a professional social worker, caring also for poor Polish and Jewish families in Warsaw. Under the German occupation Mrs. Sendler began to help Jews from the very fall of Poland in September 1939. In 1940, over 400,000 Jewish citizens living in the Warsaw ghetto were sealed off behind high walls. Jews leaving the ghetto without a German permit were punished by death, and the Poles were strictly forbidden to help Jews in any way. If caught, such persons and their household members faced immediate death sentence. Nowhere else in the German-occupied Europe, but only in Poland, Nazi rules were so brutal.

In spite of the great danger, Irena Sendler, a 29-year-old wife and mother and some of her colleagues decided to help Jews. They obtained special passes from the city authorities, letting them visit the ghetto as sanitation workers. They could carry food, clothes and medicine, especially typhoid vaccines, to the walled-off part of Warsaw. Sendler, together with her friend and co-conspirator Irena Shultz and other social workers, rescued Jewish babies, children and youngsters from an inevitable death in the Warsaw ghetto or in German concentration camps.

The most difficult was to persuade Jewish parents, mothers in particular, to hand over their beloved children to merciful gentiles who wanted to save them: infernal scenes. Father agreed but mother didnt. Grandmother cuddled the child most tenderly and, weeping bitterly, said I wont give away my grandchild at any price, Mrs. Sendler later recalled. The helpers came back to Jewish homes several times, occasionally finding that the families living there were gone through the infamous Umschlagplatz, a railway platform from which Jews were loaded into cattle-cars to be deported to Treblinka and to other death camps. About 20 Polish social workers led by Mrs.

Sendler exposed themselves to immediate capital punishment but carried on, using all kinds of tricks to get children out of the ghetto walls. Smuggling of them out was highly risky and it also had to involve dozens of people inside the ghetto and hundreds outside, on the so called Arian side of Warsaw. Inside the sealed-off Jewish City the social workers wore Star of David, same as the Jews, not to call attention of Germans and also to show their solidarity with the persecuted people.

They smuggled babies and small children in wooden boxes, wrapped in packages, getting them out in ambulances and trams, carrying them through holes, sewages or even through corridors of an old courthouse leading out of the ghetto to the other side of the city. One small boy, Stephan, got out under a mans coat, with his feet in the mans shoes and hands clasped on his belt. Some children were rescued in coffins, pretending to be dead, other were hidden in suitcases.

But the mortal danger didnt stop beyond the ghetto walls, as Germans and some Polish traitors could locate a Jew anywhere, and as helping Jews meant immediate death to the helpers and their families. Jewish babies, children and youngsters saved from the Warsaw Ghetto received false Christian identity documents and were hidden in orphanages, convents, parish rectories and with Polish foster families. Jewish teenagers joined guerilla units and fought against Germans.

Irena Sendler began helping Jews immediately after the German invasion of Poland (September 1939). But only in December of 1942 her team of about twenty social workers received substantial support from a newly found Council for Aid to Jews, codenamed Zegota (and old Slavonic first name, unrelated to Jewishness).

Zegota, a codename for the Council for Aid to Jews, operated underground from 1942 to 1945, under the auspices of the Polish Government in Exile to help the Jews and find, for at least some of them, a place of safety in occupied Poland. The organization helped to save many thousand Polish Jews by providing relief money, false identity documents and shelter. Zegota as an organized effort was tantamount to Schindlers List multiplied a hundredfold, said Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Irena Sendler became head of Zegota Childrens Section which cared for 2,500 of the 9,000 Jewish children smuggled from the Warsaw ghetto. This unique organization, the only one in the German-occupied Europe, not only helped Jews in Poland but also assured that the saved children, when the war was over, must be returned to their Jewish relatives or communities. Thinking of their future, Mrs. Sendler carefully noted the true names of her children and kept slips of papers at home.

In the hands of Gestapo
On October 20, 1943 eleven Gestapo officers came to Sendlers home to arrest her. She managed to pass the slips to a friend, who hid the paper in her stockings and later buried the archive in glass jars under an apple tree in an associates yard. Some 2,500 names of Jewish children were thus recorded and saved.

Pawiak Prison: Her name was listed on German public bulletins as among those executed in early 1944.

Irena Sendler was taken to a notorious Pawiak Prison, which few people left alive. She spent there three long months. Beaten and tortured repeatedly, with both her arms and legs broken, she revealed nothing. I kept silent. I preferred to die than to reveal our activity, she was quoted as saying. While in prison, she was sentenced to death for helping Jews. The worst moment of the brutal interrogation happened when a Gestapo officer, questioning her, showed a thick file with information from Polish denunciators. She survived three months in jail and was set free by a Gestapo officer, who took a huge bribe from Zegota to check off her name on a list of those already shot.

Her name was listed on German public bulletins as among those executed in early 1944. Until the end of the war she had to live in hiding, under a false name. Even then, she continued her work, endangered by Germans but also by Poles. In 1944 (according to a Polish weekly Wprost), an intelligence unit of a Polish nationalist and anti-Semitic underground organization NSZ issued a death sentence on her as an alleged Communist and Jew-helper. Mrs. Sendler avoided having been shot by her compatriots but suffered pain until the end of her life, after the Gestapo thugs beat her up and broke her arms and legs. Never again would she be able to walk without crutches.

Forgotten in Communist Poland
After the end of the war (1945) Irena Sendler divorced her first husband (though she is known under his family name) and married a fellow conspirator Stefan Zgrzembski. They had two sons and a daughter. One died a few days after birth. The second son, Adam, died of heart failure in 1999. (She is survived by a daughter, Janina Zgrzembska, and a granddaughter.)

Her life in Communist Poland was not a happy one. In 1949, she was brutally interrogated by the then Communist security service (UB) for allegedly hiding members of Polish underground organization (AK, Home Army). She lost her baby after that. Before, she managed to hand over her jar archive with 2,500 names of the Jewish children her team had saved to Adolf Bermann, the chairman of the Central Committee of Jews in Poland. Under German occupation, Zegota included Jewish organizations, represented by Adolf Bermann and Leon Feiner. The Council for Aid to Jews Zegota was the only underground organization that was run jointly by Jews and Polish gentiles, representing a variety of political movements. They helped at least 4,000 Polish Jews, mainly in Warsaw, and both the Polish and the Jewish underground was able to reach with aid to some 8,500 of the 28,000 Jews hiding in Warsaw, and to about 1,000 trying to survive elsewhere in Poland.

After the war, Irena Sendler continued her work as social welfare official and director of vocational schools but she and her family couldnt avoid harassment from the then Communist authorities. She never spoke in public about her wartime heroic deeds, having chosen a private life, dedicated to her family and friends. The memories of the past haunted her. As Mrs. Sendler recalled later, she and her co-workers visiting the Warsaw ghetto saw starving children, abandoned corpses and Nazi SS officers using skulls for target practice I saw all this and a million other things that a human eye should never have to see she later said, and it has stayed with me for every second of every day that God granted me to live.

The Polish Communist authorities were not interested to reward her for the help rendered to Jewish children during the war. But the Jews did not forget. In 1965, Irena Sendler became one of the first Righteous Gentiles honored by the Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial in Jerusalem for wartime heroics. Polish authorities did not allow her to go to Israel to be praised there. Only in 1983, she could collect the award (a medal Righteous among the Nations), confirmed by the Knesset. In 1991, she became an honorary citizen of Israel.

Earlier, in 1968, when the Communist authorities cracked down on Polish Jews, calling them Zionists and expelling some 20,000 from Poland, Mrs. Sendler announced she was ready to hide Jews again. For her statement, the authorities expelled her children from the Warsaw University.

In Communist Poland, official statistics (backed by Dr. Szymon Datner of the Jewish Historical Institute) listed the total number of Jewish children saved during the war as 500 600. Only in March of 1979, a joint declaration issued by the surviving members of the wartime Warsaw City Department of Social Care and the Council for Aid to Jews Zegota (signed by Irena Sendler, Jadwiga Piotrowska, Izabela Kuczkowska and Wanda Drozdowska) brought up that number to about 2,500. Records show that Sendlers team of about 20 people saved so many Jewish children between October 1940 and the final liquidation of the Warsaw ghetto in April 1943, when the Nazis, furious because of the Jewish unexpected armed resistance (Ghetto Uprising 43), burned and demolished the Jewish quarter of Polands capital, shooting the surviving residents or sending them to death camps.

In spite of the fact that already in 1958 Irena Sendler was rewarded by In the Service of Health medal from Polands Minister of Health, she never became a publicly renowned person for her outstanding bravery and dedication in the Second World War. This situation lasted throughout the years of Peoples Poland (the Communist regime ended in 1989). In 1989, she was 79, ill and forgotten. This situation lasted until 1999, when four curious American high-school students from Kansas caused a big change in her life.

From the shadows to world fame
Irena Sendlers life-story is so fascinating that millions of people everywhere read and write about her deeds now with true admiration. While writing this article, I have put Irena Sendler on my browser finding more than 440 thousand hits (about 226,000 in English and over 41,000 in Polish). But until 1999 there were only a few remarks on her heroic life in the media and on the Web. One of them drew the attention of a history teacher from a high school in Uniontown, Kansas in the United States.

Norm Conard showed a short clipping of the March 1994 News and World Report weekly to four of his students, all girls -- Megan Steward, Elisabeth Cambers, Jessica Shelton and Sabrina Coons -- asking them to do some research on the news which said Irena Sendler saved 2,500 children from the Warsaw Ghetto in 1942-43, in their year-long National History Day project. At first, both the teacher and the students thought it was a typographical error, since no one of them heard of this woman or her story. It might be a mistake, Mr. Conard told a Polish Dziennik daily in May 2008, perhaps there were 25 children saved, or 250 at most?

But the information proved true and that Polish woman, supposed to be dead for years, turned out a living and the most interesting witness.

The wartime story of Irena Sendler was not fully known to the American girl-students at the time they wrote a scenario of a short drama, entitled Life in a Jar. Their presentation enjoyed an enormous success and it was played over 240 times all over the United States and in Europe as of May, 2008. The performance brought a great popularity to the Mother of the Children of the Holocaust. But it also helped the young authors and actors to come over to Poland (in 2001 for the first time, and later in 2002 and 2005) to meet their heroine.

A long-time cordial correspondence developed between Megan, Elisabeth, Jessica and Sabrina from Uniontown and Irena in Warsaw, with a translation help from a Polish student, Anna Karasinska, from a local Kansas college. Mrs. Sendler wrote to them in one letter Before the day you had written Life in a Jar, the world did not know our story, your performance and work is continuing the effort I started over fifty years ago, you are my dearly beloved girls.

Thank to the four curious girls from Kansas and their presentations of Life in a Jar, Irena Sendler was finally rediscovered in her own country, Poland, and in 2003 she was rewarded by the highest civilian decoration, the Order of White Eagle, then honored by the Polish Senate.

In 2003, she was also honored in America by the Jan Karski Award For Valor and Courage ($ 20,000). On that occasion, John Paul II sent to Mrs. Irena Sendler a following letter:

The Vatican, November 13, 2003 from POPE JOHN PAUL II TO IRENA SENDLEROWA:Honorable and dear Madam. I have learned you were awarded the Jan Karski prize for Valor and Courage. Please accept my hearty congratulations and respect for your extraordinarily brave activities in the years of occupation, when disregarding your own security you were saving many children from extermination, and rendering humanitarian assistance to human beings who needed spiritual and material aid. Having been yourself afflicted with physical tortures and spiritual sufferings you did not break down, but still unsparingly served others, co-creating homes for children and adults. For those deeds of goodness for others, let the Lord God in his goodness reward you with special graces and blessing. Remaining with respect and gratitude I give the Apostolic Benediction to you. Signed: Pope John Paul II

In 2005, a book by Anna Mieszkowska called Mother of the Children of the Holocaust. The Irena Sendler Story was first published in Polish and later on translated to Hebrew, German (2006), and in part to English as a 23-page pamphlet. Several TV documentaries about her life have been produced in Poland and abroad. After she became a honorary citizen of Israel (1991), in 1995 she was interviewed on camera in a 40-minute French documentary by Polish-born Franch writer and film-maker, Marek Halter: Irena Sendler, her squinty, blue eyes awash with tears, recounted how she smuggled Jewish children out of the Warsaw Ghetto in an ambulance. In a front seat, a dog barked loudly to drown out the cries of her small passengers. Still visited by some of the Jews she saved, I could have done more, she said. This regret will follow me to my death. (AP reported)

It took a true miracle to save a Jewish child, Elzbieta Ficowska, who was saved by Sendlers team as a 5-month-old baby in 1942 and is a chair-woman of the Association of the Children of the Holocaust now, recalled in an AP interview in 2007. Mrs. Sendler saved not only us, but also our children and grandchildren and the generations to come, she concluded.

In 2007 Irena Sendler was nominated to Nobel Peace Prize by efforts of President of Poland Lech Kaczynski and many other people in Poland and abroad. She lost to Al Gore, former Vice President of the United States, but she didnt care about it. When she heard the news, Irena Sendler told her doctor, Hanna Wujkowska, that she was relieved. For her the greatest Noble Prize were letters from children of Poland and the world, because there were schools named after her in many countries and she received letters with photos of children for them she is somebody they could follow.

In 2008, before her 98th Birthday (Feb.15), students from Kansas working on The Irena Sendler Project wrote on their Web site: she is still in good health and continues to inspire many. Her family and many of her saved children continue to tell her story of courage and valor. But already in April Irena Sendler fell ill (of pneumonia) and on Monday, May 12, she passed away at 8.00 a.m. CEST in a Warsaw hospital. Her funeral was arranged in Warsaw on May 15, 2008 three months after her last Birthday.

During a memorial ceremony at Ford Scott in Kansas somebody wrote Her legacy of repairing the world continues, as good continues to triumph over evil. On May 13, a day after her death, the Hallmark Hall of Fame in the U.S.A. announced that a movie based on Mieszkowskas book was being prepared and will be filmed in Poland and aired by CBS. John Kent Harrison wrote the script and will direct it.

One year before her death, Irena Sendler wrote in a letter to the Polish Senate: Every child saved with my help and the help of all the wonderful secret messengers, who today are no longer living, is the justification of my experience on this earth, and not a title to glory.

This sentence might be the best epitaph for Mrs. Sendler, Mother of the Children of the Holocaust, an Angel in the Ghetto as many people used to call her.

© David Dastych 2008
David Dastych is a veteran journalist who served both in the Polish intelligence and the CIA; jailed in Poland by the Communist regime he spent several years in special prison wards; released in early 1990s he joined international efforts to monitor illegal nuclear trade in Europe and Asia; handicapped for lifetime in a mountain accident in France, in 1994; now he returned to active life and runs his own media agency in Warsaw.

Audiphone Software-Tools Geheimtipp nur für Geheimdienste?

hha — 2008-03-28T19:23:00Z

Harald Haack Am Anfang ist oft nur ein Rauschen. Aber das ganze Weltall ist ein einziges Rauschen, Knacksen, Bratzeln und Pfeifen. Es ist endlos weit, und wir Menschen darin sind vielleicht nur ein unbedeutender audiphoner Knackser; mehr nicht. Uns inmitten des schallend gemachten Chaos zu entdecken wäre für außerirdische intelligente Lebewesen ohne spezielle, fähige Hilfsmittel aussichtslos. Extraterrestrier wären geneigt, unsere Zivilisation in einer Aufzeichnung von dem rauschenden Konzert des Weltalls als Störung zu empfinden und heraus zu schneiden. Das Rauschen des Weltalls ist analog und unbrauchbar für eine Verständlichkeit über große Distanzen.

Doch eigentlich ist es egal, was oder wer hier auf der Erde das Rauschen verursachte, das sich auf audiphonen Aufzeichnungen breit macht. Es ist wie lästiger Staub und rauscht und schmiert akustische Information unbarmherzig zu, manchmal bis zur Verständnislosigkeit, legt sich zudem plump auf die Ohren. Aber damit nicht genug! Wurde die Aufzeichnung vom Tonband in ein anderes Medium, dem der Schallplatte nämlich, übertragen, mischte sich zusätzlich Knistern durch Staubpartikel dazu und in tragischen Fällen erzeugten Schrammen im Vinyl der Schallplatten periodisches Knacken. Wurde die Schallplatte falsch gelagert, häufig zu warm in ungünstiger Position, so kam auch noch Rumpeln hinzu, ein Geräusch, das entsteht, wenn die Tonabnehmernadel sich extrem auf und nieder bewegt, weil die Platte für die kleine Nadel sozusagen zur Achterbahn wurde. Da jedoch die Störungen mit jedem erneuten Abspielen einer Schallplatte nahezu identisch sein können, gewöhnte man sich daran und wenn sie nicht zu vorherrschend waren, zählten sie bald untrennbar zum Sound, der von der Schallplatte kam. So hatte jede Kopie einer Schallplattenproduktion ihre eigene, persönliche Aura; was zwangsläufig puristische Fanatiker aktivierte und diese die (längst ausgediente) Schallplatte zum Kult-Objekt machten.

Die älteste Klangaufzeichnung eine Audiografie
Kürzlich präsentierte ein Forscherteam um den US-Radiohistoriker David Giovannoni, dem auch Mitarbeiter der Plattenfirma Archeophone Records angehören, die angeblich älteste Klangaufzeichnung. Die soll von Edouard-Léon Scott de Martinville stammen und von ihm mittels des von ihm erfundenen Phonoautografen um 1860 aufgezeichnet worden sein; jedenfalls datiert das französische Patent seiner Erfindung mit der Nummer 17,897/31,470 auf März 1857.

Der von Edouard-Léon Scott de Martinville erfundene "Phonoautograph".

Scott de Martinville lebte in Paris und verdiente sich seinen Lebensunterhalt als Drucker und Korrekturleser wissenschaftlicher Werke. Zwangsläufig lagen seine Absichten wohl im grafischen Bereich, denn mit dem Phonoautografen gelang es ihm, nach dem Vorbild des fotografischen Verfahrens von Louis Jacques Mandé Daguerre, der Optisches auf metallisch irisierende Platten konservierte, Akustisches als Muster in eine rußgeschwärzte Walze zu kratzten; vergleichbar zur Fotografie Daguerres also eine Audiografie. Schon bald ersetzte Scott de Martinville die Rußwalze durch Papier. Das Prinzip seiner Maschine jedoch blieb unverändert: Mittels eines großen Trichters leitete er den Schall auf eine Membrane, die die Schwingungen dann auf eine Schweineborste übertrug. Diese Schweineborste kratzte dann das Muster in die Ruß-geschwärzte Walze bzw. zeichnete es auf Papier.

Scott de Martinville war wohl fasziniert von den Möglichkeiten die Welt zu erfassen: Von Licht geschriebene (damals noch die "Daguerrotypie") und nun von Schall verursachte optische Muster Klangbilder. So dachte er offensichtlich nicht daran die von seinem Phonoautografen im wahrsten Sinn des Wortes aufgezeichnete Klänge auch wieder als Schall hörbar zu machen. Das gelang 1878 mit dem von Thomas Alva Edison patentierten Phonografen.

Vom Papier zurück in die Luft
Giovannonis Forscherteam fand die Klang- bzw. Schallbilder von Scott de Martinville in den Archiven des Pariser Patentamts und der Französischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Was noch vor wenigen Jahren mit den Mitteln der analogen Tontechnik unmöglich war, gelang ihnen nun mit Hilfe digitaler Technik: Sie scannten die alten Schallbilder, die von Carl Haber und Earl Cornell vom Berkeley National Laboratory in Kalifornien zurück in Schall verwandelt werden konnten. Dies ermöglichte ihnen eine Software, die sie vor einigen Jahren für die Schallplattensammlung der US-Kongressbibliothek entwickelt hatten, bei der eine Art virtuelle, digitale Grammofonnadel die von Scott de Martinville aufgezeichneten Muster abtastete.

Probleme bereitete den Forschern die Abspielgeschwindigkeit, denn Scott de Martinville hatte seine Aufzeichnungswalze mit der Hand gedreht. So leierte das Aufzeichnungstempo heftig. Doch dieser störende Effekt konnte in zahlreichen Einzelschritten ausgeglichen werden. Und damit gelang es ihnen die Schallaufzeichnung aus dem Jahr 1860 hörbar zu machen: Eine fürchterlich verrauschte Aufnahme, in der sie das französische Kinderlied "Au Clair de la Lune" entdeckten.

Die Restaurierung der Restaurierung
Ich habe mir nun den Ausschnitt dieser Aufnahme als mp3-Datei heruntergeladen und mit Hilfe der Adobe-Software AUDITION 3 weitere Restaurierungsschritte vorgenommen.

In AUDITION 3 wie auch schon in Vorgängerversionen dieser Software lassen sich Störgeräusche heraus rechnen. Dabei können die Störgeräusche alles Mögliche sein: Verkehrslärm einer nahegelegenen Straße, das Ticken eines Weckers, das Rascheln mit Bonbon-Papier und ganz einfach Rauschen jeder Art.

Digital erzeugtes Spektralbild (Adobe AUDITION 3) der mp3, die Giovannoni und sein Team am Freitag im kalifornischen Palo Alto während einer Konferenz vorstellten. Bei der mp3 handelt es sich um die hörbar gemachte Version der Schallaufzeichnung von Edouard-Léon Scott de Martinville aus dem Jahr 1860. Deutlich zu sehen ist hier in diesem Spektralbild, wie der Klang, eine menschliche Stimme Gelb dargestellt vom Rauschen Rot vollkommen überlagert wird.

Hörbeispiel:

Die von Giovannoni und seinem Team vorgestellte Audio-Datei.

In der Wellenformanzeige derselben Audiodatei sind klangliche Lücken der menschlichen Stimme zu sehen, die vom Störgeräusch gefüllt sind. Ich entschied mich, den Anfang der Aufzeichnung, in der die menschliche Stimme noch nicht einsetzt, als Profil zur Erfassung des Störgeräusches zu markieren, hier der weiße Bereich.

Nachdem Adobe AUDITION 3 das Störgeräusch anhand meiner Markierung ermittelt hatte, genügten Klicks auf Gesamte Datei auswählen und auf OK, um das Störgeräusch vollständig heraus rechnen zu lassen.

