Nuclear proliferation cannot be controlled now - Former CIA agent says
Hamid Mir - A former American CIA agent and nuclear expert David Dastych has claimed that main nuclear arsenals of Pakistan, India, Britain, France, the USA, Russia and China are safe but nuclear proliferation could not be controlled now because it has completely slipped out of control.
He said some corrupt officials of the US defence and state departments were involved in the theft of US nuclear secrets which were sold to many countries including Israel and Pakistan.
In an exclusive interview with Hamid Mir, he said questioning Pakistani scientist Dr A Q Khan is not of any high value now. He said Russian-made small neutron bombs are a real threat to world peace. David Dastych (66) was recruited to Polish intelligence in 1961. He joined CIA in 1973 and became a double agent. He served in the USA, Europe, Vietnam, and China and in other countries. He was arrested by Polish counterintelligence in 1987 on charges of espionage for American and Japanese secret services. He was released from prison in 1990, after the fall of communist regime in Poland.
In the following years he worked for several western intelligence services for the monitoring of illegal nuclear trade. He survived two assassination attempts. His son died mysteriously [in poland, after returning from] in the UK in 1996. He is living in Poland these days and writing for some local and international magazines. This interview was done via email.
Q: For how long you worked with the CIA and in which countries you performed your duties? (Also mention about your arrest and then release from prison)
A: I had first informal contacts with the CIA in North Vietnam, when working for the International Supervision and Control Commission (ICSC) and the Polish Intelligence in 1967. Canadian officers enabled them. But I was blocked from going to South Vietnam and I was expulsed from that Communist country (and was) declared "persona non grata."
I went to China then. A formal CIA recruitment was my own initiative and it happened in summer of 1973 in Saigon, Republic of Vietnam. Then, in August 1973, I passed lie-detector tests and interrogation by CIA teams in Paris. In Poland I reported my CIA recruitment and I became a covert agent, in loose contact with the Agency and targeted against the Soviet Union, from 1973 until my arrest in March 1987.
In fact, I became sort of a double agent for the CIA in the Polish Intelligence and Counterintelligence and that lasted fourteen years. I worked in Poland, USSR, Hungary, East Germany and other countries of Eastern and Central Europe - in the countries of the Warsaw Pact. In result of a "sting operation" I was arrested under false accusations of spying for the Japanese Intelligence. Following a secret military trial I got a sentence of 8 years in 1988, but the Communist regime in Poland collapsed in 1989 and I was released by general amnesty in February 1990.
Q: Is it correct that you tried to break up a Soviet Nuclear spy ring in Europe in the 70's?
A: Yes, my information to the CIA about Soviet spies in Western Europe helped the NATO to break up a multinational organisation of Soviet agents (planted in Germany, France, Italy and other countries). This organisation consisted of nuclear scientists, engineers and technicians, working in sensitive places. Most of the members of that intelligence network were arrested in a sweeping operation but some escaped. It happened in the second half of the 1970s.
Q: Did you monitor the illegal trade in nuclear materials, weapons parts and technology in 1990's and which particular countries were involved in illegal proliferation?
A: Yes, I did. For me it was a voluntary mission and I worked under many covers in Europe and Asia. Since the beginning of 1992, following a meeting in Jerusalem's "King David Hotel" with a prominent Israeli and international nuclear expert, the late Shalheveth Freier, I performed many special tasks. The purpose of my mission was to penetrate organised crime and intelligence groups trading in nuclear materials, weapons parts and technology. Most of these products originated in Russia and in other states of the former USSR, some also from China.
In my work, I had contacts with several intelligence agencies but I was not employed by any of them. My work lasted until December 16, 1994. At this stage, the countries (or rather their intelligence services and various criminal groups) involved in the nuclear proliferation were mainly Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Baltic states (Latvia and Lithuania), and Kazakhstan. Chinese and Mongolian private groups traded in post-Soviet nuclear materials via Hong Kong.
The countries searching for nuclear materials, weapons and technology were (among other) Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Pakistan, Iran, Libya, Iraq, North Korea and some terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. Palestinians from several political-military organisations (al Fatah, Abu Nidal Organisation) often served as intermediaries for Arab and other states. Chechen rebels, fighting against Russia and cooperating with the Russian and other mafias, were an important source of materials and weapons for al-Qaeda.
Several countries, including Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, as well as Germany, France, Switzerland, Italy, Greece, Turkey and Israel were "transit" places for shipments of nuclear materials and products from Russia or other post-Soviet states to "end users" in other countries. Specialised laboratories in Switzerland, Germany, Austria, France and other states tested illegally imported nuclear products.
American, Australian, Canadian, and also Mexican businessmen or intelligence "front companies" participated in the illegal nuclear trade and in the proliferation of nuclear technology.
Q: How safe are the Russian and American nuclear weapons.
A: I have no direct access to the Russian and American nuclear secrets but I know from many sources that the main nuclear arsenals of these big nuclear powers, as well as other nuclear states like Britain, France, China, India and Pakistan, are safe and under strict control. In the early 1990s, tactical nuclear weapons from Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine were offered on international nuclear black markets.