Und das Ergebnis kann sich nicht nur sehen lassen: Die von den Störgeräuschen bereinigte Datei im Spektralbild.

Hörbeispiel:

Die von mir bearbeitete Audio-Datei.

Adobe AUDITION 3 ist, wie ich hörte, nicht die einzige Software, mit der solche verblüffenden Störgeräuschbeseitigungen möglich sind. Diese Möglichkeit ist auch nicht unbedingt das Gelbe vom Ei, kann aber hervorragend als Grundlage für weitere Restaurierungsschritte dienen; richtig bedient wie sich wohl von selbst versteht.

In der von mir mittels Adobe AUDITION 3 weiter restaurierten Aufzeichnung von Edouard-Léon Scott de Martinville aus dem Jahr 1860 ist nun auch die Klangfarbe der Stimme zu hören; wahrscheinlich die Stimme einer jungen Frau oder eines Kindes. Die Person sang das Lied "Au Clair de la Lune" nicht nur nur, sondern sie gurgelte es möglicherweise. Das Gurgeln wird, wie ich vermute, keine tontechnische Verzerrung sein, bedingt durch die Kurbelei an der Papierwalze, was aber durchaus auch möglich sein könnte.

Edouard-Léon Scott de Martinville wollte deutliche Muster des Schalls auf dem Papier erzeugen. Da lag es nahe, eine Person singend gurgeln zu lassen, eben weil das Gurgeln ein deutlicheres Muster ergibt als irgendwelche gesungenen Worte. Auch das abgebrochene Quieken am Ende der Aufnahme, was ich als einsetzendes Lachen der Person deute, weist in diese Richtung. Es muss für Scott de Martinville und seine Sängerin eine lustige Situation gewesen sein: Sie singend gurgelnd und er emsig kurbelnd an seinem Phonoautographen, ein obskur anmutendes Gerät aus einem Trichter, einer Membrane und Schweineborsten sowie eine Papierwalze. Da blieb gewiss kein Auge trocken...

Leuchtende Augen aber haben heutzutage wahrscheinlich Geheimdienste, die mit Audio-Softwares dieser Art arbeiten. Längst sind die Zeiten nämlich vorbei, in der versucht wurde mit Hilfe umfangreicher analoger Hardware mit Hunderten von Drehreglern die Worte belauschter Personen deutlich herauszufiltern.

Kill the messenger: Gary Webb (1955-2004 †)

softlabhennef — 2007-12-10T17:51:00Z

World Content News - Heute jährt sich zum dritten Mal der Todestag von Gary Webb. Gary war ein investigativer Journalist und Pulitzer-Preisträger, der mit zahlreichen Dokumenten und Zeugenaussagen belegte, wie tief die CIA in den Kokainschmuggel verstrickt war. Am 10. Dezember 2004 wurde Gary Webb mit zwei Kopfschüssen in seinem Haus in Sacramento tot aufgefunden. Noch vor dem Ende der offiziellen Untersuchung wurde sein Tod als Selbstmord dargestellt. Er wurde nur 49 Jahre alt.

Kill the Messenger: Remember Gary Webb

Obwohl anscheinend fest steht, dass Gary unter Depressionen litt, glauben viele bis heute nicht, dass er Selbstmord begangen hat. Zu lang ist die Liste der mysteriösen Todesfälle, die in Skandalen im Umfeld der Geheimdienste geschehen sind.

Gary Webb war einer der wenigen unerschrockenen und unbeugsamen Journalisten, der die Wahrheit ans Tageslicht bringen wollte - dafür wurde er am Schluß von den etablierten Medien geschaßt.

Mögen nun andere künftig der CIA ins schmutzige Handwerk pfuschen - hier noch eine kleine Prinzenrolle für alle Ungläubigen: In der Iran-Contra-Affäre fehlen bis heute wichtige Kapitel, die noch der Aufklärung bedürfen und bis in die Gegenwart reichen (Prinz Löwenherz, 1 + 2). In diesem Sinne...

Dark Alliance:
Artikelserie von Gary Webb in den San Jose Mercury News
Gary Webb-Archiv von Sacramento News & Review

Reports:
Journalist Gary Webb durch Kopfschussverletzung gestorben
(oraclesyndicate.twoday.net, 13.12.2004)
Gary Webb Is Dead (The Nation, 13.12.2004)
Gary Webb Died of Two Gunshot Wounds to the Head
(blog.democrats.com, 17.12.2004)

Nachrufe:
Nachruf von Robert Parry
"SAYING GOODBYE TO A GIANT", Michael C. Ruppert
Kill the Messenger, Nick Schou

Dieser Artikel erschien bei World Content News

Was schert es den Mond....

sfux — 2007-08-23T07:00:00Z

Karl Weiss - Brasilien hat begonnen, den 100. Geburtstag von Oscar Niemeyer zu feiern. Am 4. August wurde hier in Belo Horizonte im Kultur-Palast die offizielle Ausstellung zu diesem Ereignis eröffnet. Die Hauptstadt von Minas Gerais kam zu dieser Ehre, weil hier die ersten bedeutenden Bauten erstellt worden waren, die der Architekt von Weltruf entworfen hatte und weil hier sein wohl bedeutendstes Werk steht, die kleine Sankt-Franziskus-Kirche am Ufer des Pampulha-Sees.

Andere kulturelle Ereignisse sind bereits in Rio de Janeiro und in São Paulo geplant. Auch wenn der eigentliche Geburtstag erst am 15. Dezember sein wird: Die Feierlichkeiten haben begonnen. Wird das Geburtstagskind interviewt, dann spricht das Genie Niemeyer nicht von sich. Er spricht von Bush, der die Welt in eine gefährliche Kriegssituation gebracht hat und wie wichtig jetzt die sozialistische Revolution ist.

Das Niemeyer-Bad in Potsdam wird dagegen nicht gebaut ein Verlust für Deutschland, aber sicherlich nicht für den Brasilianer Oscar Niemeyer, den wohl berühmtesten Architekten des 20. Jahrhunderts (und wie es scheint, auch des Beginns des 21.), der weiterhin 6 Tage in der Woche arbeitet und letztes Jahr wieder geheiratet hat.

Das Bad wäre neben dem Interbau-Hochhaus in Berlin von 1957 das zweite Werk von Niemeyer in Deutschland gewesen, von wo ja seine Vorfahren stammten. Es wäre sicherlich ein Anziehungspunkt geworden, aber was will man machen.
Oscar Niemeyer ist es gewohnt, von Politikern und anderen, deren Ideologie und Religion der Antikommunismus ist, angefeindet zu werden, denn er ist Kommunist und verteidigt bis heute vehement seine Überzeugungen.

Da sind der CDU-Wirtschaftsminister von Brandenburg, mit Namen Junghans und ein dubioser FDP-Politiker mit Namen Lanfermann nicht die einzigen. Bezeichnend, wenn ausgerechnet ein Politiker der unsäglichen FDP von Grössenwahn bei Architektur spricht, einer Partei, die mitverantwortlich war für die Monumentalbauten des Bundesumzugs nach Berlin unter Kohl .

Werden doch Architekturstudenten aus den verschiedensten Ländern eigens nach Berlin geschickt, um sich ein Beispiel anzusehen, wie Architektur nicht sein darf, die sogenannte Bundesfallera-Architektur, ausdruckslos, einfallslos, ungewollt monumentalistisch, eklektisch, ohne Bezug zum Ort und beziehungslos nebeneinandergestellt.

Die Bauten von Niemeyer dagegen sind ebenfalls Wallfahrtsorte von Architektur-Studenten, aber deshalb, weil man von jedem von ihnen lernen kann, was wirklich gute Architektur ist. Niemeyer gilt als der Meister der Leichtigkeit, was naturgemäss bei Bauten nicht einfach ist.

Die Anfeindungen gegen Niemeyer begannen bereits im Jahr 1940, als die Pläne für die Sankt-Franziskus-Kirche in Belo Horizonte in Brasilien fertig waren. Die katholische Kirche tönte, sie wolle keine Kirche von einem Kommunisten und antikommunistische Politiker erklärten den Entwurf für hässlich.

Juscelino Kubitschek, der damals Bürgermeister von Belo Horizonte war, der später der Präsident Brasiliens mit dem grössten Weitblick werden und den Bau Brasilias entscheiden sollte, erkannte die Einmaligkeit des Niemeyer-Entwurfs und setzte den Bau der Kirche durch. Wer heute Architektur studiert und seinen Beruf ernst nimmt, von dem wird erwartet, dass er zumindest einmal hierher nach Belo Horizonte kommt und das Werk im Original sieht, das heute nicht einfach nur als exzellente Architektur, sondern als Kunstwerk angesehen wird.

Die ganze Rückwand der Kirche ist in blauen Fliesen des brasilianischen Künstlers Portinari ausgeführt, das Leben des Heiligen zeigend. Die vier Bögen der Kirche lehnen sich einerseits an die Wellen des Wassers an, denn Franziskus sprach ja unter anderen zu den Fischen. Anderseits sind diese Bögen aber auch eine Nachahmung der Bergkette, an der Belo Horizonte liegt und die der Stadt den Namen "schöner Horizont" gegeben hat.

Nach der Fertigstellung weigerte sich die katholische Kirche für über 10 Jahre, das Kirchlein anzunehmen und zu weihen. Erst als sie merkten, wie berühmt die kleine Kirche schon war, fand sich endlich ein Bischof, der die Kirche weihte.

Ähnliches erlebte Niemeyer in vielen Ländern. Das UN-Gebäude in New York z.B. das auf einem Entwurf von ihm beruht, durfte ihm nicht offiziell zugeschrieben werden, denn man begann gerade den kalten Krieg und konnte unmöglich einen Kommunisten als Architekten des Gebäudes nennen.

Die wohl treffendste Ehrung hat ihm seine Heimatstadt Rio de Janeiro zukommen lassen: Die Strasse in der Stadt am steilen Felsenufer, welche die Strände São Conrado und Leblon verbindet, wurde nach ihm 'Avenida Niemeyer' benannt, einer der landschaftlich schönsten Punkte der Erde.

Der vorletzte dieser zahlreichen Fälle von antikommunistischer Hysterie geschah in seiner Heimatstadt. Niemeyer, dessen Büro im Obergeschoss eines Gebäudes an der weltberühmten Copacabana liegt, hatte als Geschenk an 'seine Stadt' am nördlichen Teil der Copacabana, genannt Leme, eine Anzahl von Skulpturen aufstellen lassen, die auch gut von der Bevölkerung angenommen wurden.

Dann allerdings kam ein Bürgermeister in Rio de Janeiro ans Ruder, dessen Religion Antikommunismus heisst, von der Partei mit dem damaligen Namen PFL (Parteien wechseln in Brasilien den Namen wie unsereiner die Unterhosen), einer Partei, die mit der Militärdiktatur im Bett gelegen hatte. Er ordnete die Entfernung der Niemeyer-Skulpturen an. Sie hätten keine Genehmigung.

Diese Art von Politikern hat immer heuchlerische Ausreden, so wie auch jetzt wieder in Potsdam. Angeblich sei die Förderfähigkeit nicht gegeben. Wenn das so wäre, hätte man das schon vor vier Jahren feststellen können, als noch kein Geld ausgegeben worden war. Also ein vorgeschobenes Argument.

Warum nur gibt es unter unseren heissgeliebten Politikern nicht einen einzigen, der Mut hat, zu seiner Ideologie zu stehen? Ich habe die Macht, also wird unter meiner Ägide kein Bad verwirklicht, das von einem Kommunisten entworfen würde. Das wäre ehrlich gewesen. Aber ehrlich, wer erwartet schon Ehrlichkeit von unsere Politikern?

Was als moderne Architektur bezeichnet wird, also jene im 20. Jahrhundert, die nicht einfach irgendetwas Älteres nachahmt, begann mit dem Bauhaus eines Mies van der Rohe und anderer in den Zwanziger Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts. Es handelte sich um einen Gegenentwurf zu jenem verschnörkelten Stil vom Anfang des Jahrhunderts, der auf deutsch als Jugendstil bezeichnte wird, der aber nichts mit Jugend zu tun hatte, sondern der Versuch war, mit Pflanzenformen der Architektur ein weicheres, ein menschlicheres Antlitz zu geben.

Die Bauhaus-Architektur, so sehr sie Ausdruck des neuen Zeitgeistes wurde, ist aber auch für die grössten architektonischen Sünden des 20. Jahrhunderts verantwortlich, denn sie wurde in ihrer Baukastenform und in ihrer Schnörkellosigkeit von Hunderten von Architekten nachgeahmt. Die einfallslosen Blöcke, die allenthalben wie Bauklötze in der (Stadt-)Landschaft stehen, sind eine der Folgen davon.

Demgegenüber verwenden die modernen Architekten wie Niemeyer und der mit ihm in vieler Hinsicht vergleichbare Franzose Le Corbusier (mit dem er von 1935 bis 1953 zusammenarbeitete) runde und abgerundete und andere ungewöhnliche Formen. Mit der Erfindung des Stahlbetons in den dreissiger Jahren war die Möglichkeit gegeben, runde Formen zu schaffen und grosse Überhänge und ähnliches, was die Möglichkeiten der Architekten immens erweiterte.

Trotzdem klammert sich bis heute die Mehrheit der Architekten an Bauklotz-Formen. Dagegen wurde Niemeyers Hauptwerk Brasilia von der UNESCO zum Weltkulturerbe erklärt, eine Ehrung, die kaum ein anderer lebender Architekt vorweisen kann.

Nun wird also Deutschland kein neues Niemeyer-Werk haben, aber was schert es den Mond, wenn die Hunde ihn anbellen.

Beeindruckend an Niemeyer auch: Er ist immer noch in voller Aktivität. Hier in Belo Horizonte, wo seine Karriere begann, ist gerade das neue Zentrum der Landesregierung in Bau, das von ihm entworfen wurde.
Die deutschen Manager, die bereits Menschen ab 50 zum alten Eisen werfen, dürften rot werden, wenn nur sein Name erwähnt wird. Sie haben sich diesen roten Kopf redlich verdient.

Dieser Artikel erschien bei Karl Weiss

Der Kampf der Kulturen, Teil 2

sfux — 2007-05-25T06:20:00Z

Karl Weiss - In diesem Teil von Kampf der Kulturen wird nun untersucht, wie es denn nun mit der Gefährdung des Westens aussieht. Stehen wir wirklich kurz vor der Übernahme der Regierungen in Europa und den USA durch die Muslims?

Im ersten Teil von Kampf der Kulturenhatten wir uns erst einmal klar gemacht, dass es sich um einen Krieg der Religionen handelt, der da gepredigt wird, nicht um einen der Kulturen. Weiterhin wurde uns klar, wie der Kern der jüdisch-christlichen Werte aussieht, die wir angeblich gegen den Ansturm des Islam verteidigen müssen. Beim genaueren Hinsehen stellte sich heraus, sie stellen sich eigentlich nicht so verteidigenswert dar.

In diesem Teil also die Bedrohung. Es wird von interessierten Kreisen so dargestellt, dass wir hier in Europa unter einer Einkreisung durch den Islam leben, der demnächst die Regierungen in Europa und dann wohl auch in den USA übernehmen wird.

Sieht man sich die Länder an, die wesentlich vom Islam geprägt sind, wie z.B. Marokko, Algerien, Ägypten bzw. sogar den Islam als Staatsreligion haben, wie etwa Pakistan, der Iran, aber auch Saudi-Arabien, ebenso wie jene Länder, die zwar eine mehrheitlich islamische Bevölkerung haben, aber eine relativ feste Trennung von Staat und Religion aufweisen, wie etwa Syrien, der Libanon, die Türkei oder Indonesien (früher auch der Irak man sehe sich an, was der Überfall der USA mit seinen Verbündeten angerichtet hat), so kommen wir schnell zu dem Schluss: Selbst wenn sich diese Länder alle zusammenschließen würden (wofür nicht die geringsten Anzeichen bestehen) und einen Angriff auf Europa oder die USA oder gar auf beide unternehmen würden, bestünde nicht die geringste Gefahr. Sie sind weder militärisch noch von den Kräften her, die wirtschaftlich einen solchen Krieg unterstützen und unterhalten müssten, in der Lage, auch nur eine Bedrohung darzustellen für die modernen militärisch hochgerüsteten Staaten Europas oder gar für die die USA.

Würden diese Länder tatsächlich einen solchen Angriff wagen, wofür nichts spricht, so wäre ein solcher Krieg innerhalb von Wochen beendet und die islamischen Länder hätten eine vollständige Niederlage erlitten. Dies ist so offensichtlich, dass die Apologeten des Krieges der Kulturen dies auch gar nicht behaupten. Was also sagen sie?

Sehen wir uns zu diesem Zweck einen Artikel an, der in der Welt im Internet am 17. April 2007 unter dem Titel Die dritte Angriffswelle auf Europa rollt erschien, von einem US-Ex-Professor, der sich als Experte in Islamfragen vorstellt, einem gewissen Bernard Lewis. Man könnte natürlich auch einen Text von Henryk Broder verwenden, aber damit würde man ihm schon zu viel Ehre erweisen.

Lewis schreibt dort, wie sich diese Leute die Gefährdung durch den Islam vorstellen: Die dritte Angriffswelle nimmt eine andere Form an: Terror und Einwanderung.

Vorher hatte er die beiden ersten Angriffswellen vorgestellt: Die erste war jene, die im Mittelalter von Arabern und Mauren geführt wurde und sogar für kurze Zeit zu einer Besetzung des heutigen Spaniens führte. Die zweite sei jene Attacken gewesen, die durch die Türken in der Zeit der Renaissance und kurz danach vorgebracht wurden. 1453 hatte man Konstantinopel erobert, das ab dann zu Istanbul wurde. In der Folge wurde für eine ganze Zeit der Balkan oder jedenfalls bedeutende Teile davon erobert und gehalten. 1528 und 1683 konnte man bis Wien vorstoßen und die Stadt belagern, wurde aber jeweils zurückgeschlagen.

Nun, kommt also die dritte Angriffswelle und sie wird durch Terror und Einwanderung vorgetragen. Der Artikel in der Welt online kommt zusammen mit einem Bild ohne erkennbaren Zusammenhang mit dem Artikel, wo allerdings die Worte Kanak Attack zu sehen sind. Man merkt die Absicht an der Auswahl des Bildes. So führt man faschistische Schlagworte in einen Welt-Artikel ein, ohne dies explizit getan zu haben.

Lesen wir einmal, wie sich Lewis das etwa vorstellt:

In Europa haben die Muslime auch die Freiheit der Meinungsäußerung und der Bildung, die ihnen zu Hause fehlt. (...) Dies ist ein großer Anreiz für Terroristen, die emigrieren. Terroristen haben in Europa und bis zu einem gewissen Grad in Amerika eine viel größere Freiheit, Anschläge zu planen und auszuführen als in den meisten islamischen Ländern.

(...)

In Europa wie in den Vereinigten Staaten ist eine häufige Antwort Multikulturalismus und Political Correctness gewesen. In der islamischen Welt erlegt man sich keine solchen Zurückhaltungen auf. Man ist dort sehr identitätsbewusst. Muslime wissen, wer und was sie sind und was sie wollen eine Eigenschaft, die wir großteils verloren zu haben scheinen. Den radikalen Muslimen ist es gelungen, in Europa Verbündete zu finden. Nach links üben sie eine Anziehungskraft auf die antiamerikanischen Segmente in Europa aus, für die sie sozusagen die Sowjetunion ersetzt haben. Nach rechts üben sie eine Anziehungskraft auf die antijüdischen Segmente in Europa aus, für die sie die Achsenmächte ersetzen. Es ist ihnen gelungen, unter beiden Flaggen beachtliche Unterstützung zu gewinnen. Für einige Leute in Europa ist der Hass offenbar stärker als ihre Loyalität.

(...)

Einige Türken in Deutschland machen davon [einem angeblichen Schuldgefühl wegen des Holocausts] sehr geschickt Gebrauch, um mit deutschen Schuldgefühlen herumzuspielen, damit effektive Maßnahmen zum Schutz der deutschen Identität verhindert werden die, wie andere in Europa, mehr und mehr gefährdet wird.

(...)

Ist die dritte Welle erfolgreich? Das ist gar nicht ausgeschlossen. Muslimische Einwanderer haben einige klare Vorteile. Sie haben Glut und Überzeugung, die in den meisten westlichen Ländern entweder schwach sind oder ganz fehlen. Sie sind überzeugt von der Gerechtigkeit ihrer Sache, während wir viel Zeit damit verbringen, uns selbst zu erniedrigen. Sie verfügen über Loyalität und Disziplin und was vielleicht am wichtigsten ist sie haben die Demografie auf ihrer Seite.

Interessant, was wir von diesem Mann aus den USA über Europa lernen, nicht wahr? Haben Sie Europa wiedererkannt? Wenn sie das nicht eindeutig mit einem Nein beantworten können, dann sind Sie auch schon Opfer der Kampf-der-Kulturen-Propaganda geworden.

Waren Anwerbekolonnen der damaligen Bundesregierung etwa Instrumente des extremistischen Islamismus?
Stellen wir uns einige einfache Fragen. Sind die Muslims in Europa wirklich hierher gekommen, um die Macht in Europa zu übernehmen? Oder weil sie Terroranschläge begehen wollen? Die Türken in Deutschland zum Beispiel. Wurden sie nicht in den 50er und 60er-Jahren mit Anwerbekolonnen aus der Türkei geholt? Waren diese Anwerbekolonnen der damaligen Bundesregierung etwa Instrumente des extremistischen Islamismus?

Sind wirklich in Europa (und den USA) weit mehr Terroranschläge islamistischer Extremisten verübt worden als in den Ländern des Norden Afrikas und des Nahen Ostens? Nach offizieller Version wurden drei bei uns ausgeübt, über 40 dort (in dieser Zählung sind die Anschläge in Israel und jene im Irak nicht mitgezählt).

Ist es wirklich so, dass es einen beständigen Antiamerikanismus in Europa gibt (also eine Ablehnung der Vereinigten Staaten als Land und als Volk, nicht der dortigen Regierung), der früher als Sympathie mit der Sowjetunion zum Ausdruck kam und heute als Sympathie mit extremistischen Muslims?

Ist es wirklich so, dass die Multikulti-Aktivitäten, also die Versuche, Immigranten zu integrieren, indem man die eigene Kultur öffnet, zur Unterstützung von extremistischen muslimischen Terroristen geführt haben?

Ist es wirklich so, dass die Ablehnung rassistischer Hetze (hier fälschlich und absichtlich mit dem unsinnigen Konzept der political correctness bezeichnet) zur Unterstützung von Terroristen führt?

Ist es wirklich so, dass Europa voll von antijüdischen Elementen ist (gemeint sind offenbar Faschisten), die früher die Achsenmächte (also das faschistische Deutschland und das faschistische Italien) unterstützt haben und heute die extremistischen Islamisten unterstützen? Sind die faschistischen Gruppierungen in Europa nicht sogar genau auf Gegenkurs, nämlich jenem, der die Ausweisung der Immigranten und speziell der Muslims fordert (in verdächtiger Nähe zur Position des Professors)?

Nutzen die Türken in Deutschland wirklich geschickt ein angebliches allgemeines Gefühl des Schuld wegen des Holocausts aus, um Vorteile für die Positionen des extremistischen Islamismus zu erlangen? Gibt es überhaupt einen erwähnenswerten extremistischen Islamismus unter den Türken in Deutschland?

Kennen Sie in ihrem Bekannten- und Familienkreis oder sonst in ihrer Umgebung auch nur einen einzigen, der Schuldgefühle wegen des Holocausts hat oder der viel Zeit damit verbringt, sich selbst zu erniedrigen?

Sind jene, die uns solche Schuldgefühle einreden wollen, wie die Antideutschen und Herr Broder, der Spiegel und die Springerpresse, nicht genau jene, welche die Positionen des Kampfes der Kulturen verbreiten, so wie Professor Lewis, der ja nicht umsonst im Springerblatt Welt übersetzt wird. Jene, die uns immer einreden wollen, wir dürften die Regierungen Israels und der USA wegen ihrer Schlächtereien nicht beschuldigen, denn wir hätten ja noch eine Schuld abzutragen und das sei Antisemitismus, wenn man die israelischen Terrorüberfälle anklagt?

Brauchen wirklich die extremistischen Islamisten nur weiterhin in so großer Zahl nach Europa zu emigrieren und viele Kinder kriegen, dann haben sie in absehbarer Zeit in Europa die zahlenmäßige Mehrheit (Demographie)? Sind wirklich alle oder fast alle Mohammedaner, die nach Europa kamen und kommen, extremistische Islamisten?

Gibt es wirklich eine stark steigende Zahl solcher Immigranten in letzter Zeit (die Immigration nach Europa ist heute bei etwa einen Zehntel der Zahlen in den 80er-Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts)? Ist es nicht so, dass bei einer Fortführung der heutigen Zahlen von Immigration und Geburtenüberschuss die Mohammedaner (angenommen, es seinen alle extremistische Islamisten) noch etwa 1000 Jahre bräuchten, um zu einer zahlenmäßigen Mehrheit zu kommen in Europa?

Man braucht nur diese Fragen zu stellen, um zu sehen, die Aussagen des Professors sind Unsinn.

Gleichzeitig konnten wir auch noch bemerken, diese Positionen des Kampfes der Kulturen stehen in ideologischer Nähe zum Faschismus, der uns ebenfalls einreden will, wir hätten Schuldkomplexe wegen des Holocausts und die Ausländer in Europa seien unser Untergang, so wie man uns damals einreden wollte, die Juden seien unser Untergang.

Es gibt keine Gefährdung durch islamische Einwanderung. All dies wird von interessierten Kreisen erfunden, um uns auf den Geschmack zu bringen, den Kriegskurs der US-Regierung, der israelischen Regierung und ihrer Vasallen in der NATO, einschließlich Frau Merkel, zu unterstützen.

Allerdings haben wir in diesem zweiten Teil noch nicht den eigentlichen Terrorismus islamistischer Extremisten untersucht. Das wird einem dritten Teil vorbehalten bleiben.

Letzter Marinesoldat aus dem ersten Weltkrieg beerdigt

sfux — 2007-04-04T18:56:00Z

Stephan Fuchs 105 Jahre alt wurde Lloyd Brown, der letzte lebende US-Marinesoldat, der im ersten Weltkrieg diente. Brown wurde am 7. Oktober 1901 geboren und mit 16 Jahren, 1918 in die Navy eingezogen.

Er wurde auf die USS New Hampshire eingeteilt. Der Baltimaore Sun erzählte der Veteran 2005, er sei in die Navy gegangen, weil die Girls auf Uniformen stünden und weil es die Jungs in der Navy auch in die Nachrichtenschlagzeilen brachten: "Wir waren wer!"

"The last living US sailor to have served in World War 1 was buried Wednesday after dying at 105", sagt die US-Marine. Weitere drei Weltkriegsveteranen der US- Armee und ein kanadischer Veteran sind noch am Leben. Im ersten Weltkrieg kamen zwischen 1914 und 1918 rund 53.000 US Soldaten ums Leben, 204'000 wurden verwundet.

Rückkehr des "Übermenschen"?

onlineredaktion — 2007-02-11T18:48:00Z

onlineredaktion Er ist wieder da, der Duce, der Übermensch Benito Mussolini, von den Toten auferstanden zumindest in einem kürzlich aufgetauchten Tagebuch, dessen Echtheit angezweifelt wird.

Auffällig bei Fälschungen sind häufig die mitgelieferten Geschichten, die überaus plausibel konstruiert sind und sich zumeist auf menschliche Intimitäten beziehen. Schließlich soll eine Fälschung nicht gleich als solche entlarvt werden. So gab es zu den Hitler-Tagebüchern, die sich später als Fälschungen herausstellten, umfangreiche und abenteuerliche Berichte, die von der deutschen Illustrierten STERN groß publiziert wurden. Zum Schluss gab es nur Verlierer und einen lustigen Spielfilm über das kriminelle Handwerk des Fälschers der Hitler-Tagebücher.

Nun schreibt die italienische Tageszeitung La Repubblica in ihrer heutigen Ausgabe, der römische Senator Marcello Dell'Utri habe das Tagebuch des faschistischen italienischen Diktators Benito Mussolini (1883-1945) vom Sohn eines Widerstandskämpfers erhalten, der bei der Festnahme Mussolinis dabei gewesen sei. In diesem Tagebuch soll Mussolini Vorbehalte gegen den von den Deutschen begonnenen Zweiten Weltkrieg geäußert haben, wie die Zeitung schreibt. Sie betont jedoch, es in der Vergangenheit mehrfach solche Funde gegeben, die sich alle als nicht herausgestellt hätten.

Es sei nicht bewiesen, dass es sich dieses Mal um das echte Tagebuch des Diktators handelt, schreibt La Repubblica. Und wie einst bei den Hitler-Tagebüchern meldeten sich bereits einige mehr oder weniger selbst ernannte Experten zu Wort, die von der Echtheit überzeugt sind.

War es nicht einst Mussolini selbst, der gesagt hatte, Kerle seines Schlages schrieben keine Tagebücher, weil dies weibisch sei, sie hätten ihre eigenen, persönlichen Geschichtsschreiber?

Jacques Chirac: "Der Planet ist krank"

onlineredaktion — 2007-02-06T19:00:00Z

Rede von Staatspräsident Jacques Chirac zur Eröffnung der Konferenz für eine globale Umweltordnung Bürger der Erde.

Paris, 2. Februar 2007

Jacques Chirac - Der Planet ist krank: Die Vielzahl von extremen Reaktionen, Orkane, Überschwemmungen, Dürren, sind die besten Symptome dafür, wenn ich so sagen darf. Die Natur ist krank: Die Artenvielfalt nimmt in einem alarmierenden Tempo ab. Wir haben den Beweis dafür, dass menschliches Tun diese Störungen mit sich bringt. Der Tag rückt näher, an dem die klimatischen Verwerfungen außer Kontrolle geraten: Wir stehen in der Tat an der historischen Schwelle des Unumkehrbaren.

Wie Professor Yves Coppens aufgezeigt hat, haben Klimaveränderungen dazu geführt, dass sich die Menschheit in ihrer afrikanischen Wiege entwickeln konnte. Heute könnte die rasante Beschleunigung des Klimawandels unser Verschwinden bewirken. Kulturen sind sterblich, und zwar nicht immer als Folge von Kriegen. Die übermäßige Ausbeutung von Rohstoffen hat zum Untergang der Mayas, der Wikinger in Grönland, der Polynesier auf den Pitcairn-Inseln und der Anasazi-Indianer geführt. Jede dieser hochentwickelten Kulturen lebte bis zum Schluss in Sorglosigkeit und Verblendung. Jede einzelne steht für die Verletzlichkeit des Menschen und für das, was das Schicksal der Menschheit sein könnte.

Seit Jahren kämpft Frankreich in den europäischen Institutionen, in der G8 und in allen internationalen Gremien um Aufmerksamkeit für die Dringlichkeit des Umweltschutzes. Von Rio über Kyoto bis Johannesburg ist die Staatengemeinschaft zwar aktiv geworden und hat sich mit Instrumenten, Konventionen und Institutionen ausgestattet. Aber wir müssen wesentlich schneller dafür sorgen, ein entsprechendes Bewusstsein zu entwickeln, und wir müssen entschieden mehr tun. Deshalb wollte ich diese Konferenz von Paris für eine ökologische Weltordnung. Deshalb freue ich mich ganz besonders, dass Sie heute hier sind, und ich danke Ihnen von ganzem Herzen für Ihr Kommen.

Wir sind, und zwar zu Recht, stolz auf unsere Intelligenz und unsere technischen Meisterleistungen. Doch haben wir in wenigen Jahrhunderten Ressourcen verbrannt, die hunderte Millionen Jahre zu ihrer Entstehung brauchten. Wir zerstören Ökosysteme, die einer für immer verlorenen biologischen Vielfalt Schutz bot und machen damit zunichte, was für unsere Zukunft unverzichtbar ist. Wir wissen das alles. Warum ergreifen wir dann nicht die zwingend notwendigen Maßnahmen? Weil wir in einem schuldhaften Egoismus verfangen sind und uns weigern, die entsprechenden Konsequenzen zu ziehen. Weil wir nicht in der Lage sind, uns von überkommenden Denkweisen und einer aus dem 19. Jahrhundert übernommenen Wirtschaftsstruktur freizumachen. Weil unsere internationale politische Ordnung für die lebenswichtige Herausforderung des 21. Jahrhunderts, nämlich die ökologische Herausforderung, ungeeignet ist.

Angesichts der Dringlichkeit ist die Zeit der Halbheiten vorbei. Jetzt ist es Zeit für eine Revolution im eigentlichen Sinn des Wortes. Die Revolution des Bewusstseins. Die Revolution der Wirtschaft. Die Revolution des politischen Handelns.

Die Revolution des Bewusstseins. Der Mensch darf sich nicht mehr nur als Herr und Besitzer der Natur verstehen. Ein solches Verständnis, das in früheren Zeiten notwendig war, um der Idee des Fortschritts zum Sieg zu verhelfen, führt uns heute an den Rand des Abgrunds. Wir müssen ein neues Stadium des menschlichen Bewusstseins erlangen: Unsere Intelligenz muss dem Schutz des Planeten gelten. Wir müssen lernen, ein harmonisches Verhältnis zwischen Mensch und Natur zu pflegen. Ein neues und notwendiges Verhältnis.

Unsere Verantwortung für die Erde ist nicht zu trennen von unserer Verantwortung für die Menschheit: Die ökologischen Erfordernisse eröffnen ein neues Kapitel der Menschenrechte. Wir müssen ein neues Grundrecht bekräftigen und durchsetzen: Das Recht auf eine gesunde und geschützte Umwelt. Das ist es, was unter humanistischer Ökologie zu verstehen ist.

Die Revolution der Kultur. Sie erfolgt über die Umwelterziehung aller, insbesondere der Jüngsten. Damit wir alle Bürger der Erde werden, sollten wir in den Vereinten Nationen eine allgemeine Erklärung der Umweltrechte und -pflichten verabschieden: Sie wäre Ausdruck einer gemeinsamen Umweltethik, die sich sowohl auf das öffentliche Handeln als auch auf unser individuelles Tun auswirken würde. Frankreich hat als erstes Land seiner Verfassung eine Umweltcharta hinzugefügt. Ich wünsche mir, dass diese Initiative die UNO anregt und dass jeder Staat den Schutz der Umwelt in seine Grundlagentexte aufnimmt.

Die Revolution des Bewusstseins wird eine Revolution der Wirtschaft möglich machen. In einer Welt, in der mehr als 800 Millionen Männer, Frauen und Kinder Hunger leiden, wird die Antwort auf die ökologische Herausforderung nicht Nullwachstum heißen können. Das Streben der Völker nach einem besseren Leben ist legitim: Es muss unsere Politik leiten. Aber der Planet wird nicht lange ein Wachstum, wie wir es betreiben, aushalten. Um aus diesem Dilemma herauszukommen, müssen wir ein anderes Wachstum erfinden.

Eine neue industrielle Revolution liegt vor uns, nämlich die der nachhaltigen Entwicklung. Sie erfolgt über den radikalen Wandel unserer Produktionsmethoden und unseres Konsumverhaltens: Bewahrung der natürlichen Ressourcen und des natürlichen Umfelds; Einschränkung der Umweltverschmutzung; Einbeziehung der Umweltqualität in die gesamtwirtschaftliche Wertschöpfung; angemessene Bewertung der natürlichen Rohstoffe. Die Unternehmen müssen ihre Verantwortung für die Umwelt übernehmen. Und wir müssen technologische Durchbrüche fördern: Wir müssen Energien ohne Treibhausgas entwickeln; für Heizung und Strom die Sonnenenergie nutzen; Wärme aus Bioenergie statt aus Öl gewinnen; mehr Strom sparen durch Gebäude, die keine Energie verbrauchen, sondern erzeugen; wir brauchen saubere Autos und Lastwagen; und wir müssen bei der CO2-Abscheidung und -Lagerung für die Stromerzeugung sowie für die Zement- und Stahlproduktion Fortschritte machen.

Diese neue Ära verspricht ein besseres Leben für alle. Die innovativsten und umweltgerechtesten Volkswirtschaften werden morgen die stärksten Volkswirtschaften sein. Dafür brauchen wir jedoch klare und loyale Wettbewerbsregeln. Entweder beschäftigt sich die Staatengemeinschaft damit, oder wir erleben den ökologischen Krieg.

Die Anstrengungen müssen gerecht verteilt sein. Die Länder des Nordens haben als erste ihren Reichtum auf der massiven Ausbeutung der natürlichen Rohstoffe aufgebaut. Sie müssen ihre Verantwortung übernehmen und in einem abgestimmten Rahmen umweltgerechte Produktionsregeln und Normen einhalten. Darum geht es bei den Verhandlungen über die Bekämpfung des Klimawandels im Rahmen der UN-Konvention zur Zukunft des Kyoto-Protokolls, die vor 2009 Ergebnisse bringen sollen. Mit der Verpflichtung, auf Initiative Frankreichs und Großbritanniens und mit Unterstützung der Kommission, die Treibhausgasemissionen bis 2050 auf ein Viertel zu senken, weist die Europäische Union den Weg.

Die Schwellenländer haben viele Vorteile. Sie verfügen über ein reiches natürliches Erbe. Sie müssen dazu angehalten werden, dieses Erbe zu schützen und die neue Verantwortung zu übernehmen, die ihnen zufällt. Das ist die andere Herausforderung für die Nach-Kyoto-Zeit. Die Verfügbarkeit der grünen Technologien macht es ihnen möglich, schneller als die alten Industrienationen zur Wirtschaft der nachhaltigen Entwicklung zu gelangen.

Was die armen Länder betrifft, so müssen wir ihnen helfen, sich zu entwickeln und dabei die Umwelt zu achten und sich vor den katastrophalen Folgen der Erderwärmung zu schützen, an denen sie nicht ganz unschuldig sind. Ich denke an die Inseln, die durch den Anstieg des Meeresspiegels gefährdet sind, oder auch an Länder wie in der Sahelzone, die von Dürren dramatischen Ausmaßes betroffen sein werden.

Wir müssen die Bekämpfung der Armut und die ökologische Revolution miteinander zu verbinden wissen und dazu neu über den Begriff des gemeinsamen Erbes der Menschheit nachdenken. Über innovative Finanzierungen, wie die internationale CO2-Steuer, könnten Entwicklungsländer, die dabei mitmachen, sich die Mittel verschaffen, um die ökologischen Schätze, über die sie verfügen, wie Urwälder, zum Wohle aller zu bewahren und von vornherein auf saubere Technologien zu setzen. Der Erfolg des Solidaritätsbeitrags auf Flugtickets für die Bekämpfung der großen Pandemien gibt uns ein Beispiel, das weitergeführt werden muss und zeigt uns, was getan werden muss.

Die Revolution in den Köpfen bliebe aber fruchtlos und die wirtschaftliche Revolution würde behindert, wenn nicht gleichzeitig eine politische Revolution erfolgen würde. Sie ist auf dem Weg: Dank den Vereinen und Initiativen, dank der Mitwirkung der Bürger, dank der zunehmenden Mobilisierung der gewählten Vertreter wirkt sich das Umweltgebot zunehmend auf lokale und nationale Politikbereiche aus. Dieser Kampf wird jedoch auf globaler Ebene geführt: Die ökologische Krise kennt keine Grenzen. Dafür fehlt unserem Handeln allerdings noch zu häufig Kohärenz.

Wir müssen eine globale Umweltordnung entwickeln. Auch in diesem Bereich führt Einseitigkeit in die Sackgasse. So wie Multilateralismus die Voraussetzung für den Frieden ist, so ist er auch der Schlüssel für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung. Das UN-Umweltprogramm ist ein bemerkenswertes Programm, das ich an dieser Stelle würdigen möchte. Aber es hat nicht genügend Macht und institutionelles Gewicht. Unser Ziel muss sein, dieses Programm in eine vollwertige Organisation der Vereinten Nationen umzuwandeln. Diese UN-Umweltorganisation wird das Umweltgewissen der Welt sein. Sie wird eine unparteiische und wissenschaftliche Bewertung der Gefahren vornehmen. Ausgestattet mit einem politischen Mandat wird sie legitimiert sein, die gemeinsam getroffenen Entscheidungen umzusetzen. Sie wird unserem gemeinsamen Handeln mehr Kraft und mehr Kohärenz verleihen.

Mit unserer Konferenz wollen wir alle Bürger und alle Gesellschaftskreise mobilisieren und eine Gruppe von Pionierländern bilden, die bereit ist, dieses Projekt einer UN-Umweltorganisation zu unterstützen, damit wir die Länder überzeugen können, die noch zögern.

Sie alle, die Sie hier sind, Vertreter von Staaten und internationalen Organisationen, namhafte Wissenschaftler, Verantwortliche aus Nichtregierungsorganisationen, Unternehmer, engagierte Bürger, Sie sind die Speerspitze einer globalen Umweltbewegung. Sie werden durch Ihre Debatten und Ihre Arbeit zur Mobilisierung der internationalen Verantwortungsträger und der internationalen Öffentlichkeit beitragen, eine Mobilisierung, die wir mehr denn je dringend notwendig brauchen. Ihnen allen möchte ich meine Wertschätzung, meinen Respekt und vor allem meinen Dank aussprechen.

Vielen Dank.

Diese Rede wurde übersetzt und herausgegeben von der Französischen Botschaft in Berlin

Watergate-Organisator Howard Hunt gestorben

sfux — 2007-01-24T07:16:00Z

Miami - Einer der Organisatoren des Watergate-Einbruchs, Howard Hunt, ist am Dienstag im Alter von 88 Jahren gestorben. Der Skandal brachte 1974 US-Präsident Richard Nixon zu Fall. Hunt war Soldat während des Zweiten Weltkriegs, Mitarbeiter des US-Geheimdienstes CIA, Organisator eines Staatsstreichs in Guatemala und der gescheiterten Invasion in der Schweinebucht auf Kuba, aber auch Autor von mehr als 80 Büchern, bei denen es sich oft um Spionagegeschichten handelte.

Als Watergate-Einbrecher wollte Hunt sich nicht bezeichnen lassen. Er sei ein Watergate-Verschwörer gewesen, erklärte er. Noch während er beim CIA arbeitete, warb er vier der fünf Männer an, die schliesslich am 17. Juni 1972 in das Hauptquartier der demokratischen Partei im Watergate-Haus in Washington einbrachen. Bei einem von ihnen wurde Hunts Telefonnummer gefunden. Die fünf Männer, Hunt und ein weiterer Verschwörer, Gordon Liddy, wurden drei Monate später angeklagt. Hunt verbrachte 33 Monate im Gefängnis.

Die Ermittlungen zu dem Einbruch machten auch die Verwicklung des Weissen Hauses und von Nixon in den Fall deutlich, so dass der Kongress ein Amtsenthebungsverfahren einleitete, dem der Präsident mit seinem Rücktritt zuvor kam.

Sämtliche Artikel zu Watergate

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld Interviews with Mr. Bob Woodward / Part II

sfux — 2006-10-04T09:53:00Z

Interview continued on July 7, 2006

LT GEN RENUART: You know, Mr. Secretary, from the other side of the world those 29 things drove us crazy, because we spent thousands of brain bytes trying to make sure that as we went through that we answered all those "what if" questions. And some of those are a little later in the process, but certainly the vast majority of them got a considerable amount of effort put to them as we talked about early on.

MR. WOODWARD: Yes, yes.

LT GEN RENUART: What do you do about WMD? What do you do about the fall of Baghdad? What do you do about a fortress Baghdad? What do you do about these various contingencies that could come up?

And so some of the comments that are made by people who say nobody paid attention to them just, from my view, didn't -- that wasn't true.

MR. WOODWARD: Did the list actually come down to you, do you know, through General Franks?

Bob Woodward

LT GEN RENUART: I think General Franks actually got a copy of that list. I didn't see it. I got -- you know, Franks, he turned 29 questions into 53. I got a whole variety -- I say 53, but it was a substantially bigger number than 29, because as he read that, he began to think of, well, what about this thing? And so we go off scurrying trying to come up with ways to make sure we acknowledge those in the planning process.

And then the bulk of those topics came back into the NSC, where General Franks briefed specific issues on eight or 10 or 12 of them.

MR. WOODWARD: Right.

SEC. RUMSFELD: When you think of the amount of time we spent on fortress Baghdad.

MR. LUTI: He briefed that six different times.

MR. WOODWARD: I have that in the non-Bible --

SEC. RUMSFELD: I don't know how many meetings were called on that subject, but it was unbelievable.

MR. LUTI: Secretary Rice probably --

MR. WOODWARD: Really went into orbit about that, didn't she? -- to the extent

MR. LUTI : Well, she asked that question at least once or twice where we thought we had briefed it, and -- but -- so it was something

MR. WOODWARD: Kept coming back.

SEC. RUMSFELD: (Off mike) -- no plan. You all didn't have a plan; you hadn't thought through the plan --

MR. WOODWARD: Can -- are you willing -- could your new military assistant go through all 29 of those with me, so --

LT GEN RENUART: (Off mike.)

(Cross talk, laughter.)

LT GEN RENUART: So there is risk here.

(Laughter, cross talk.)

SEC. RUMSFELD: Did you see what was on the door when you came in?

MR. WOODWARD: No.

SEC. RUMSFELD: A reporter like you not that observant?

MR. WOODWARD: No, no, I would -- people get upset if you look at what's on their desk.

SEC. RUMSFELD: On the door, on the door.

MR. WOODWARD: Yeah, but it's private. (Laughter.)

So you won the squash game against --

LT GEN RENUART: It's perspective.

MR. WOODWARD: Oh, really?

SEC. RUMSFELD: (Off mike) -- debate if you can be a good enough squash partner to get the job. (Laughter.)

(Cross talk.)

SEC. RUMSFELD: What else? What else did you not talk about?

MR. WHITMAN : Well, the only thing I wanted to do was to take this little bit of a canard that's out there about WMD and how it's been played in retrospect about WMD and the comments the secretary made about, "we know where it is" and this thing has been dissected out there in ways that, I think, are very unfair and very inaccurate

MR. WOODWARD: I went through this with Larry DiRita, and I agree -- I mean -- (cross talk).

MR. WHITMAN: He always referred to suspect sites.

SEC. RUMSFELD: The intelligence community's sites that that they showed us is what I was referring to.

MR. WOODWARD: I understand. I went through that with Larry, and I mean, I don't even raise that.

I'm -- if I could get all 29 of these -- this is from "Plan of Attack," my last book, which I now call the non-Bible. It has a new subtitle.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I've not read it.

MR. WOODWARD: I understand. But it talks about your memo and the 29 things.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Oh, does it do it?

MR. WOODWARD: Yes, sir. And I only had some of them. See, this is why it's not biblical. It has some of them, and it has some quotes from them --

SEC. RUMSFELD: It starts out with me writing in my own handwriting, and doing it in a NSC meeting in front of everybody, saying, here are some things that we're worried about and we're thinking about, and you all want to think about these. And I must have listed, oh I dont know 10 or 15 or so -- and then I came back and dictated it and then refined it --

MR. WOODWARD: It grew to 29 at least. And you made sure it was part of your deliberations with the president.

SEC. RUMSFELD: You bet.

MR. WOODWARD: Did he say, when you went over this with him, now, do you have a plan to make sure each one of these 29 things doesn't happen?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Obviously. He obviously asked questions about all of them, and he deserved to know that we were worried about these things and that we were thinking about them, and that they are things that occupied us seriously in this department and we needed to brief the people responsible.

MR. WOODWARD: Did you feel you had a plan for each one, or some idea of how to cope with --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Sure.

MR. WOODWARD: -- because it's a great list, a great list -- including the possibility of Sunnis, Shi'ite, Kurds --

SEC. RUMSFELD: We thought of those things and talked about them and discussed them and had people considering them. And we had the your policy group [looking at Bill Luti] had to address a lot of it, the military had to address a lot of it. Some of the things that were more interesting to others than others, and some sparked like Fortress Baghdad was a nightmare for people in the White House Fortress Baghdad -- it was one a lot of people were very interested in.

MR. WOODWARD: And I think the Marines --

SEC. RUMSFELD: You can imagine how terrible it would have been.

MR. WOODWARD: The Marines were really worried about some sort of urban hunkering down, I think.

SEC. RUMSFELD: You bet. And the possibility of bridges getting blown --

MR. LUTI: Oil fields --

SEC. RUMSFELD: -- oil fields getting set off, and the terrible environmental nightmare you saw in Kuwait.

MR. WOODWARD: Last night I went back and looked at everything and I -- what I really appreciate you doing this again --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Did you tell your dear wife that I appreciated her high compliment?

MR. WOODWARD: Yes, I certainly did. No, you -- (laughter) -- well, and she said, if I may quote her back, she said, and "well, did you say because I know he's a hard hitter.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Did she really? (Laughs.)

MR. WOODWARD: Yes, she did. (Laughs.) And I said, I don't know --

SEC. RUMSFELD: I know he's a hard hitter.

MR. WOODWARD: (Laughs.)

This book, the new one, also non-biblical, is a narrative of scenes like the other books -- and I understand you don't have time to read them. And so it's kind of like a movie: this scene, this scene. A portrait emerges of the president as a wartime leader, which I'm trying to address as best I possibly can. And the real first question for you: Can you recall any important scene, interchanges, moments of decision, that show him doing it and leading like that? Because I went back and read your Truman Library speech earlier this year, and you told a great story about Truman when he met with Molotov.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Un hm

MR. WOODWARD: And he gave Molotov hell, and Molotov said, "I've never been talked to like that in my life," and Truman recalled.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Dont behave that way and you wont be

MR. WOODWARD: Exactly, carry out -- (laughter) -- carry out your agreements and you won't be talked -- (inaudible). You know that's -- and I got some, and I --

SEC. RUMSFELD: I can remember going over -- what I tried to do with him is to put myself in his shoes, and say, what would I want to know, and what was -- how can I, when I take his time on something, come out of here with him having -- and address the specific issue that provides him an umbrella answer for other like kind of issues. So I can remember being in there with Tommy Franks and targeting questions as to the issues of the natures of the targets, how we -- so that when we left he saw that we were looking at is it better to do it in day or night? Would the buildings be more or less occupied by civilians at what time of day? What might be the collateral damage in neighboring areas? Are there ways to slant weapons?

MR. WOODWARD: Come in from this angle --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Exactly. What angle --

MR. WOODWARD: -- because there's a school over that way.

SEC. RUMSFELD: So that he would come away not picking targets, but coming away with a template that he was comfortable with -- Franks and his team and I and this team -- were -- had an approach that was rational and as humane as possible, but as effective as possible in terms of saving American lives. And so I can picture meetings where that type of thing was done -- of that type -- that specific, but also a series of --

MR. WOODWARD: Can you recall any in the postwar period, what I call after the -- after May 1st, after major combat, where -- and you know, what I would say is --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Take this big issue on training and equipping and where we sent in, I guess, now three or four assessment teams every six months to try to take a look at how we were doing, do we have the enablers and all of that.

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MR. LUTI: From the very beginning with our experience in Afghanistan we went right off --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Right, I started right off in Afghanistan trying to train and equip and I wanted to do the same thing in Iraq. The bottom line was this: We have -- had a tendency in the Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, to think that the only people who can train anyone were the Special Operations. I ended up -- every time I turned around they were sending them off to Georgia, the Republic of Georgia, to train them. They were training Karzai's personal security forces. They were training everyone around. And I said, look, we only have so many of these people. We need more. We're working like [heck] to get more.

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We should work like the dickens to get more. But, by golly, there's hundreds of Marines and Army people who can train people. They're good at it. They know how to do it. They do their own. And let's start using them. And we started replacing all of them with other people. Then I said, let's get contractors to do some of this.

MR. WOODWARD: Why did Paul Wolfowitz have the feeling there was some hesitancy on your part?

SEC. RUMSFELD: No idea

MR. WOODWARD: Did that ever come up?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I cant imagine. No. No.

MR. WOODWARD: -- that there would be -- and even -- I think he told someone that he felt he almost had to hold your hand to sign the order for either the Eikenberry or setting up the training.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Oh, thats silly. Do you remember any of that?

LT GEN RENUART: No. The only discussion really was -- as we do so well, -- we couldnt train anybody to be like an American -- to the level that we train Americans.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Which I've been against.

STAFF: And that was, I can remember, discussion of let's train them to the best Iraqi soldier they can be or Afghan soldier they can be

SEC. RUMSFELD: You bet.

STAFF: as opposed to making them a U.S. Special Forces --

SEC. RUMSFELD: The other thing I said was, [heck] I remember during the Vietnam War, I turned around and we were training people to be doctors instead of medics, and what the Vietnamese people needed were medics. They didn't need U.S.-style hospital care over there at that stage. And the same thing on T-28 pilots. I remember we were training Vietnamese to be T-28 pilots, and I've been a T-28 flight instructor. Then I was an instructor of flight instructors. And I said, why don't we train the instructors to teach them how to do it -- train Vietnamese to be T-28 flight instructors, so that we can create an institutional capability that's on a level that's similar to --

MR. WOODWARD: So what level of training were you seeking -- in other words, you're not going to make them Americans.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Ask Casey. It's good enough.

MR. WOODWARD: Pardon?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Casey's answer is good enough.

MR. WOODWARD: Good enough meaning?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Whatever is appropriate. Good enough. But it is not that they're going to end up winning the soldier of the year award at Fort Bragg. I mean, it just is not in the cards. You've got too little time, too many people to deal with, too fast a turnover, and you simply got to do what you can do.

MR. WOODWARD: Describe generally, or if you think of any, I drive back at this point, the president as a wartime leader, because that's the issue here.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, he is. And he's a good one. He's a very good one. You watch him, and I don't know quite how he does it; he moves from -- I mean, here in this department we move across the full spectrum of maybe 180 degrees. He moves 360 degrees. He'll go from stem cell research to immigration, you know, 15 other things in a given day. And the stuff we bring to him on a regular basis is complicated, it's tough -- and he has a very effective technique where he -- first of all, he's a very rapid reader, and he absorbs quickly. But he also asks questions, and he just keeps pinging question after question after question. And then he boxes the compass. He ends up looking at the thing multi-dimensionally instead of one-dimensionally. And I assume -- I know -- I don't assume anymore; I know -- what he's also doing in the process is he's getting to know the people and taking their measure and seeing how they handle those questions and how they answer them, how much they know and who they rely on for answers to things. And he ends up coming away with a confidence level, and he develops an ability to know how much -- how long a leash he wants different people to be on.

MR. WOODWARD: How long is your leash?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Oh, goodness gracious, don't ask me.

MR. WOODWARD: I am.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I have no idea.

MR. WOODWARD: Do you feel a tug sometimes? Because you know, people who work for you feel the tug. It may be a long way away, but you make sure that, you know, you're --

SEC. RUMSFELD: I am constantly trying to think what ought he to know. How can I help make his job easier? Looking at it from his perspective, how can we present it without a lot of acronyms and in a way that he can approach it presidentially?

MR. WOODWARD: You could write a book on you and Cheney. How is Cheney's role in this? How does he help you? Give me some sense of him, because you know, there's this urban myth out there that he's the all powerful vice president and he controls the president. (Laughter.)

SEC. RUMSFELD: That's nonsense. He -- really they have a very good relationship; you can feel it in the room. But the president is the president, and let there be no doubt about it.

MR. WOODWARD: Can you think of an example? I have some examples to share of that.

SEC. RUMSFELD: The vice president doesn't even -- isn't even slightly confused on the issue. He is very -- his handling of issues when the president is in the room is, in my view, just perfect in the sense that he does not take strong positions when the president is in the room that could conceivably position him contrary to the president in the room. I've not with him when he's alone with the president, but I have every confidence that he does there what he does with everybody else alone, and that's tell him exactly what he believes, because he knows that one of the prices of proximity to the president is the willingness. The burden that goes with that is the burden of having to tell him the truth, what you really believe, for good or bad, positive and negative. And I'm sure he knows that that's one of the responsibilities of the person who's in that close proximity to the president. And he does it. I'm not there, so I can't say he does it, but I do know that he is -- if I -- put yourself in the president's shoes, I think his handling of that relationship in the presence of others is just about as good as it could be. He asks good questions, but he doesn't put the president in a corner or take away his options.

MR. WOODWARD: Is Cheney your best friend --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Oh, goodness.

MR. WOODWARD: -- in Washington?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Oh, I don't know. I don't rank friends in that sense. He clearly is a person that I know well, and have for an awful long time. I have a lot of respect for him. I think he's doing a terrific job as vice president of the United States. But the implication that we work closely together particularly is -- I mean, I don't know, we just don't. I mean --

MR. WOODWARD: He doesnt call a lot --

SEC. RUMSFELD: No, we're not on the phone all the time. Neither one of us are visitors particularly. We both have full lives. We're doing our things. He's a friend and he's a darn good vice president.

MR. WOODWARD: There was an interesting time last summer at the White House when the speechwriters and Bartlett and Card decided that the language of resolve that the president always talks about -- we're going to stick this out; we're not going to -- (inaudible) -- was no longer working, that it wasn't enough, that you had to go a little bit further and say, yes, we might have made some mistakes -- as a way of demonstrating that, you know, we're charting a new course. This kind of led to the clear, hold and build that we talked about yesterday. Did you get involved in that question of -- you know, the language of resolve is a very interesting -- it's important from the bully pulpit. But there was a very clear-eyed assessment there with --

SEC. RUMSFELD: I wasn't involved in it.

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MR. WOODWARD: Back on. And the reason I ask this -- I interviewed the president for eight hours --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Wow!

MR. WOODWARD: -- (inaudible) -- books, and get a sense -- and there's a tendency he has, which -- and he said to me -- he said, I'm a gut player. I -- you know, the president has to lead, calcium in the backbone. You don't -- and so this -- there's an element of denial in his personality, where he's just saying -- no. And he was on Larry King last night saying things he told me three years ago -- (laughs) -- I mean, exactly the same talking point: Saddam Hussein was a threat; it was the right thing to do to remove him -- you know, verbatim language. Is there an element of denial in this? Is that -- (inaudible) --

SEC. RUMSFELD: No. I think it's, first of all, conviction. And second, it is a historical context he reads history. And he knows that those who have persevered are the ones who have made this country what it is. And that there have been -- in every conflict there have been dark, dark days and that he also -- when I say conviction, he also knows that we can't lose a battle over there. The only place he can lose it is here. And he understands that intuitively. He understands it intellectually. And he also looks beyond the difficulties that people face. And I'm sure -- I mean, I know it's true with me that when I read about the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, World War I, World War II -- I'm reading on North Africa now and my goodness. You cant read those histories and not see all the difficulties and the problems. And the numbers of people who are saying toss in towel -- you can't do it, we're not going to get there, the Cold War, lord -- the Mansfield amendment, pull the troops back now

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MR. WOODWARD: It's a wrestling match now. You're back on top. Go ahead.

SEC. RUMSFELD: He knows that. And he knows that perseverance and --

MR. WOODWARD: I talked to people over there, and let me ask about an important relationship involving him and also you, because you and Joyce go to the military hospitals. And some people over there shared -- and the president has said publicly that most of the soldiers who are injured, their families say, "keep going, don't give up," calcium in the backbone. Then three incidents I know of where people have challenged him, family members who have said, "Only you can stop this." Another one said, pointing to her maimed son, and said, "Was it worth it, Mr. President?" And he has expressed to people anguish --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Sure. You can't help it. You cannot help but come out of there Ill put it in priority order inspired and strengthened -- and you are because the wounded there disabled veterans -- an enormous percentage are anxious to get back to their units -- proud of what they've done, confident that they'll be able to survive injuries in one way or another. In a case with their leg off, go back to jump school, qualify for status and get back to Iraq. You come out inspired and strengthened, to be sure. You also cannot help but look at those wonderful human beings and see the damage that has been done to their bodies and not understand the difficulty of tying a tie or putting a shirt on. You know, the simple things.

MR. WOODWARD: So do you feel anguish at those moments --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Oh, sure. My goodness. No one could do that and not feel that, in my view. It is a -- it is something that I look forward to doing, do frequently. Joyce always goes almost always. And I always come out and -- you come out and you get in the car and you talk about the experience of the people you've met, the soldiers and sailors and Marines, the families, and how inspiring they are and how different they are in their personalities, and yet how almost predictable they are in their pride of their service. And we are so lucky to have people like that.

MR. WOODWARD: Have any family members in any of those times accosted you --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Sure.

MR. WOODWARD: -- and said --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Sure.

MR. WOODWARD: What have they said?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I don't think I want to discuss the family conversations. They have indicated their disagreement with the conflict in Afghanistan, the conflict in Iraq. Personal disagreement -- and I don't recall -- it has almost always been a family member, as opposed to injured soldiers, wounded.

MR. WOODWARD: What do you respond to them, just to help maybe? The president says, I can understand how you feel right now.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Sure. I mean my goodness. They're going through a period in their life where something that they had loved and cared for and nurtured is damaged, and in a way that they never anticipated. And you can certainly understand the fact that any person in that circumstance is going to go through some swings of emotion, and it depends on where you get them and where they are when you're there.

MR. WOODWARD: Does that give you any swing of emotion yourself where you kind of go --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Certainly, certainly. There are things that raise that question in my mind -- but not that so much.

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SEC. Rumsfeld: The -- it is part of this job. I understand that historically. I understand it from my prior service here. I understand it today. So I do not go away and think, gee, this is something that I ought to -- (off mike).

MR. WOODWARD: Yesterday when I was leaving, we talked about Admiral Vernon Clark and how he didn't become CNO -- or become chairman. And I understand that this goes way back to Shelton, who was chairman when you came in -- recommended that Clark be his successor.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I don't know that.

MR. WOODWARD: Yeah, Shelton has said that multiple times that he recommended to you that --

SEC. RUMSFELD: I don't know that. MR. WOODWARD: You don't believe he would --

SEC. RUMSFELD: I didn't say I believed it or didn't believe it. I said I don't know that. I am very precise. If you say something that I don't remember, I am not going to say it's wrong, and I'm not going to say it's right. I'm going to say I don't know that, and I don't.

MR. WOODWARD: You don't recall?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I don't recall that. I could go back maybe and look at the list, but my recollection is we talked to probably 10, 15 people about four or five individuals and triangulate it, and that the -- Vernon Clark was ranked high and Pete Pace was ranked high and Dick Myers was ranked high. Dick Myers at that time.

MR. WOODWARD: And you said Clark in the end didn't want it.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I didn't say that. I said -- I think I said he didn't seem to want it. He was very engaged in the Navy doing a terrific job, and I didn't have the feeling that he was leaning forward anxious to do that. And I had always kind of -- and I clearly held him very, very, very well up there. He knows that, and I knew that, and the president knew that, and all of us were very respectful of his talent. But I kind of like someone who wants to do something, whos a tough guy and who can take a lot of stuff. And it strikes me that someone needs to be leaning forward and wanting to do it. I think maybe Vern didn't. I did get him to stay extra long --

MR. WOODWARD: In the Navy.

SEC. RUMSFELD: -- as CNO.

MR. WOODWARD: Do you recall a conversation with him about that? Because there's actually a record of this which I have seen where he talked to you about -- he was going to see President Bush for an interview, and he said, I want to talk to you, Secretary Rumsfeld, and see if we're on the same page.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Mmm-hmm.

MR. WOODWARD: What you believe and what you expect of your chairman -- do you recall such a conversation?

SEC. RUMSFELD: That would be fairly typical for me, yes.

MR. WOODWARD: And you -- I mean, it was real kind of interesting, intellectual confrontation about what do you believe; if I'm going to be your chairman, I've got to know what you believe, because there's lot of studies going on at this time. And he laid down something about under Goldwater-Nichols he has a responsibility to give independent military advice to the president --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Oh, sure, that comes up always, and I obviously agree with that, thats what the law is. Absolutely. Not just to the president, but to the National Security Council.

MR. WOODWARD: Do you remember a real kind of clash with --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Oh, not at all.

MR. WOODWARD: You don't?

SEC. RUMSFELD: No.

MR. WOODWARD: You also mentioned during the briefing that there was -- and this is important in this discussion of numbers of troops -- that there was a plan to ramp up. You were drawing a line and you had decided not to --

SEC. RUMSFELD: My recollection is this: that we did not know how many troops it would take. And he said you ought to have as many as you're going to need. And one way to do that is to put them in train, get it started, get that mobilization process going, because the president is engaging in diplomacy, and we don't want to go to war. The goal is to not have to. It is going to be the very last choice, and we're going to find a way to give Saddam two or three extra chances at the end, even one to leave the country before it started, which we did. And -- but we wanted to have him to have the ability to have as many as we needed. And I don't know what the top number is --

MR. WOODWARD: Yeah, what was the top number, 400,000 or something?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Four-hundred thousand to 500,000.

LT GEN RENUART: It's about 400,000 total troops. Ground combat forces build to about 275,000 or so, and that includes divisions, cavalry regiments and Marines.

MR. WOODWARD: And that would have been -- when would that point have been reached?

LT GEN RENUART: Well, you remember the -- you know, we were sort of in the 11, 15 -- I forget the numbers now, but the plan as it evolved had about a 90-day period of build of combat operations, because we weren't sure how long it would take to get to Baghdad and beyond. And so that substantial build occurred over about a 90-day period.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Once we started --

LT GEN RENUART: It started much earlier than that --

SEC. RUMSFELD: -- Earlier than that, in terms of the timing and the preparation and all of that. And then we said, okay, should there be some on-ramps or off-ramps if you need to add somehow. And they did. They came back with some --

LT GEN RENUART: Off-ramps.

SEC. RUMSFELD: -- off-ramps, we called them. And that you review along the way and then make a recommendation, which you did, and which we accepted.

LT GEN RENUART: Yes, sir.

MR. WOODWARD: And what was the basis of the recommendation to then not add more troops? As you know, this is one of the big controversies.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Canards. Yeah

MR. WOODWARD: -- great controversies in all of this --

SEC. RUMSFELD: It was based on what the combatant commander needed, and he made a judgment that he had what he needed or would have, as this played out, and that he would not need the additional ones that were in the queue to come in were they needed. And he made that recommendation, and I made the recommendation to the president, and we agreed with it.

MR. WOODWARD: So it would have been Franks and Abizaid when they took over making recommendations?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Abizaid was the deputy during that period.

LT GEN RENUART: Kind of the division that was -- I guess the plateau was, as we brought the 1st Armored Division in, the one that we took to the off-ramp was 1st Cav. And that's kind of where we said , nope -- General Franks made the decision -- no, I didnt bring 1st Cav. in.

MR. WOODWARD: Why do you think it's a canard, this business of number of troops, just to get it on the record? Because it's out there as --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, you know, people serve in the military or write about it as journalists and old timers. And they have needs that they develop over their careers, and they look at what's going on, and they are asked what they think and then they say what they think. And they have opinions, just like anybody else --

MR. WOODWARD: But you now, your opinion on this issue.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I mean, let me just go on. So then they say something, and then that becomes their position. And they may base it on a lot of knowledge or not too much knowledge. But the fact is that each of these things are debatable. Someone can legitimately have different views. And so they do. They do have different views. And it should come as no great surprise. There's been different views in every war about all kinds of things as you go through this. And the people who have the responsibility for making the decisions have to make the decisions, and the people who don't have responsibility for making the decisions can extend their opinions, and they do. And there are people who say you have too many, there are people who say you have too few, there are people who say you're going too fast, you're going to slow, whatever it is. And that's life. And I accept that. But the interesting thing to me is that so many of them say, "oh, it's Rumsfeld," as though I'm sitting around with a black box figuring all this out. And anyone who knows me or watched me do anything knows that I don't do it that way. I come here into this job --

MR. WOODWARD: The recommendation of the combatant commander.

SEC. RUMSFELD: -- knowing that there's no one smart enough to do this job. All you can do is to come into it and then figure out who smart people are, ask them a lot of questions, get advice from multiple sources, and then sift it, and then make recommendations and make a judgment who you're going to put your confidence in. I can't from sitting eight thousand miles away, say, "oh, you should have had more or less." Other people do it, and they do it from their armchairs, loud and strong. I can't. I can't do that. I just know I don't know.

MR. WOODWARD: Fair enough. Fair point. So you never bought the argument from where you're sitting that there weren't enough troops at any point in this?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I -- it's entirely possible there were too many at some point and too few at some point, because no one is perfect. And the people -- all of us that were trying our best to make these judgments were doing it in a context of concern about having enough to get the job done and enable a process, political and economic process to go forward -- and not so many that it persuaded people that we were there to steal their oil and occupy their country and disrupt and cause disturbances in their neighboring countries that cause the overthrow of some of those other regimes. And so we made the best judgment we could. And in retrospect, I have not seen or heard anything from the other opiners that would suggest to me that they have any reason to believe they were right and we were wrong, nor can I prove we were right and they were wrong.

MR. WOODWARD: So in a sense it's an unknown unknown?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I'm afraid it is, because unless you try things other ways, you can't then compare them and have different approaches. But the only thing I can say is they seem to have a lot more certainty than my assessment of the facts would permit me to have.

MR. WOODWARD: Fair point. And the opiners, if I can put them in a box, seem to say that you either intentionally or unintentionally rejected what's called the Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force.

SEC. RUMSFELD: It's the Weinberger Doctrine, I think.

MR. WOODWARD: It used to be. Now it's called the Powell Doctrine.

SEC. RUMSFELD: And that's incorrect. We didn't reject it or accept it. We looked at all the factors and the dynamics in this different situation, and I made -- people made recommendations to me which I agreed with. And I'm comfortable with them --

MR. WOODWARD: I understand.

SEC. RUMSFELD: -- today.

MR. WOODWARD: I understand. I mean, that really puts on exactly how to look at this in a much more complete way than I've seen anywhere. I think it's --

SEC. RUMSFELD: It will probably end up on the cutting room floor.

MR. WOODWARD: No, it won't. (Laughter.) I can see theres honesty in that because, you know, as I'm writing the new Bible on this -- (laughter) -- I have what's called the "Gospel According to Don." (Laughter.)

MR WHITMAN: We've got about 10 minutes.

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MR. WOODWARD: And quick things I want to make sure that before 9/11 the CIA was working on all their bin Laden action plans, and you weighed in to question some of the intelligence, asking questions in your hard-ass way that this might be deception. They may be trying to measure our reaction and defenses; then the agency and others did a study on this that showed very clearly, no, it's real. But you recall asking questions about that?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I ask questions every day. I'm not smart enough to know the answers, so I run around asking questions.

MR. WOODWARD: Steve Herbits -- your friend --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yes.

MR. WOODWARD: -- what about him? Was he useful to you?

SEC. RUMSFELD: He was. He was helpful on the personnel side. He was my special assistant the first time, and Admiral Holcomb was my military assistant. And I got them both to come back. Admiral Holcomb was doing the military promotion thing, and Steve helped with the civilian recruiting. They're both very smart and very fine people.

MR. WOODWARD: He supposedly came in -- now this is December of '02, so four months before the war, and said to you -- this is a note: You are in the unique position to being the sole person who could lose the president's reelection. And he went on to say that the postwar operation, that Feith and company are running is screwed up, and then you started looking very hard at who? This kind of put you on the train to find Jay Garner -- to find somebody to run that office. Do you recall that?

SEC. RUMSFELD: No. Doesn't mean it didn't happen, but --

MR. WOODWARD: Understood, understood. That was -- you really looked at a hundred candidates for Garner's position -- or for Bremer's, I'm sorry.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Both. We got all kinds of names from everybody, people talked about them in the State Department and the White House and here. We all did --

MR. WOODWARD: Last question then. If you -- this is very important -- were to lay out an optimistic scenario of what might happen in Iraq, what's the case for its working, with some sense of time and consequence? In other words, best-case scenario or realistic best-case scenario. Do you see what I mean?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Optimistic best-case -- I mean, this business is ugly, it's tough. You know, there isn't any "best." It's a when did I say it-- long, hard slog. I think I wrote years ago and it is. It's -- we're facing a set of challenges that are different than our country understands -- our public. And we're a democracy and we need to be rooted in the public. They're different from our Congress understands. They're different than our government -- much of our government probably understands. And is organized or trained, or equipped to cope with and deal with. They are complex. We're dealing with enemies that can turn inside our decision circles. They are -- they don't have parliaments and bureaucracies and real estate to defend and interact with or to deal with or cope with, and they can do what they want. They aren't held accountable for lying or for killing innocent men, women and children. There's something about the body politic in the United States that they can accept the enemy killing innocent men, women and children and cutting off people's heads but have zero tolerance for some soldier who does something he shouldn't do. And it is an environment that is vastly more complex because of the fact that we have all of these new realities in terms of e-mails and video cameras and wire transfer.

MR. WOODWARD: Are you optimistic in the fighting?

SEC. RUMSFELD: We're fighting the first war of history in this new century and with all these new realities with Industrial Age organizations and in an environment that has not adapted and adjusted, a public environment that has not adapted and adjusted.

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MR. WOODWARD: Because Bob McNamara said publicly -- and very interesting and hard point, and I want to ask it directly of you. He said, "Any military commander who's honest with you will say he's made mistakes that have cost lives."

SEC. RUMSFELD: Mmm-hmm.

MR. WOODWARD: Is that correct?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I don't know. I suppose that if a military commander --

MR. WOODWARD: Which you are.

SEC. RUMSFELD: No, I'm not.

MR. WOODWARD: Commander in chief, secretary of Defense, combatant commander.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I can see a military commander in a uniform who is engaged in a conflict having to make decisions that result in people living or dying and that that would be a truth. And certainly if you go up the chain to the civilian side, to the president and me, you could, by indirection, two or three steps removed, make that case. But the fascination with that question comes up at almost every press conference. "Oh, tell us every mistake you've ever made, please. We want to have a litany of all your mistakes." And I hear it over and over. And they ask the president. And finally everyone says well, of course there have been mistakes made. And then they'll tell us about these mistakes. You know? I think it's kind of a -- my attitude is this: Our job is to get up every morning and figure out how we can help protect the country and the American people, and to have people that are dedicated to this country, that are patriotic, that care about defending the American people, and help to organize and encourage and lead and bolster their efforts to do that. And sitting around contemplating the kinds of questions that you in the media are so fascinated with is not my idea of how to spend my time on the taxpayer's dollar.

MR. WOODWARD: Can I just say something very -- we know each other well enough -- that you don't understand the power of admitting error --

SEC. RUMSFELD: I do.

MR. WOODWARD: It is the most powerful thing you can do is to -- (inaudible) -- as the leader --

SEC. RUMSFELD: I've done that. I've done that.

MR. WOODWARD: You have.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I've done that.

MR. WOODWARD: I understand that. I understand.

SEC. RUMSFELD: But do I need to do it every day?

MR. WOODWARD: No.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Do I need to spend an hour on it with every journalist who comes in and says, "Oh, tell me all the terrible things you've done"

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SEC. RUMSFELD: I have demonstrated my understanding of that principle.

MR. WOODWARD: Yes, I understand.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Then why did you say you don't understand?

MR. WOODWARD: Well, I think --

SEC. RUMSFELD: He's not as bad as he sounds -- (inaudible). (Laughter, cross talk.)

MR. WOODWARD: Will you get him to write me a snowflake about -- (laughter) -- have you ever written a journalist a snowflake?

SEC. RUMSFELD: No.

MR. WOODWARD: Oh, could I be the first to get a snowflake?

No, seriously --

SEC. RUMSFELD: They are reserved for --

MR. WOODWARD: You're going to think of things about Bush or Cheney that should be in my book that if you just -- you know, they come to our head, make him a snowflake for the Bible, for the "Gospel According to Rumsfeld."

[Portion deleted by ground-rule and mutual consent]

SEC. RUMSFELD: The Cold War was won not by some buildup to a crescendo of a military battle. It was won economic, political and military. And the war on terror, the struggle against violent extremists, is going to be won the same way-- over an sustained period of time. And anyone who thinks it is purely a military battle is wrong. It is going to take the same kind of patience and persistence, and ultimately it will take what helped us prevail in the Cold War, and that is the fact that through successive administrations of both political parties, people recognized the threat and they were willing to invest and persevere, and they were willing to work with other countries in Western Europe, in this case, and make tough decisions.

MR. WOODWARD: And Wolfowitz got -- right after 9/11 set up this thing called Bletchley II. Do you remember that? Chris DeMuth at the AEI --

SEC. RUMSFELD: I asked him to. I said look, we ought to get some group going to think about --

MR. WOODWARD: And they wrote a paper, seven pages, called, "The Delta of Terrorism," meaning the origin of terrorism, and it essentially said we are in a two-generation war with radical Islam, and we have to do something, and we better start with Iraq.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I remember that.

MR. WOODWARD: Yeah. It had a lot -- quite an impact on the president and Cheney and Rice, because it was short, and it said a two-generation war; that other countries are the real problems, but you can't deal with them; you better start with Iraq.

SEC. RUMSFELD: InterestingI don't remember that. I remember asking that they gather a group and that we think that through discussed it with Paul. Where you there Bill?

MR. LUTI: No?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I had in mind something different than they ended up with, and I participated in the initiation of it.

MR. WOODWARD: which was more or less -- (inaudible)

SEC RUMSFELD: More like Bletchley.

MR. WOODWARD: Think tank or

SEC. RUMSFELD: -- yeah, that you'd end up with a continuing body that would bring together some very fine minds, on a highly confidential basis, and provide you the intellectual content for something that was obviously new and different and challenging. And that did not happen.

MR. WOODWARD: And just one quick thing so I'm -- I'm going to be able to cover everything here. In '03, this business about the Army and where the Army took McKiernan out and put Sanchez in with his very light headquarters, a number of people have said you were not happy with that because it wasn't visible to you what was happening. Is that correct?

SEC. RUMSFELD: That's true.

MR. WOODWARD: What happened there?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I have no idea. I shouldn't say I have no idea. I've asked people to think about it so that we don't repeat the mistake. And regrettably, the lessons learned, what occurred, ended at the end of major combat and did not start up again until about six months later. And it was during that period where things happened that I did not have visibility into. I do not know the extent to which other in the building did, but no one on the civilian side that I know did. And I'm -- it's not clear to me that Pete Pace or Dick Myers did.

MR. WOODWARD: Because I know at the time how you were talking with Franks about putting in a four-star as the commander in Iraq in May of '03, you were discussing it.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I felt badly a year or so later when I started looking at all that stuff that had happened so rapidly without my awareness. So that is about my learning. I also felt badly for General Sanchez. I think he ended up in a position that was difficult.

I've got something that's time sensitive.

Interview Ends

[Unrelated banter deleted by mutual agreement]

Part I

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld Interviews with Mr. Bob Woodward / Part I

sfux — 2006-10-04T09:51:00Z

Defenselink: July 6 and 7, 2006 / Part I

SEC. RUMSFELD: You know, I asked Jean Renuart, my incoming senior military assistant, and he was with Franks this whole time. And Bill Luti was the guy here --

MR. WOODWARD: With Feith and Wolfowitz, right.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yeah. And my memory is not perfect, and I don't want to say something that's inaccurate. And I have asked them to feel free to intervene. And my interest is in getting it right and having you get it right.

Rumsfeld: Yeah. And my memory is not perfect, and I don't want to say something that's inaccurate.

MR. WOODWARD: Mine, too. Mine, too.

SEC. RUMSFELD: and having you get it right. So I said, gee, why don't you two -- they are at different ends of the rubber band.

Woodward: Mine, too. Mine, too.

MR. WOODWARD: And I may be able to follow up with them on a couple of things.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Sure. Absolutely.

MR. WOODWARD: If I can be cleared to do that, that would be great. Because I want to begin with a couple of months ago in a public briefing down there, you said Woodward's book is not the Bible.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, I think I --

MR. WOODWARD: You did, you did.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I said you guys are not writing history. (Laughs.) And I said basically, by God --

MR. WOODWARD: Woodward's book is not the Bible.

SEC. RUMSFELD: That's right.

MR. WOODWARD: And I wanted to start off by saying --

SEC. RUMSFELD: You want it to be.

MR. WOODWARD: No, no. I want to say no one knows that better than me.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Okay. (Laughter.)

MR. WOODWARD: Because if every conversation with you is a bit of a wrestling match, I want you to know you're starting on top. (Laughter.) Is that fair?

SEC. RUMSFELD: You also know that I'm not the kind of guy who's going to say bad things about my colleagues. I just don't do it.

MR. WOODWARD: This is such a serious history and a most serious issue --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Exactly.

MR. WOODWARD: -- that the country is dealing with. And you know, one thing -- just one quick thing not on the list but someone told me about the other day, which I found fascinating. When the person that gave that speech on the Lincoln with the "Mission Accomplished" on the back, somebody told me that the White House speechwriters had used MacArthur's surrender speech on the Missouri as a model. And they literally had in that speech "the guns are silent," and you edited it out.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I took "mission accomplished" out. I was in Baghdad, and I was given a draft of that thing to look at. And I just died, and I said my God, it's too conclusive. And I fixed it and sent it back..

MR. WOODWARD: were you on the trip?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I was. And we got it back and they fixed the speech, but not the sign.

MR. WOODWARD: That's right. But it had "the guns are silent," and someone said you line-edited it out and said the guns are not silent.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yeah, that's for darn sure.

MR. WOODWARD: Is that --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yeah. No, there's no question but that I was well aware that things were still happening there. I was there.

MR. WOODWARD: The beginning is this question of what was the model for Iraq, because I think it was Bill Luti who was giving briefings here about kind of an occupation -- not necessarily MacArthur style, but it looked like that. And then other people were talking about a quick handover in one of these meetings. You say --

SEC. RUMSFELD: I tilted to the latter, to the quicker handover, and the president did.

MR. WOODWARD: -- that you were looking for Iraq's Karzai, is that correct?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I don't remember that. Clearly, you needed somebody who people could recognize as providing leadership in the country. And I always felt that foreign troops are an anomaly in a country, that eventually they're unnatural and not welcomed really. I think I used the characterization of a broken bone. If you don't set it, everything grows around the brake and you end up with that abnormality. And I used the phrase of it's like teaching a youngster how to ride a bicycle. You run behind them with your hand in the seat. And at some point you've got to take some fingers off, and then you've got to let go, and they might fall. You help pick them up and put them back on it. But otherwise, if you don't take your hand off, you're going to end up with a 40-year-old who can't ride a bike.

MR. WOODWARD: Okay. (Inaudible.)

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yeah, I mean, I said that.

MR. WOODWARD: When did you start saying that?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Oh, early. I mean --

MR. WOODWARD: In '03?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Oh, I'm sure, yeah. There's also the concept of declining consent and the like. And there's the -- John Abizaid and I and the president talked on many occasions about this, and we used this construct that there is a natural tension between having too many and too few. Too few and the political and economic environment can't go forward. Too many and you have two risks: one, you feed the insurgency and create opposition, engender opposition; and second, you create a dependency. Our folks are so good at what they do, and if there's a ditch to be dug they're going to dig the ditch. And we can't allow that to happen. We've simply got to manage that, and it's an art not a science. And therefore, I tend to want to go, and so does the president, with the person on the ground -- in this case, General Casey -- and he's got to be the artist. You can't do it from 7,000 miles away.

MR. WOODWARD: In '03, though, if I go through the record, talk to people like Garner and go through records, talk to people in the White House, it seemed --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Garner had that model, too.

MR. WOODWARD: Pardon?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Jay Garner --

MR. WOODWARD: Yes, yes --

SEC. RUMSFELD: -- had that model, too.

MR. WOODWARD: Yes, exactly. Exactly. He was let's set up an interim governing council, let's, you know -- I mean, he briefed the president on we're going to use 200,000 to 300,000 Iraqi troops for border patrol and security and so forth.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Is that right? Well, I don't know that.

MR. WOODWARD: And --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Do you want me every time you say something that I don't know to tell you?

MR. WOODWARD: Absolutely.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Okay. I don't know that.

MR. WOODWARD: My question really is -- what did you envision in the spring of '03 happening? Because, of course, Bremer comes in with a very different model.

SEC. RUMSFELD: He did? I was more in the Jay Garner mode. And Jerry Bremer, of course, is a presidential envoy and, as such, he reported to the president and to Condi at the NSC staff.

MR. WOODWARD: You picked him.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yes. We all agreed on him that he was the guy. I think I've forgotten where his name came from. Im not sure -- but it might have been George Schultz who recommended him. In any event, he had a good background, was a capable guy, understood a lot of the pieces at the Department of State. And of course, he put together a team that was basically Department of State. He built the back office here and did the support for us. I talked to him only rarely, and he had an approach that was different that Jay Garner's, no question.

MR. WOODWARD: Did you -- as I look at it, there's that conflict that kind of never gets resolved maybe until 2004. So it's kind of going along, Garner has unhappiness during this period.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Good man -- Jay Garner is a terrific guy.

MR. WOODWARD: I've gone through at great length with him this whole thing from his notes and so forth, and he was going to be home for his Fourth of July cookout in '03 with basically this problem solved. And he felt kind of --

SEC. RUMSFELD: He had an experience, lived it during -

MR. WOODWARD: Supplanted by Bremer?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yeah. He had an experience with the Kurds in '90, I guess, and he was on a track towards that.

MR. WOODWARD: Now, NSPD 24, which set up Garner's office, made you the lead agency.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Right.

MR. WOODWARD: Why did you want the lead on this?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, I don't know that I did want it. [Portion deleted by ground-rule] But we had the troops, and we needed a unity of command. We needed to have everything coming through one place, particularly when we were the ones -- we are the ones with the principal force levels and costs and responsibility. So we looked at the whole thing, and we had had difficulty in Afghanistan with, for example, the police situation. The State Department has the money from the Congress for that, the Germans had responsibility for it, and yet they're a big part of the security forces. So what do you do? If we've got the security responsibility, how will we manage that? And the answer was it didn't get done well early on and as fast as it might have. And therefore, we decided -- we'd start working in the interagency to figure out how we could solve that. We had the same problems with the police in Afghanistan, which is why this year, 2006, is the year of the police instead of 2003.

MR. WOODWARD: And maybe should have been, is that true?

SEC. RUMSFELD: You bet. And it is a very complicated thing because of the subcommittees in Congress, the committee's jurisdictions, the bureaucracies in the departments. And in any event, I guess last -- when did we start working the police in Iraq?

LT GEN RENUART: In Iraq?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yeah.

LT GEN RENUART: You sent Eikenberry out. You selected him in November and December. I think he went out in June.

SEC. RUMSFELD: No, that was an assessment. I did three assessments. I'm talking about when did DOD get the responsibility for the police.

LT GEN RENUART: In October.

SEC. RUMSFELD: In October of last year --

LT GEN RENUART: Yes, essentially that's right.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Just recently.

MR. WOODWARD: You sent Gary Luck out there in the beginning?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, I sent -- first I sent Eikenberry.

MR. WOODWARD: Right.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Then I sent Luck. Now I sent somebody else, and now this Austin is in there.

MR. WOODWARD: Okay.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I've had an assessment team go in about every six months or so to take a fresh eye on things. What's it look like?

MR. WHITMAN : Slocombe.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Who?

MR. WHITMAN : Slocombe.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Slocombe was the security person out there with Bremer, yeah.

MR. WOODWARD: For Garner --

SEC. RUMSFELD: No.

MR. WOODWARD: For Bremer.

SEC. RUMSFELD: For Bremer.

MR. WOODWARD: You're absolutely right, Bremer.

SEC. RUMSFELD: But he was not on an assessment team. No, we sent three assessment teams to look at how you do this, and how are we doing, are the numbers still right, has the situation changed? What can we learn from what we've done? How can we make it better? And we've done that not just in security forces, but I had sent out budgets and other subjects I've sent out assessment teams.

MR. WOODWARD: So it would be right, as I've interviewed these people for Garner and Bremer, in particular, to feel some confusion about what the model is. Is that --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, I think they each had their own model and they differed.

MR. WOODWARD: I see, but did you -- because you were in charge, you -- particularly Garner was reporting to you in this? And Bremer actually reported ot you initially?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Bremer actually was --

MR. WOODWARD: Reported to you initially --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Technically, but not really. He didn't call home much. In other words, he was out there in a tough environment, making a lot of decisions, calling audibles, and it's a difficult job.

MR. WOODWARD: And he felt he was the Presidents man.

SEC. RUMSFELD: You bet, and he was. It wasn't a matter of feeling it; he was. And he had a staff that he put together that was basically from the State Department, and they worked well together, and they did a hell of a good job. It's a difficult job, and they accomplished a heck of a lot in a relatively short period of time.

MR. WOODWARD: One of the things -- and this is John Abizaid who said this to Garner early, before the war, a few months before the war -- January '03 -- we've got to provide an opportunity for the Iraqi army to emerge with some honor.

MR. WOODWARD: Did you agree with that?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Sure.

MR. WOODWARD: Was that a message that was sent?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I mean, I talked to Abizaid all the time, and he felt that way about the military; he felt that way about the Sunnis that they were losing control of the country, and constantly was looking to see that decisions being made in the CPA reflected what he believed to be, and I agreed with, a recognition of the fact that the goal was to have everyone feeling that the country is fair and representative of them. And because of the significant loss on the part of the Sunnis in terms of their role in that country, he was constantly looking to me to try to see that the political side of the house in Iraq reflected that.

You were --

LT GEN RENUART: Yes sir, I think in fact this comment was pretty consistent with General Abizaid's view - as his deputy -- and his recommendations to General Franks as well as his coming on, that you had to provide for the Iraqi regular army because they were the folks least dependent upon Saddam or more likely to be representative, that they would be a force that you would be capable of using and reintegrating very quickly back into the Iraqi security.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Also the thing with the army was (off mike) hundreds of thousands or tens of thousands of Shi'ite conscripts, and 15(,000) or 17,000 Sunni generals. I'm overstating for emphasis.

MR. WOODWARD: And colonels.

SEC. RUMSFELD: And colonels. It was a different army. And the other problem was that it disbanded itself in large measure.

MR. WOODWARD: But yes and no. I mean, as you know, the current Iraqi army has all these officers back. All the NCOs and officers in the Iraqi army served in Saddam's army.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Certainly a lot did.

MR. WOODWARD: As best I can tell, virtually all. And so the question becomes -- again, looking at the chronology of this -- is that the goal is give them honor. And then there's this disbanding of the army there. Actually, at Garner's feet begging to be brought back. They were sending Garner lists and so forth. I've got the lists and they felt kicked in the face. And the question was how did that happen?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yeah. I don't know. Do you know?

LT GEN RENUART: This is when Bremer -- the first two CPA orders that he wanted to issue, CPA order one and two -- de-Ba'athification and dissolution of the entities -- were -- I think he said this in his book. He wanted to make a statement that there was an authority in Iraq, he was the authority, and these were the two ways he was going to establish that authority. But if you read both of those orders -- have you read them?

MR. WOODWARD: Oh, yes.

LT GEN RENUART : Very carefully -- they're not as draconian, especially on de-Ba'athification, that some people have made them out to be. And on the army, there was a, I believe -- and I have to go back and check it -- and Gene (sp), you might be able to correct me -- but I believe it was allowed to come back colonel and below without question, if I remember correctly.

MR. WOODWARD: I mean, the whole army was just disbanded completely -- I mean, I've read the order and --

LT GEN RENUART: But in building the new Iraqi army, there were provisions, I believe, in disestablishment to bring them back.

MR. WOODWARD: Later on.

LT GEN RENUART:: Right, right.

MR. WOODWARD: Later on, which is what happened.

The question -- again, when I've looked at the White House on this -- there was no interagency process on this critical decision. And Bremer says it was, essentially, Wolfowitz and Feith who gave him that order, as you know, because you've read Bremer's book.

MR. WOODWARD: Where did it come from?

LT GEN RENUART: (Laughs.) No, I haven't read Bremer's book.

MR. WOODWARD: What?

LT GEN RENUART: I haven't read Bremer's book.

MR. WOODWARD: Yeah, I have.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I'd be surprised if that were the case.

MR. WOODWARD: Yes, sir, that's what he says.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I didn't say he didn't say it. I'm not surprised at that. I say I would -- that's just -- it would be a surprise to me if Wolfowitz and Feith gave him those orders. I just don't know that.

MR. WOODWARD: He carried those orders back, and there's some indication from e-mails and so forth that were drafted here in the Pentagon. Isn't that true?

MR. LUTI: Well, contrary to convention wisdom, there was an interagency process. It was discussed at length in the interagency.

MR. WOODWARD: At what level?

MR. LUTI : At the working level, at the PCC level, we call it, which is, you know, assistant secretary and deputy assistant secretary.

MR. WOODWARD: Never got to deputies or principals, best I can see.

MR. Luti: That I don't know, either, okay. But there was a lot of work going on in this area and a lot of communication going back and forth in the interagency. So it would be inaccurate to say that it wasn't discussed in the interagency.

MR. WOODWARD: Well, not at the principal or NSC level.

Mr. Secretary, did you know that this was going to happen?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I can't say I did. I simply don't recall it, and I don't recall an NSC meeting on the subject, but that doesn't mean there wasn't one. That's just my best recollection today.

MR. WOODWARD: And do you remember there was an NSC meeting -- it's very specific, but I have notes -- the 28th, '03, when Garner said specifically we're going to use between 200,000 and 300,000 of the Iraqi army.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Don't remember that one. Again, that doesn't mean it isn't correct, but I --

MR. WOODWARD: I understand. I understand.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I've not gone back and studied --

MR. WOODWARD: No reason that you should have.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I havent gone back through the papers. I've got other things to do.

MR. WOODWARD: Garner quotes you as saying at one point the Iraqis are going to spend their money rebuilding the country, that we're not putting money in. This is at this point --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Early on.

MR. WOODWARD: -- early on. Yes, sir.

SEC. RUMSFELD: It became clear to me that -- fairly early, I think -- that the Iraqi infrastructure had been neglected for decades. I went over and looked at an electric power plant. It was being held together with chewing gum and bobby pins and bailing wire. I looked at myself and said, my lord, it took 30 years to get here; it's going to take 30 years to get out of here to get that -- not us out -- for them to get back to looking like Kuwait or Jordan or Saudi Arabia or Turkey or their neighbors. And I said oh, my goodness, that's going to be their job over a long period of time because it just takes that long. And they have -- they've got wealth. They've got water, they've got oil, they've got industrious people. They clearly are going to be the ones that are going to have to be there.

MR. WOODWARD: But there was a point where we put in lots of money -- $21 billion. When did it become apparent to you that we're going to have to pay some of these?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I don't know when that became apparent to me, but I know the government had an interagency process and they decided they wanted to help out. And so they went to the Congress with a proposal. I thought it was for $18 billion.

MR. LUTI : Nineteen point four (billion dollars).

MR. WOODWARD: And then there was $2 billion they added on.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yeah, but I can remember saying in the interagency process and on the Hill that the likelihood of the Congress passing annual reconstruction funds to rectify 30 years of neglect while he was building palaces is unlikely. As a broken down ex-politician, I could smell that.

MR. WOODWARD: Before Bremer was picked, there's a memo you faxed over to the president recommending that Wolfowitz be -- that they consider Paul Wolfowitz.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I don't know that that's true. I do know that Paul came to me and said he'd like to be considered. And I can remember Paul saying orally -- not in a memo, but orally -- maybe in a memo --

MR. WOODWARD: I have a copy --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Oh, good. Then you know better than I do -- that the president might want to consider Paul. He asked me to do that and I did it.

MR. WOODWARD: And why was it decided not him but Bremer?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I don't know why it was decided that way. The president made the decision. He probably looked at a lot of different people.

MR. WOODWARD: They say in the White House -- I didn't talk to the president yet -- that you made the decision on Bremer.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I simply supported the -- recommended him and supported him. And he was well known to Colin Powell, he was well known to Condi, and everyone. A series of names were looked at, a number of people were looked at, and that clearly was something that everyone agreed was an appropriate recommendation.

MR. WOODWARD: Do you remember -- this is June of '03 -- I'm sorry to be so long on this -- when Garner had left, he had been replaced by Bremer. He came back here and you gave him a medal. And he says and he has notes telling you that three tragic mistakes had been made in the postwar period: de-Ba'athification so deep, disbanding the military, and Bremer's decision to let an interim government group that Garner had set up go home.

Do you recall any of that?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Vaguely. I remember having a very good discussion with him. I felt that he had not been properly recognized for what he'd done. So we had him come back and had a visit and did give him a medal and expressed my appreciation to him. I think he's a fine retired officer and a very talented guy who cares a lot about Iraq.

MR. WOODWARD: Then you and he went and met with the president after that, and it was kind of lots of old stories. And I've asked Garner about this, and I said did you not tell the president that you told Secretary Rumsfeld that three tragic mistakes had been made? And he said he did not. He felt he had reported to you. And we had a long, very interesting discussion about the obligation of somebody to make sure the guy at the top knows --

SEC. RUMSFELD: I think the president knew that there were big disagreements over de-Ba'athification and big disagreements over the military. I mean, those are not -- don't you feel that way?

MR. WOODWARD : At that point, in June?

SEC. RUMSFELD: June of '03.

MR. WOODWARD : Yes, sir. I don't think so. I thought there was nothing. It was kind of --

SEC. RUMSFELD: I mean the first thing that struck me about the military when Jerry Bremer and Walt Slocombe got there was the issue of -- saying he was going to organize the military only for external defense. And it just seemed to me that the problem was not external defense at that moment; it was internal, and I can remember a discussion on that point.

MR. WHITMAN: Surely, some of that in June, July '03 was also taking place actually in the news media, too. If you go back and look at the articles that were written there was debate and there were varying opinions about that --

MR. WOODWARD: Right, but not much. I've looked at it thoroughly. It surfaced much later, obviously, and it's an issue now. I just wonder whether -- I find it striking -- I pressed Jay Garner on this. I said how can you tell the secretary that three tragic mistakes had been made -- not just errors, but tragic mistakes -- and then go meet with the president and not tell him? And he said well, he reported to you, he stuck to the chain of command. He assumed you would tell the president that Jay Garner thinks --

SEC. RUMSFELD: There's no question that the president was aware of those issues.

MR. LUTI: And if I may, certainly more on the governance issue, because we had a big change on the issue of sovereignty that came up, and that was Jay's third point.

MR. WOODWARD: Yeah, but that was three or four months later.

MR. LUTI : It was in September and October when the discussions began, and then in late October the decision was made.

MR. WOODWARD: Right, right.

MR. LUTI: So his third point was taken right to the top.

MR. WOODWARD: When did sovereignty pass?

MR. LUTI : June 28th -- we decided on July 1st, and it happened --

SEC. RUMSFELD: I can remember all the pressure to delay it. The president said not a chance.

MR. LUTI: That's why they brought Jerry back to talk about the --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Not a chance.

MR. WOODWARD: Not a chance of what?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Delaying sovereignty -- (off mike) -- sovereignty.

MR. WOODWARD: Very anxious to get it. Give it to the Iraqis.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Damn right.

MR. WOODWARD: This is the theme of the Iraqi "face," give it to them.

SEC. RUMSFELD: It's their country, yeah. More accurately, it would be give it back.

MR. WOODWARD: Did you ever say that to Jerry Bremer, it's their country? Because he's running around -- this is public -- we are sovereign, we are the occupiers, you are occupied. I mean, he is just -- pardon me -- sticking it in their face that we have got our wheel on your neck.

SEC. RUMSFELD: My whole approach has been, as I've said here, that it is their country. They're going to have to run it. We're going to have to take our hands off the bicycle seat, and we have to try to do it in a way that we find a great balance so that they can pull up their socks, grab their country, make a go of it, and we will not create a dependency and we will not feed the insurgency. And John Abizaid and I have been very much in agreement with it and the president was.

MR. WOODWARD: And the president, most recently, though -- hasn't he become -- at least from his public comments -- I think he's made it much clearer since the Maliki government has been set up. Is that fair?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, I mean, he -- I think if you asked him, he would probably say that what I just said was correct, that the numerous discussions with Abizaid and Rumsfeld and him, on that subject-- (inaudible) -- that we found -- I can't say what he was thinking, but I certainly didn't find him disagreeing with Abizaid on it.

MR. WOODWARD: This General "Spider" Marks, who was the chief intelligence officer from McKiernan, had doubts about WMD intelligence before the war, like you.

Did you ever -- did that information ever get to you that there's a two-star general out there who has doubts about WMD?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Do you know who he is?

LT GEN RENUART: He was General Dave McKiernan's chief of intelligence.

SEC. RUMSFELD: But he was not Tommy Franks'?

LT GEN RENUART: No, he was not. He worked down at the land component level. He was a one-star at the time for the Army.

MR. WOODWARD: He was a two.

LT GEN RENUART: I guess he was a two-star. He had been recently promoted to a two-star when he went public.

SEC. RUMSFELD: No. I mean, we dealt with the combatant commanders' people. I may have met him --

MR. WOODWARD: Can you give me, for the record here, some idea of your feelings about whether WMD would be there or not?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Sure. I don't know how much is colored by what's happened, to be honest. I just don't. I'll tell you I was very worried about it, and I developed confidence over time, and conviction, as I think everyone did. And I particularly -- (inaudible) -- after I knew that Colin Powell was spending day after day on the subject with George Tenet and with the intel people and with his intel people and with Condi Rice over at his house drafting his U.N. speech. And I was not into the intel piece of it, but I worry about intelligence. I have to. I was worried about it in a micro sense because -- it wasn't so micro, but in a DOD sense -- because our military people were worried about it. They saw the same intelligence. And every morning, they're getting up and putting on their chemical suits -- not for the hell of it; because they were worried about having their troops killed by chemical weapons. None of us ever believed they had nuclear weapons, although we did have knowledge that in the earlier Gulf War they had -- the United States intelligence community had considerably underestimated the pace at which their nuclear program had progressed. But the only real worry we had was chemical -- it's very high on the list -- and a question about biological.

Now, the fact that these people -- 100-plus thousand -- put those chemical suits on every day as they were going north tells you that the --

MR. WOODWARD: They're believers.

SEC. RUMSFELD: You bet. You bet.

MR. WOODWARD: My wife, Elsa, whom you've met --

SEC. RUMSFELD: I've met her, yeah --

MR. WOODWARD: -- believes that if you'd been made CIA director instead of secretary of Defense in the Bush administration, you would have picked the hole and discovered that maybe WMD was not there.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, I don't know. Tell her thank you very much. I'm not sure I'm as smart as that. I mean, you've got an awful lot of intelligent people working on that problem and doing their best, and they came out where they came out.

MR. WOODWARD: Do you -- there's a November 11th NSC meeting -- 2003, again. This is when the CIA comes in and says there's an insurgency out there. And you were quoted in the notes telling the CIA briefer, "I may disagree with you," and the president did not think it had reached the point where there was an insurgency. And the CIA was very actively pushing there's an insurgency out there.

Do you remember your thinking in that period?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I don't. I can't put it in time and place. I do remember the phrase "insurgency," the phrase "guerrilla war" and the al Qaeda terrorist activity. And I don't know which month all this was. But I watched that thing evolve and change, and I watched the military people -- I finally got a military dictionary and started looking up what those words mean and what they conjure up. And I raised a question in a public briefing on the subject.

MR. WOODWARD: I remember that.

SEC. RUMSFELD: And I said gee, you know, beauty is in the eye of the beholder, I guess, and people have different ways of characterizing it, and I didn't have conviction.

MR. WOODWARD: When did you get it, sir, that there was an insurgency, because clearly there is?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I didn't have conviction that I was the one who ought to use -- set the phrase as to what we would call it at any given time; let me put it that way. It has been, for a long time, characterized by a mixture of things, multiple problems.

MR. WOODWARD: I understand.

SEC. RUMSFELD: And it has evolved over time. It's not been static, it's been dynamic.

MR. WOODWARD: And so did -- I mean, there was just a hesitation on your part that --

SEC. RUMSFELD: I did not think it would be useful if I called it one thing and Abizaid called it something else, for example.

MR. WOODWARD: And this issue of who was the enemy in Iraq -- I understand there's still briefings that the intel people give on that.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Sure -- a lot of people.

MR. WOODWARD: And somebody told me that in fact the mystery has deepened.

SEC. RUMSFELD: It has. It's gotten more complex. When General Casey was back here last time, if I'm not mistaken, he briefed the NSC and the president -- certainly me -- and characterized that issue as having become more complex.

MR. WOODWARD: So we know less?

SEC. RUMSFELD: No, no, we know more. They're getting so much more intelligence now. And they're looking -- they're seeing schisms and gaps and seams between elements, and they're finding people who are doing things for money as opposed to love or conviction. But it is just a fact that the world is round, it's not flat. It's evolved and changing.

MR. WOODWARD: And the number of attacks are going up actually.

SEC. RUMSFELD: That's probably true. It is also probably true that our data's better, and we're categorizing more things as attacks. A random round can be an attack and -- all the way up to killing 50 people some place. So you've got a whole fruit bowl of different things -- a banana and an apple and an orange.

MR. WOODWARD: But somebody said up to 900 attacks within one week last month.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I can't validate that. I'd have to go back and look.

MR. WOODWARD: I mean, that's unexploded IEDs, that's counted as an attack; detonated IEDs, close engagements, standoff attacks and attacks on Iraqi authorities.

SEC. RUMSFELD: What do you suppose how many things of those character occur in countries that aren't at war in a given week?

MR. WOODWARD: I've heard you --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Detroit, Chicago, anywhere. I mean, you look at the number of homicides and rapes and armed robberies and attacks and shootings, and goodness knows -- (inaudible) --

[Passage deleted mutual consent and ground-rule]

MR. WOODWARD: You stayed on as secretary of Defense in the second term, obviously, and there were lots of people close to the president who were recommending that he needed a whole new national security team. And I want to be specific with you. Rice, Hadley, Card and Powell all told him you need an entire new national security team. He moved some people around and you stayed.

What is your understanding of how that happened? And help me with --

SEC. RUMSFELD: No --

MR. WOODWARD: What happened?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I did not get engaged with those people in recommending to the president that he ought to hire somebody else. I did, obviously, let him know that I was available to do something else in my life.

MR. WOODWARD: You did?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Sure. And I think if we remember the term ended. It's a fresh start - we all look around. I remember telling him and I think Andy Card there's no one around here -- certainly there are no indispensable people in this business. He ought to do what sets him on the right path. But what specifically they did I don't know.

MR. WOODWARD: When did the president ask you to stay?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I don't know that he did. I don't recall that he asked me to stay.

MR. WOODWARD: But you indicated you would go or stay depending on his wish.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I let that be well known.

MR. WOODWARD: And a number of people have said the president talked to Cheney about it, and Cheney said you can't change the secretary of Defense in the middle of the war.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I don't know that. And I also don't know if that's true.

MR. WOODWARD: It's happened.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Sure.

MR. WOODWARD: But I think in the 24-hour-seven world that you live, you do that. There's no way you can say it's not some sort of judgment.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Interesting. I don't know. I mean, I --

MR. WOODWARD: Did you want to stay?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I'm here. I really wanted and do want what's best for the country and what the president feels is appropriate. He's got a tough job, and he's got to do it his way.

MR. WOODWARD: But there was never a moment, a meeting where he said I want you to stay?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I don't recall that there was. I'm quite confident there was never a moment when he said I want you to leave. (Laughter.)

MR. WOODWARD: Fair enough.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I'd remember that. But I don't remember the other.

MR. WOODWARD: But there was a moment when you said I'll stay or leave if you want.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yeah, I mean I can remember saying that to Andy Card. I can remember saying that to the vice president. I can remember saying something like that to the president, but I don't remember precisely what. I just don't want to get in the habit of resigning every 15 minutes and having them feel they have to beg you to stay. I submitted my resignation in writing twice since I've been here.

MR. WOODWARD: In writing you actually submitted a letter.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yes.

MR. WOODWARD: What did the president say to you when you --

SEC. RUMSFELD: He handed the first one back and said no. And the second one, he handed back, and I handed it back to him, and I said you ought to keep this.

MR. WOODWARD: And?

SEC. RUMSFELD: And he said no, he did not want me to go. He said it publicly. So, I mean, I don't know why --

MR. WOODWARD: How much time was it between the two letters?

SEC. RUMSFELD: - theres a fixation on this. I don't know.

MR. WOODWARD: Was it weeks or something like that? Was there a reason, or just "I hereby resign"?

SEC. RUMSFELD: No. One was a relatively short letter and the other was a relatively longer letter.

MR. WOODWARD: A longer letter saying?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Oh, I don't know.

MR. WOODWARD: It would help for the history of this --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Your book is not the history of this. (Laughter.) I've told you that.

MR. RUMSFELD: You admit it! (Laughter.)

MR. RUMSFELD: It's not the Bible.

MR. WOODWARD: It's not the Bible; I agree. But it's history -- or between journalism and history. Listen, I totally agree. No one is -- I wake up in the middle of the night thinking I don't know anything about this, like Rumsfeld's letter to the president -- it was long.

SEC. RUMSFELD: What else?

MR. WOODWARD: Okay. We've done the bicycle seat thing, which I think is a very important theme in all of this. And it's -- because, as you know, somebody like Steve Hadley kind of has the view -- I'm sure you've heard this -- that Iraq is an abused child, that we need to help it along, we need to keep our hand on the bicycle seat.

Hadley said after the first term to colleagues that the foreign policy of the administration deserved a B-minus for the way it was formulated and a D-minus for implementation. Do you agree?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Oh, gosh, I'm not going to be judgmental.

MR. WOODWARD: Do you grade it at all?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I'm not going to grade it.

MR. WOODWARD: Why?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, I don't know that I would -- I'm more interested in precision and accuracy and fairness than to allow me to try to, off the top of my head, characterize policy in that broad, macro sense. I just don't know that that's useful or if I'm the right person to be doing it or if this is the right time to be doing it.

MR. WOODWARD: About 18 months ago, Secretary Rice sent a team to Iraq. And they --

SEC. RUMSFELD: If I were going to do it, I might flip those without using the numbers, the letters. But I think there's been execution in a lot of things that has been very good.

MR. WOODWARD: The formulation is maybe the weakness?

SEC. RUMSFELD: No, I just -- I just don't -- I'd rather not do it. I don't think I'm in a position to do it. I haven't thought it through carefully

MR. WOODWARD: It's interesting. You've told Hadley -- or he's reported to others that the interagency process is broken, a number of times --

SEC. RUMSFELD: I think it is that in the 21st century, in the Information Age, we're still functioning with an interagency process and a governmental structure that is in the Industrial Age in the last century. And it would be like if the DOD tried to function today without Goldwater-Nichols, where each service goes off to fight -- the Navy war and the Army war and the Air Force war, and that's -- that doesn't work in this environment. And it is not -- my comment about the interagency being broken is not in any way meant at characterizing the people who are in it or even the structure that they control. It's a reflection of the fact that the government structure is a leftover from an earlier era. And it is something that I think all of us feel on occasion.

MR. WOODWARD: Have you told the president this?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Sure.

MR. WOODWARD: What does he say?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I don't say what he says.

MR. WOODWARD: But that would be something worth fixing, wouldn't it?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Indeed.

MR. WOODWARD: And it almost kind of should go at the top of the list of let's fix.

SEC. RUMSFELD: You might want to give him the memo I did -- the speech I gave at the Truman Library where I talked about the fact that Truman was at the juncture of the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. And he fashioned a number of institutions that were appropriate for the period coming forward, and successive presidents have used those institutions. This president is at the end of the Cold War and at the juncture of the global war on terror and the types of problems he's facing and the Information Age. And he's trying to fight a war in a set of new realities as to how people communicate with each other and function electronically. And it's a vastly different task, much more complex today. The time pressures are very much greater.

MR. WOODWARD: Eighteen months ago -- February '05 -- Rice sent out a team to evaluate the situation in Iraq, and they came back and said Iraq at that time was a failed state.

Do you think in February '05, was that a --

SEC. RUMSFELD: I don't know that I ever saw that, did you --

MR. WOODWARD: No. It was internal State report. Does that reflect what you would have seen 18 months ago? Is this a failed state?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, clearly, if you don't invest in your infrastructure for decades, and if you run a repressive regime that discourages and penalizes entrepreneurial activity and innovation and creativity and assuming responsibility, you end up with a group of people who will either do exactly what they're told -- and that just doesnt make any sense -- or they cheat and lie and dont do what they're told but pretend they do.

MR. WOODWARD: Corruption is a big issue, isn't it? In fact, there was an NSC meeting where you and your J5 -- speaking out on the importance of corruption in Iraq. Is that correct?

STAFF: Well, I don't recall the specifics to the corruption. It continued to be a problem for us in --

SEC. RUMSFELD: It's a problem not just there, but in lots of parts of the world. We're worried about it in Latin America because it gives democracy a bad name --

MR. WOODWARD: (Laughs.)

SEC. RUMSFELD: It does. And people expect that a democratic system -- (inaudible) -- like America, and it ends up with people being corrupt, and then they go to -- (inaudible).

(Cross talk.)

MR. WOODWARD: In August '05, Kissinger wrote and has talked to the president about this at length. You know he meets with the president regularly?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I helped set it up.

MR. WOODWARD: You did. And you and Kissinger are supposed to be at odds.

SEC. RUMSFELD: no thats baloney

MR. WOODWARD: And he says -- Kissinger says victory over the insurgency is the only meaningful exit strategy in this war.

Do you agree?

SEC. RUMSFELD: He's right. Sure. No, no, I'd qualify it. First of all, I don't agree that he said that.

MR. WOODWARD: Oh, he did. He's written it publicly and he's --

SEC. RUMSFELD: He may have, I think ultimately, the victory over the insurgency will be made by the Iraqis because it will take time. As I mentioned in the memo I showed you, it could take eight to 10 years. Insurgencies have a tendency to do that. Victory -- is that the word he used?

MR. WOODWARD: Yes. Victory by the insurgency is the only meaningful exit strategy. It's a great line.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yeah, but I would say that our exit strategy is to have the Iraqi government and security forces capable of managing a lower level insurgency and ultimately achieving victory over it and repressing it over time. But it would be a period after we may very well not have large numbers of people there.

MR. WOODWARD: The key word in that sentence, though, is victory. You have to have victory.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yeah, absolutely.

MR. WOODWARD: You can't have --

SEC. RUMSFELD: You can't live with it for 50 years and let it simmer there.

MR. WOODWARD: And General Casey's campaign plan calls for neutralizing the insurgency, which has technical meanings. And I understand he's said, look, we haven't neutralized it yet; we've contained it.

Is that correct?

SEC. RUMSFELD: If you say it is. I don't know --

MR. WOODWARD: (Inaudible.)

SEC. RUMSFELD: You said he said it.

MR. WOODWARD: Yes, sir.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Is it correct that he said it?

MR. WOODWARD: I sure believe so.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, then he said it.

MR. WOODWARD: Now you're on top, wrestling. I mean, the question was do you agree it has not been neutralized, only contained?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yeah, yeah.

MR. WOODWARD: Okay.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Thus far.

MR. WOODWARD: Okay. Last fall, Secretary Rice went over this saying the overall Iraq strategy is clear, hold and build. You had some objections to that.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yeah, I was a little worried that -- and we talked about it. I mean, clearly, you need a bumper sticker, and that's what they were looking for. And they felt that a bumper sticker was needed. I didn't need one. We've got our job to do; we were doing it. And they had to fashion something like that. And they're right. If you're going to communicate with multiple audiences, including ours -- our Congress, our public, the Iraqi people -- they may want to know, well, what are you doing? Do you have a strategy? Do you have a plan? The answer is, we do have a plan.

But the question was clear, is one thing. And my problem was that I wanted -- if that is our strategy for the United States, then I worried about it, because in fact, I wanted -- we've got -- what? -- 263,000 Iraqi security forces. I wanted them clearing and them holding. And I didn't want the idea to be that it was just us. And so that was my concern, because that is grabbing a hold of the bicycle seat and hanging on for dear life.

MR. WOODWARD: Forever.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Forever. Clear, hold and build worried me -- for the reason I mentioned earlier -- on reconstruction, because that's going to take 30 years and it's going to take a pile of money and it is not going to be the taxpayers' money -- our taxpayers' money.

MR. WOODWARD: Someone said you objected to it so much, a half hour before the president was adopting that in the speech you called Andy Card and said take it out.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Probably true, yeah. I was concerned that it had a connotation that sounded good at the moment, but that it could, over time, come back and -- because of the nuances in it -- not be seen right. So then we tried to define it. We left the words and we tried to define it in a way that was accurate.

MR. WOODWARD: And what was that definition that's accurate, do you know?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, the way I said it. In other words, it's not just us clearing, it's the coalition. And the holding -- it's clearly increasingly them and not us. And the building is we want to help create environments that they can reconstruct their own country, and that type of thing. And those refinements are in there now.

MR. WOODWARD: In May, two months ago, one assessment said the Sunni Arab insurgency is gaining strength and increasing capacity, despite political progress and Iraqi security force development.

Does that sound right to you? That was one written assessment --

SEC. RUMSFELD: When?

MR. WOODWARD: Two months ago, six weeks ago.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Gosh, I don't know. I don't want to comment on it. I'd have to go -- I read so many of those intelligence reports and they are all over the lot. In a given day, you can see one from one agency, and one from another agency, and then I'll ask Casey or Abizaid what they think about it or Pete Pace, "is that your view?" and trying to triangulate and see what people think, but it changes from month to month. I'm not going to get tied to saying I agree or don't agree with something like that.

MR. WOODWARD: Just so we can have some -- you remember this snowflake from '01? I have to give a copy of this to Gene too. Maybe the problems in the Navy might be systemic, -- it's one thing to make mistakes when you are pushing the envelope; it is another thing if you make mistakes walking to work.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Oh, I can't remember.

You don't remember that?

MR. WOODWARD: Do you remember the anchor chain memos?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Oh, I wrote that myself. You bet.

MR. WOODWARD: Yeah. I've got four drafts of it.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Do you really?

MR. WOODWARD: Yes, sir. I wanted to give you a copy --

SEC. RUMSFELD: It got better.

MR. WOODWARD: What?

SEC. RUMSFELD: It got better.

MR. WHITMAN: It did. (Laughter.)

MR. WOODWARD: I mean, it really -- tell me, were you -- it almost looks like you struggled, if I may be frank with you, trying to define the number of problems and the magnitude of the task.

SEC. RUMSFELD: This is a difficult job here. This is not easy -- this department. And I can remember, having been here a month or two and standing up at my desk and at night reflecting over this whole thing and saying, okay, I was asked to do this job, I've accepted. And what is it? How do you define the job? And what are the problems you are facing, and what are the obstacles to getting it done? And what's doable and what isn't doable? And the more I reflected on it, I ended up coming up with this kind of an analysis that --

MR. WOODWARD: In the end saying we won't be able to do it for this president, we'll have to do it for the next president.

SEC. RUMSFELD: You know, in any administration that's almost true of everything. The people that they -- each president either benefits or is disadvantaged by the decisions of his predecessor. And each president and each Congress has at their fingertips only those things that were invested in five, 10, 15, 20 years before. And if you think about it -- I approved the M-1 tank that was used in the Gulf War and was used in Iraq, back in 1975. The F-16, which we're using, which is what bombed Zarqawi, I was at the fly-over for the F-16 in Fort Worth back in 1974 or 1975. That's the nature of this. These decisions you make play out over a long period of time, either to the benefit of the country or, conversely, to the detriment of the country if you fail to do something.

MR. WOODWARD: Do you know, as I look at the history of these past three years, postwar, one of the things a number of military people, active military people have said to me is that, particularly with Garner and Bremer -- until Casey and Negroponte got there, it was kind of a pick up team, and that for some reason, the government assigned a pickup team the most important thing that they were doing. Is that fair?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Oh, I don't think so, no. I mean --

MR. WOODWARD: Garner had to beg George Casey for people. He was then director of the Joint Staff and Casey said to him, you sound like this is going to be 24/7. And Garner said you're damn right. But I don't think it's.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Were still trying to find people to go over and advise the ministries. Not at the Ministry of Defense or Ministry of Interior. You've got about 485 people that we haven't filled and all the other ministries in Iraq. How do you find people that other Departments arent deploying? I mean, our government's not arranged to do that.

MR. WOODWARD: To me, looking at it, looks like a pickup team was thrown together in a way that did not get the attention that we now know it should have had.

SEC. RUMSFELD: That doesn't sound correct to me.

MR. WOODWARD: Doesn't it?

SEC. RUMSFELD: No. I mean, if you think about it, we had 150,000 troops over there. We had terrific military leadership. We had a back office here, which was functioning full-time. We had enormous numbers of people of real talent who volunteered to go over there, spent six months Larry DiRita went over, Suzanne -- my top secretary here went over there. These people flocked over there to do it, and they did a darn good job.

Is it a tough job? You bet. Is it a heck of a lot harder than people sitting in Washington think it is? You bet. But they did it, and they did well at it, and they worked their heads off, and it was 24/7. But the fact that you did not have in being a government or a set of government advisers for an entire country and that you could then implant and that you paid to stay and wait year after year after year after year --

MR. WOODWARD: Until this moment comes --

SEC. RUMSFELD: -- in case you don't need them is nonsensical. Of course, you can be pejorative and say it's a pickup team, but it wasn't a pickup team at all. It was a bunch of -- Jerry Bremer is not a pickup team. Jay Garner isn't. These are talented people. And the team they put together are very talented people. I mean, look where they are now. Meghan O'Sullivan, she was over there; she's working at the White House, and a whole bunch of people who were involved there. I think that would be a mischaracterization.

MR. WOODWARD: The number of --

SEC. RUMSFELD: You would be embarrassed in history if you did something like that but wouldn't want to do that. As your old friends say, that would be wrong. (Laughter.)

MR. WOODWARD: Talk to some military people and they say, you know, did the war get subcontracted to the military? Where is the rest of the government? I get lots of people saying that.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I hear it all the time. Yeah. And it's one of those things that -- I mean, look at the sign up there: "We're at war; are you doing all you can?" See the thing on the wall --

MR. WOODWARD: Right. "We're at war; are you doing all you can?" Uncle Sam pointing at you.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yeah, yeah. And, I mean, this department is at war. And on the other hand, that's why it's here. The other departments are not here for that. They've been asked to do something that they were not organized, trained and equipped to do, and it takes time, and it's hard, and there's resistance in the Congress. And there are -- people are attracted to different organizations depending on what their bent is. And the people that are attracted here are people who are ready to be deployed and ready to go into danger zones. And the people who are attracted in other departments may or may not be. And if they're asked to, it wasn't something they signed up for, and it may not be career enhancing. In this department --

MR. WOODWARD: Can you share the concern that military people have?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, sure. I do. My lord, can I share it? I'm here!

MR. WOODWARD: Can you mobilize the rest -- help mobilize the rest of the government?

SEC. RUMSFELD: We've tried and tried and tried.

MR. WOODWARD: And?

SEC. RUMSFELD: And we've had some success and some areas where we've not succeeded.

MR. WOODWARD: It's not equal burden sharing, is it?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, no. And it -- I mean, if you think about it, it took us I don't know how long.

Gene or Bill?

We needed money for the Afghan security forces, and we couldn't get a nickel anywhere. And the funds for foreign countries --

MR. WOODWARD: When was this, sir?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Right after the -- 2001.

LT GEN RENUART: Fifty thousand dollar French bill.

SEC. RUMSFELD: And we finally went and tin-cupped the French.

LT GEN RENUART:: Yes, sir, borrowed money from the French. They gave us money.

SEC. RUMSFELD: And we couldn't get the Congress to do anything. We couldn't get the government here to do anything legally, and we knew we needed to train Afghan soldiers. Now, why couldn't we? Well, because the Department of State has the training plan, and they've programmed out two or three years in advance. And they're divided up by the subcommittees in Congress. They decide who gets that money. Well, no one really thought of Afghanistan back then. And trying to get the government to spin on a dime and adjust, it just doesn't do it.

MR. RENUART: It took us five years and we now have what's called 1206 authority -- just passed by the Congress a few months ago. It doesn't appropriate money; it gives the secretary authority to spend $200 million on training and equipping indigenous forces out of his own pocket. So we're one step at a time.

SEC. RUMSFELD: And it is the most cost-effective thing we can do. We can put five or 10 Afghan or Iraqi soldiers out there for every one of ours.

MR. WOODWARD: You know, you've got lots of people in the military who are quite unhappy that the rest of the government hasn't showed up with the same level --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Dont say you have, we have --

MR. WOODWARD: We have. Okay, fair point, fair point.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Youre a citizen. I've got a lot of rocks in my knapsack, and I don't mind you dumping some more in there. But I like to think we're all part of this country.

MR. WHITMAN -- the last one.

MR. WOODWARD: Yes, this is -- no, I -- here's what -- I numbered the questions, and I had 53 questions, and I have 24 more, and I'd like to come back.

SEC. RUMSFELD: So you've done about half.

MR. WOODWARD: Just about half.

SEC. RUMSFELD: You can come back.

MR. WOODWARD: Thank you. That's -- and I'm a real short fuse on this. I was exactly at that point, I will tell you, with your friend, Alan Greenspan, and President Bush in interviews. And I got through half the questions and they both said exactly what you said -- you can come back. And they both said the next day, "I don't know that that's possible." It would be really helpful -- tomorrow or --

SEC. RUMSFELD: We could probably do it in the afternoon -- early afternoon I could probably stay here. I was trying to get out of here at some point, but I've got an extra hour isnt going to make a difference.

MR. WOODWARD: That would be great. And let me know.

Part II

Der Kommissionsbericht 9/11: bewußte Fälschung

sfux — 2006-09-13T06:24:00Z

Karl Weiss - Es darf heute wohl als gesichert gelten: Die Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten hat einen wesentlichen Anteil an der Täterschaft bei den Anschläge vom 11. September 2001.

Es gibt Hunderte von klaren Anzeichen dafür. Über eines der wichtigsten soll hier berichtet werden. Wäre alle anderen Anzeichen nicht existent, allein dieses wäre bereits ein guter Grund, nicht mehr die Verschwörungstheorie zu glauben, die uns die Mainstream-Medien versuchen ins Gehirn zu hämmern: Osama Bin Ladens neunzehn Gefolgsleute hätten diese Attentate allein und ohne Unterstützung der US-Regierung durchführen können. Die Regierungsstellen hätten zwar wesentliche Fehler gemacht, aber dies seien eben die üblichen Pleiten, Pech und Pannen.

Die Rede ist vom Bericht der Senatskommission des US-Senats, die einzige Untersuchung von außerhalb des engen Kreises der Regierungsbeschäftigten der Vereinigten Staaten, die es bisher über die Ereignisse des 11. September 2001 gibt. Die Senatskommission (im folgenden 9/11-Commission genannt) hatte Zugang zu den vorhandenen Dokumenten, Zeugen und Berichten, die es gibt. Sie hat aber in krimineller Weise alles aus dem Fokus ihrer Untersuchung entfernt, das sie zu Schlußfolgerungen hätte kommen lassen können, die denen der offiziellen FBI-Theorie widersprechen. Soweit sie solche Tatsachen erfuhr, wurden sie bewußt ignoriert.

Das kann kein Zufall gewesen sein. Die Kommissionsmitglieder müssen gewußt haben, was sie verbergen sollten.

Hier ist die Aufzählung der Zeugen bzw. Insider, die von der 9/11-Commission entweder nicht gehört wurden oder deren Zeugnis bewußt aus den Untersuchungsergebnissen herausgelassen wurden. Diese Liste ist entnommen einer Veröffentlichung der Organisation der National Security Whistleblowers (Vereinigung der Denunzianten der nationalen Sicherheit).

1. John M. Cole. Langjähriger Spezialist des FBI für Gegenspionage, als solcher zuständig für die Gegenspionagetätigkeit des FBI in Indien, Pakistan und Afghanistan. Er hat wichtiges Insider-Wissen über Vorgänge, die unmittelbar zu den Anschlägen führten. Obwohl er von einer Reihe von Zeugen als Schlüssel-Zeuge genannt wurde, hat die 9/11-Commission ihn nie gehört.

2. John Vincent, ehemaliger Spezialagent für Gegenspionage des FBI, pensioniert 2002. Er hat zusammen mit Robert Wright vor den Anschlägen versucht, internes falsches Vorgehen des FBI bezüglich von Al Quaida-Aktivitäten auf finanzieller Ebene und mit Geldwäsche zu berichten und zu berichtigen. Er wurde zwar von der Kommission gehört, man fragte ihn aber nur zu unwichtigen und administrativen Details und ließ ihn nicht vortragen, was er über unerklärliche Falsch-Handlungen weiß.

3. Robert Wright, altgedienter Spezial-Agent für Gegenspionage des FBI. Er wurde von der FBI-Führung im Januar 2001 von seiner Aufgabe abgezogen, eine Terroristenzelle zu beobachten, die später an den Anschlägen beteiligt war. Dies hat verhindert, daß Aktivitäten, die zu den Anschlägen führten, aufgedeckt wurden. Drei Monate vor den Anschlägen hat er in einem bewegenden internen Memo des FBI die Führung dafür verantwortlich gemacht, daß mögliche Terroranschläge bewußt nicht verhindert werden. Das FBI hat einer Zeugenvernehmung von Robert Wright durch die Comission nicht zugestimmt. Diese hätte aber die Macht gehabt, ihn trotzdem vorzuladen. Dies geschah aber nicht.

4. Sibel Edmonds, frühere Sprachen-Spezialistin des FBI. Sie arbeitete im Bereich der Gegenspionage und Terrorismusabwehr bezüglich des Iran, der Türkei und türkisch sprechender zentralasiatischen Länder. Sie offerierte der Commission ihre speziellen Kenntnisse bezüglich falschen Vorgehens des FBI in Bezug auf die Verhinderung der Anschläge, wurde aber erst gehört, als Familienmitglieder von Opfern der Anschläge in der Öffentlichkeit darauf bestanden. Ihre Aussage wurde von der 9/11-Commission komplett ignoriert.

5. Behrooz Sarshar, früherer Sprachenspezialist des FBI. Er arbeitete bei Gegenspionage und Terrorabwehr mit Bezug auf Iran und Afghanistan. Er war es, der die frühen und eindeutigen Warnungen vor den bevorstehenden Anschlägen des 11. September 2001 übersetzte und weitergab. Seine Aussagen wurden vom Büro des FBI-Dierektors Mueller bestätigt. Auch er wurde erst von der Commission gehört, als Familienangehörige von Opfern öffentlich darauf bestanden. Auch seine Aussage wurde von der 9/11-Commision vollständig ignoriert.

6. Mike German, Spezial FBI-Agent für Terrorabwehr. Er berichtete innerhalb des FBI über die falsche Handhabung von Informationen über die Anschläge des 11. September 2001, die ernste Übertretungen von FBI-Regeln und von Gesetzen beinhalteten. Obwohl er sich mehrfach der 9/11-Commission als Zeuge anbot, wurde er nie gehört.

7. Gilbert Graham, ehemaliger Spezial-Agent des FBI für Gegenspionage, pensioniert 2002. Er wurde, wie John M. Cole, von Zeugen als Schlüsselzeuge benannt für das FBI-interne Blockieren von Aktivitäten, welche die Anschläge hätten verhindern können. Die 9/11-Commission hat ihn nie gehört.

8. Coleen Rowley, früheres Mitglied des FBI-Verwaltungsrats des Büros in Minneapolis. Sie berichtete, daß in Minneapolis aufgrund der Festnahme von Moussaoui konkrete Hinweise auf die bevorstehenden Anschläge vorlagen. Es gab Aktivitäten des FBI-Hauptquartiers, um jegliche Folgerungen daraus vor der Durchführung der Anschläge zu verhindern. Außer ihr waren eine Reihe von FBI- Agenten involviert, die alle hätten bestätigen können,was sie sagte. Weder sie noch die anderen Agenten aus Minneapolis wurden von der 9/11-Commission gehört.

9. Oberstleutnant Anthony Shaffer, DIA (Geheimdienst der Streitkräfte). Er übergab und erläuterte der Commission die Erkenntnisse, die mit dem Projekt Able Danger von ihm und seinen Mitarbeitern gewonnen worden waren. Sie beinhalteten den ganzen Terrorplot von 9/11. Auf Anweisung von übergeordneten Stellen ließ man diese Erkenntnisse verschwinden. Die Zeugenaussagen vom Oberstleutnant Shaffer und seinen Mitarbeitern wurden von der 9/11-Commission ignoriert, die von ihm angegebenen Dokumente wurden nie angefordert und im Kommissionsbericht ist nichts davon enthalten.

10. Dick Stoltz, früherer Spezialagent der ATF-Behörde (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firarms, Behörde für die Überwachung von Alkohol, Tabak und Schußwaffen), der langjährig Undercover im Waffenhandel (Operation Diamondback) gearbeitet hat. Obwohl die von ihm ausgespähte Gruppe in New Jersey Waffengeschäfte mit Verbindungsleuten der Taliban, von Al Quaida und von Osama Bin Laden selbst eingefädelt hatte, wurde die Arbeit zum Ausheben der ganzen Bande mit der Festnahme von einigen wenigen Verdächtigen im Juni 2001, also kurz vor den Anschlägen, unterbrochen und die weiteren Recherchen unmöglich gemacht. Obwohl sich Gruppen von Angehörigen von Opfern für das Hören dieses Zeugen einsetzten, wurde er nie befragt.

11. Bogdan Dzakovic, FAA (Federal Aviation Administration, Bundes Luftfahrt Behörde). Er war als Spezial Agent der verantwortliche Leiter des Anti-Terror-Teams der FAA. Er hat im Vorfeld der Anschläge vergeblich versucht, die Sicherheit gegen Entführungen zu verbessern, wurde aber von oben gebremst. Er machte seine Zeugenaussage vor der 9/11-Commission und übergab die entsprechenden schriftlichen Berichte. Seine Aussagen und der Inhalt der Dokumente tauchen im Bericht nicht auf.

12. Linda Lewis, frühere Spezialistin für Notfall-Programme der Regierungsbehörde USDA. Sie versuchte über Jahre nationale und örtliche Notfall-Programme gegen Angriffe auf Regierungs- und wichtige öffentliche Gebäude zu erreichen, wurde aber abgeblockt. Sie versuchte die FEMA dazu zu bringen, daß Notfall-Kommunikationseinrichtungen geschaffen würden, ohne Erfolg. Dies führte u.a. dazu, daß Hunderte von Feuerwehrmännern und Polizisten im brennenden World Trade Center nicht mehr gewarnt werden konnten und starben. Ihre diesbezüglichen Aussagen hat die 9/11-Commission nie aufgenommen.

13. Mark Burton, Analysenspezialist des NSA (National Security Agency, Nationale Sicherheits Agentur). Er ist der Autor der über 300 Seiten dicken Global Thread Summary, in der rechtzeitig vor den Anschlägen Kenntnisse über deren Vorbereitung und Abwehr enthalten waren. Er schickte die betreffenden Auszüge an die 9/11-Commission, wurde aber völlig ignoriert, nie gehört und die Informationen im Abschlußbericht unterschlagen.

Das völlige Unterdrücken aller dieser Zeugnisse und Unterlagen (auch noch vieler anderer, die hier nicht genannt sind) ist unmöglich zufällig zustande gekommen. Es wurde bewußt und gezielt alles aus dem Bericht der Commission herausgelassen, was zum Verdacht führen könnte, Regierungsstellen hätten nicht einfach nur Fehler gemacht, sondern bewußt verhindert, daß die Anschläge gestoppt wurden oder sogar an der Planung der Anschläge mitgearbeitet.

Wenn die 9/11-Commission aus von der Regierung handverlesenen Politikern dies bewußt getan hat, dann muß sie schwerwiegende Gründe dafür gehabt haben. Es gibt keine andere logische Erklärung: Sie ist Teil der Unterdrückung von Informationen über die Wahrheit der Anschläge des 11. September 2001.

Sibel Edmonds: The 9/11 Commission: A Play on Nothing in Three Acts

Zeugin des Kennedy-Attentats gestorben

sfux — 2006-09-07T07:08:00Z

SDA - Die frühere texanische First Lady und direkte Zeugin des Attentats auf John F. Kennedy, Nellie Connally, ist am Samstag tot aufgefunden worden.

Connally sass am 22. November 1963 mit in der Limousine, als die tödlichen Schüsse auf den früheren US-Präsidenten fielen. Sie war die letzte lebende Insassin des Fahrzeugs.

Bei der Fahrt hatte sie Kennedy auf die begeisterten Menschenmengen am Strassenrand hingewiesen. "Herr Präsident, sie können sicherlich nicht sagen, dass Dallas sie nicht liebt", sagte sie ihm, kurz bevor er von den Schüssen getötet und ihr Ehemann schwer verletzt wurde.

Connally beharrte stets darauf, dass Kennedy von zwei Schüssen und ihr Gatte John Connally von einem dritten getroffen wurde. Die Kommission, die das Attentat untersuchte, kam hingegen zu dem Schluss, dass eine Kugel wohlmöglich Kennedys Körper durchschlug und dann ihren Gatten verletzte.

Eine dritte Kugel habe das Auto vielleicht verfehlt. "Ich werden jeden bekämpfen, der mit mir über diese drei Schüsse streitet", sagte Connally 1998 dem Magazin "Newsweek". "Ich weiss, was in dem Auto geschah."

Einige Verschwörungstheorien besagen, dass - wenn es drei Schüsse gab, die das Auto trafen und einen weiteren, der es verfehlte - es mehr als einen Attentäter gegeben haben muss und nicht nur Lee Harvey Oswald, den die Kommission für die Ermordung verantwortlich machte.

Connallys Ehemann, damals Gouverneur des US-Bundesstaates, erholte sich von seinen Verletzungen und setzte seine politische Karriere fort. Er starb 1993. Ein Jahr später starb auch Kennedys Witwe Jacqueline. Sie war die vierte Insassin des Wagens.

Die 87-jährige Connally wurde einem Freund ihrer Familie zufolge am Samstag tot an ihrem Schreibtisch gefunden. Mit ihrem Tod habe man nicht gerechnet, ihr Gesundheitszusand sei gut gewesen.

"Peace Activists" with a Secret Agenda

sfux — 2006-08-22T06:00:00Z

Part Three: Stealth Trotskyism and the Mystery of the WWP

Kevin Coogan - One of the many ironies of the IAC/WWP story is that a group now aligned with some of the most dogmatic elements in whats left of the Left is itself most likely run by secret Trotskyists. Given the hermit-like quality of the WWP, its hard to know for sure. Even accurate estimates of the group's members are hard to come by.

In the 1980s most conventional estimates were that it had somewhere between three and four hundred followers. Thanks to the IAC in particular, the WWP's recruiting efforts over the past decade have met with some success, especially in New York and San Francisco. If both actual WWP members and fellow travelers are counted, the group may now deploy up to a thousand cadres, if not more.

Insofar as the WWP has had difficulty in recruiting, it may be due in part to the extremely closed and clannish nature of its leadership. Nowhere is this fact more evident then when it comes to discussing the group's origin. For some reason the WWP exercises great circumspection when it comes to acknowledging its origins as a faction inside the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party (SWP).

The WWPs leaders even obscure their background to their own members. In the May 6th, 1986 WW, for example, the paper began a lengthy four-part series ostensibly dedicated to explaining the WWP's history. Not once in the entire series was it ever mentioned that the WWP first emerged out of the Socialist Workers Party or that the group's founders had spent over a decade as a faction inside the SWP.

Yet the WWP's analysis of the Soviet Union strongly suggests that the sect never abandoned the worldview that its founding leaders first acquired while still inside the SWP. This issue, however, remains so sensitive that following the death of WWP founder Sam Marcy on February 1st, 1998, not one WWP memorial speech mentioned that Marcy had ever been in the SWP, much less a former member of the party's National Committee.

The bizarre nature of the WWP's attempt to conceal its origins is only heightened by the fact that virtually everything written about the group by outside commentators notes its beginnings inside the SWP. One of the rare academic discussions of the WWP's history comes in a survey book by Robert Alexander which is aptly titled International Trotskyism.

The mystery of the WWP begins with Sam Marcy, who dominated the organization from its official inception in 1959 until his death at age 86 in 1998. Born in 1911 in Russia into an extremely poor Jewish family, "Comrade Sam" grew up in Brooklyn. After spending time in the CPUSA's Young Communist League (YCL), Marcy joined the SWP in either the late 1930s or 1940s.

Trained as a lawyer, he served as a legal counsel and organizational secretary for a local United Paper Workers Union. During this time he met his wife Dorothy Ballan, who also came from an immigrant Russian-Jewish family. Although Ballan (who died in 1992) graduated from Hunter College with a degree in education, she joined the United Paper Workers to spread the Marxist gospel. Following traditional Left "industrial colonization" tactics, Marcy and Ballan next moved to Buffalo and began recruiting workers in industrial plants there into the SWP. By the late 1940s, however, the anti-communist backlash that would culminate in McCarthyism made their work inside the trade union movement virtually impossible.

Despite these political setbacks, Marcy and his fellow Buffalo SWP comrades (most notably Vince Copeland) became increasingly convinced that the world had entered a new period of revolutionary class struggle, particularly following the Chinese Revolution. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 hastened the emergence of what was known in the SWP as the Marcy/Copeland "Global Class War" tendency. The Buffalo-based "global class warriors" called on the SWP to downplay its differences with Stalinist regimes and forge a joint front against "U.S. Imperialism."

Global Class War's fundamental point was that the geopolitical defense of "really existing socialism" took priority over the Trotskyist argument that put a premium on promoting class struggles inside the Soviet bloc against the dominant Stalinist bureaucracy. Marcy and Copeland's position might be best described as "semi-entrist" because although they very much wanted to court the Stalinist states, they rejected any argument that called on Trotskyists to enter the CPUSA en masse.

What the Global Class War argument meant in practice became clear during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. The SWP majority supported the uprising as a student and worker-led revolt against Stalinist oppression. The Global Class War faction, however, completely disagreed. A Trotskyist named Fred Mazelis recalled Marcy telling him in 1959 that "the Hungarian workers were hopeless counterrevolutionaries and that we should support the Stalinists in their crushing of the Hungarian workers councils."

According to another former SWP'er named Tim Wohlforth, "Marcy had decided that the Hungarian Revolution was basically a Fascist uprising and that as defenders of the Soviet Union, Trotskyists had a duty to support Soviet intervention." The WWP's 1959 founding statement (reprinted in a 1959 issue of WW under the heading "Proletarian Left Wing of SWP Splits, Calls for Return to Road of Lenin and Trotsky") explained that while it was OK to support demands for "proletarian democracy," once the Hungarians began demanding "bourgeois political democracy," the correct Trotskyist policy was to support "the final intervention of the Red Army which saved Hungary from the capitalist counterrevolution."

In other words, if 99.9% of the Hungarian people wanted to overthrow Russian domination and prevent Hungary from being a satrapy of Moscow, introduce a democratic parliamentary system, and adopt an economic system that worked, they were morally wrong; in contrast, the Soviet troops who shot down unarmed Hungarian student and worker protesters were morally right.

In its founding statement, the WWP also denounced the SWPs attempts to engage in coalition electoral campaigns with a group of former CPers (known as the Gates faction after its leader, John Gates) who had broken from the CPUSA after the 20th Soviet Party Congress partial revelations about Stalins massive crimes.

According to WW, however, the real rightwing trend inside the Soviet Union actually began after Stalins death with the rise of Khrushchev! The WWPs founding statement further noted that while Stalinism may be theoretically as wrong as social democracy, social democrats were considered friendly to American imperialism and the Stalinists are considered hostile. Ergo, Stalinism was better than social democracy.

After breaking with the SWP, the tiny WWP sought to ally itself with pro-Stalinist and anti-Khrushchev elements still inside the CPUSA who were angry about American CP leader William Fosters refusal to openly criticize the Khrushchev revisionists. Around the time that the WWP was created, a splinter group called the Provisional Organizing Committee to Reconstitute a Marxist-Leninist Party in the United States (POC) better known as the Vanguard group split from the CPUSA and embraced Chinas anti-Khrushchev, anti-revisionist line. Although the WWP supported the Chinese position, the Vanguard group refused all of its political overtures because they viewed the WWP as treasonous Trotskyites! Not long thereafter, the WWP began removing Trotskys picture along with any references to him in party publications.

Now thoroughly isolated from the rest of the Left, Marcy led his little group with a strong hand. Tim Wohlforth met Marcy in 1959 at an SWP convention held at a New Jersey summer camp shortly before the Global Class War clique broke with the SWP. As Wohlforth later recalled in his memoir, The Prophets Children, while at the camp he had come upon a small mass of people moving like a swarm of bees and deeply engaged in conversation. In the middle of the mass was a little animated man talking nonstop who had a high-pitched voice and spoke in a completely hysterical manner. Yet Marcys devoted followers seemed enthralled by his performance. . .It was my first experience with true political cult followers.

From its inception, the WWP attacked any and all liberalization tendencies in Communist Bloc nations and scrambled to be first in line to applaud crackdowns on dissident movements. The April 1959 issue of WW even ran an editorial praising the brutal Chinese suppression of Tibets independence movement. As for the Soviet Union, the WWP regularly attacked the entire spectrum of dissident thinkers from Solzhenitsyn to Sakharov. The WWP line was that the dissidents really reflected broader rightwing forces percolating inside the Soviet CP itself. In a February 22nd, 1974 essay, Marcy noted that Khrushchevs so called democratization had opened up a Pandoras box of bourgeois reaction, not only in the Soviet Union but even more virulently in Eastern Europe.

The WWP fully supported the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, when Russian tanks crushed the Dubcek Regime and with it Prague Spring. Needless to say, it also fiercely opposed the Polish Solidarity movement in the 1980s. The WWPs true love throughout the 1960s was Maoist China, with North Korea a close second. The WWP even opposed the signing of the 1963 U.S.-Soviet Test Ban Treaty because it would bar China from acquiring nuclear weapons!

When the Chinese exploded their first H-bomb in 1967, WW declared it to be a major victory for socialism. The party was particularly enthusiastic about Chinas disastrous Cultural Revolution, so much so that as late as the WWPs 1986 party conference, Maos wife Chang Ching (a Cultural Revolution enthusiast and Gang of Four leader) was singled out for special praise.

As much as the WWP admired China, it despised Israel. WWP cadre proudly carried signs in support of al-Fath that read Israel = Tool of Wall Street Rule and Hitler-Dayan, Both the Same. A June 24th, 1967 WW editorial following the Six Day War stated that Israel is not the state of the Jewish nation, but a state that oppresses Jewish workers as well as Arabs.

The fact that Israel was largely created by Socialist Zionists and in 1967 was led by Labor Party Premier Golda Meir (a woman something unthinkable in the Arab world), whose political base was the Social Democratic Israeli trade union movement, did not matter. Nor did it matter that every Arab state that opposed Israel had systematically crushed all independent labor unions or that progressive Arab governments like Jamal `Abd al-Nasrs Egypt had a long record of employing Nazis both to train its military and security forces and to spread anti-Semitic hate propaganda throughout the Middle East.

As the WW editorial explained, The fact that many of the Arab states are still ruled by conservative or even reactionary regimes does not materially affect this position of support, because the Arabs are struggling against imperialism, which is the main enemy of human progress, whereas Israel is on the side of the oppressors.

This same editorial went on to assert that When the bosses on a world scale i.e., the imperialists go to war with the oppressed colonial and semi-colonial nations, it makes little difference who fires the first shot, as far as the rights and wrongs of the matter are concerned. . .Naturally, the imperialists were the original aggressors in every case. Some two decades later, the WWP would use virtually identical arguments to justify supporting Saddam Husayn.

The WWPs remarkable capacity for Orwellian double think was by no means limited to the issue of the Soviet Union or Israel. Take gay liberation, for example. Starting in the early 1970s the WWP actively recruited many gay and lesbian followers, since paradoxically enough the group had a fairly advanced position on this issue.

The sects recruitment successes in this area came about in part because most of the other ultra-left groups competing with the WWP were orthodox Maoists who endorsed the Stalinist/Maoist line that homosexuality was a sexual perversion caused by decadent capitalism that would be swiftly cured come the revolution. Yet even though WWP cadres frequently promoted themselves as gay or lesbian, the WWP refused to criticize the notoriously repressive practices directed against homosexuals in China, North Korea, and Cuba, much less in Serbia or Iraq.

Perhaps the ultimate absurdity of the WWP, however, is that the stealth Trotskyism of its leadership actually saved the sect from collapse in the late 1970s. In the 1960s the WWP, primarily through two key front groups, Youth Against War and Fascism (YAWF) and the American Servicemens Union (ASU), managed to recruit a fair amount of new members who were drawn to the group less by its theories than by the extreme militancy of its street actions. Indeed, YAWFs one notable contribution to the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) was that it was the only group which supported the Weatherman at the disastrous SDS convention in Chicago in the summer of 1969.

YAWF also participated in the Weatherman-organized Days of Rage protest that same autumn. With the end of the Vietnam War, however, the entire American Left began to suffer an enormous downturn, and the WWP was no exception to the rule. The cadre-based Left was further weakened by the rise of new social movements like womens liberation, gay liberation, and the anti-nuclear and ecology movements, all of which operated organizationally and ideologically outside the traditional framework of orthodox Marxism, much less that of authoritarian Marxist-Leninist sects.

Faced with the challenge of widespread de-radicalization, as well as the growth of new social movements, the WWP (like many other Marxist sects) took an industrial turn and ordered its followers back into the labor movement. The WWP even created the Centers for United Labor Action (CULA) to help coordinate these efforts.

Yet ironically, what ultimately gave the WWP a second lease on life was the death of Mao and the subsequent ideological crisis inside post-Mao China that finally resulted in the defeat of the Gang of Four. The WWPs competitors in orthodox Maoist grouplets like the October League rapidly ran out of ideological steam as the new post-Mao Chinese leadership moved even closer to the United States. After China began aiding American and South African-backed movements like UNITA, and Chinese troops tried to invade Vietnam, orthodox Maoism became even harder to rationalize.

Thanks to the WWPs stealth Trotskyism, however, the group managed to escape political oblivion by reorienting itself away from China and toward the Soviet Bloc with relative ease.
The WWPs great advantage in the post-1977 period was that throughout its entire history it only concealed but never abandoned its basic Trotskyist ideology. Orthodox Maoism, it should be recalled, maintained that with the death of Stalin the Soviet Union had ceased to be socialist state. Maoists even went so far as to claim that, thanks to Khrushchevite revisionism, the USSR had been transformed into a social-imperialist state not unlike Tsarist Russia.

The WWP, however, completely rejected this view even while it was busily glorifying ultra-Maoist groups like Chinas Gang of Four for their revolutionary zeal. In a May 1976 WW article, for example, Marcy reasserted the Trotskyist position (naturally without identifying it as such) against the standard Maoist argument. More specifically, he rejected the idea that there is a new exploiting class in the Soviet Union, and that there had been a return to the bourgeoisie to power there.

The reality was that the USSR still remained a workers state whose underlying social system. . .is infinitely superior to that of the most developed, the most glorious and the most democratic of the imperialist states. At the same time (again following Trotsky) he admitted that Russia had undergone a severe strain, deterioration, and erosion of revolutionary principles, and [was] moreover headed by a privileged and absolutist bureaucracy.

Marcy' later rejection of Gorbachev as a capitalist restorationist in the late 1980s was not all that dissimilar to Trotskys attack on Bukharin not Stalin in books like The Revolution Betrayed as the main threat to socialism in the Soviet Union in the 1930s.

The WWPs brand of covert Trotskyism would prove crucial to its future growth. In the late 1970s, its ideology allowed the sect to attach itself like a pilot fish to Soviet and Cuban-allied organizations and avoid political annihilation either from the atrophy of its membership or from a devastating political schism.

The WWPs switch from Maos China to Brezhnevs Russia was so remarkable that in 1984 the sect, which not long before was singing the praises of the Gang of Four, now publicly endorsed Jesse Jackson for President! Finally, when the CPUSA itself split into pieces in the late 1980s, the WWP was in a position to exploit the new situation for maximum political profit.
Conclusion

Given the WWPs worldview, the notion that a group as closely linked to the WWP as the International Action Center could ever be taken seriously, either as a human rights or peace organization, seems comical as well as grotesque. The all too resistible rise of the IAC/ WWP, however, only makes sense when it is viewed in the context of the broader collapse of Soviet-style Marxism and all of its ideological variants. Left to its own devices, the WWP would have remained on the political margin as a quirky Left sect whose weirdly messianic ideology combined the worst aspects of Trotskyism, Maoism, and Stalinism into a unique and utterly foul brew.

That a bizarre outfit like the WWP could become a serious player in American left-wing radicalism in the year 2001 is above all a testament to the existing ideological, intellectual, and moral bankruptcy of the broader Left, which still insists on living in a decrepit fantasy world where criminals are good, the police are evil, blacks are noble, whites are all racist, heterosexual men are sexist, all women are victims, Israel is always 100% wrong, the Palestinians are always 100% right, America is objectively reactionary, and Americas enemies are objectively progressive and therefore worth defending. If this were not the case, the IAC never could or would have emerged as a serious force.

There is no reason, at least in theory, why a new movement from the Left could not both support a U.S.-led war against Islamist fanatics and fight to preserve civil liberties and social justice, both at home and abroad. The entrenched knee-jerk anti-American mindset of so many on the Left, however, makes such a development highly unlikely. At the very least, however, the rational elements within the Left should be willing to critically examine the propagandistic claims emanating from a variety of self-styled human rights and anti-war groups that are as politically compromised and morally dubious as the IAC, ANSWER, and the WWP. While the future role of the Left after 9/11 may not be clear, surely that much ought to be obvious.

"Peace Activists" with a Secret Agenda? Introduction & Part One: Ramsey Clark from Attorney General to the IAC
"Peace Activists" with a Secret Agenda? Part Two: The Crisis of the Marxist Left and the Rise of the WWP