Most of these weapons were offered and sometimes sold by military-business groups, some via organised crime groups. A few transactions of very expensive nuclear materials and products were organised by specialised Russian military enterprises. Technical descriptions of these materials and products were available from Russian military laboratories.
Q: Do you know anything about the nuclear purchases made by Pakistan in the past?
A: Yes, I think I could trace some purchases of nuclear materials and products by Pakistan from Russia on black market. In fact, there was no other way to get them. Saudi Arabia and Brunei financed some of these transactions. I remember a shipment of special nuclear products from Russia to Austria in late 1992, which went to Pakistan then. It was perfectly organised from both sides -- the seller and the buyer.
The products were shipped by Russian military plane, delivered to a Russian diplomatic mission, inspected by experts and sold and shipped to the buyer. The end user was Pakistan but the products went there through a third party. No Pakistani officials or other people took part in the transaction carried out in Austria, near Vienna. Money was paid through banks, not in cash. But there were also cash-goods exchanges in Germany, Switzerland, Luxemburg and Liechtenstein.
Q: Do you know anything about some US officials selling nuclear secrets to others?
A: I do, but only through my American contacts in the Intelligence and the FBI. Some corrupt US officials of the Department of Defence and State Department facilitated the theft of US nuclear secrets (technology) from American national laboratories -- Los Alamos and Sandia -- to customers in several countries, including Pakistan. This procedure involved Israeli and Turkish intelligence and also Pakistan's ISI.
Dr A Q Khan's laboratories were brokers for nuclear proliferation to other countries, including Algeria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Myanmar and other states looking for nuclear technology. This information first surfaced five years ago through reports of a Turkish-American FBI translator, Ms Sibel Edmonds. She was gagged by US court decision and only recently she disclosed more information, which is still being blocked by the Bush Administration. It was revealed in part by three articles, published by "The Sunday Times" in London on the 6th, 20th and 26th of January 2008 (with my contribution).
Q: Is it correct that US officials sold nuclear secrets not only to Pakistan but also to Israel and some Arab countries?
A: Of course, they did. The main recipient of the most of the US nuclear information was always Israel, specifically after the capture, sentencing and jailing of their main spy in the USA. Jonathan Pollard, whose handler was a former top Israeli intelligence officer Rafi Eitan (now member of the Israeli government and chairman of the Pensioners Party).
An informal group in the Mossad composed of right-wing operatives and working hand-in-hand with the Turkish and Pakistani Intelligence was offering US nuclear technology to some Arab countries and to other countries. They did this for profit and, in some cases also for political motives, for example, to get direct proof of some foreign states illegally purchasing nuclear materials or technology. At present, this might be used as a justification to prove that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.
Q: How Israeli intelligence helped China to break into American nuclear laboratories. Why Israel is still a trusted friend of USA?
A: It's a long story, going back to the 1980s, when the Mossad sold PROMIS software to the Chinese Military Intelligence (PLA-2) via its top agent and business operative, the late British publisher and billionaire Robert Maxwell. Since then Chinese intelligence developed highly effective "hackers teams" which use modernised versions of PROMIS to break into American nuclear labs. But this is only one of many methods of spying by the Chinese, who are extremely numerous and active in the United States. Israel, as a state, was and still is a trusted friend and political and military ally of the United States.
But in Israel itself, there are several political groups, which have divergent goals. The present alliance of the Bush II Administration and their "neocon" advisers in particular, is with the Israeli right wing Likud coalition, which is in conflict with the Palestinians and with Arab and Muslim states. Israel is a nuclear power, the biggest in the Middle East, though it officially does not admit to the possession of the nuclear weapons.
Q: Dr A Q Khan is under a lot of restrictions from many years in Pakistan but why he is still very important for the Western media and Western governments?
A: It is important to the West and to the USA in particular to question Dr AQ Khan about his nuclear proliferation activities, which did a lot of harm to the world's efforts to stop the spread of the nuclear weaponry and technology. Dr Khan is not a nuclear scientist himself and his contribution to the development of the nuclear arsenal by Pakistan was by theft of the blueprints of uranium enrichment technology from Holland's Urenco and by his organisational skills to develop the massive centrifuge uranium enrichment systems in Pakistan.
But Dr Khan and his collaborators have also organised a profit-based, semi-official system to sell Pakistan's nuclear technology to other countries. Western media are simply looking for a "scoop", trying to approach Dr AQ Khan and to interview him. Western governments would like to know more about the ways of spreading nuclear technology to the countries, like Iran, Syria and several other to stop that procedure.
But I am sure that it isn't Dr Khan but other Pakistani nuclear scientists who were sharing their knowledge with other countries, such as Saudi Arabia and also with al-Qaeda. Therefore, the questioning of Dr Khan himself is not of any high value now.
Q: Do you think that nuclear terrorism is a real threat and if yes then how to control nuclear proliferation?
A: Sure, nuclear terrorism is the ugliest nightmare of our times and the most dreaded threat to humanity. The all-over proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, especially of simple methods of producing radiation weapons, "dirty bombs" and other devices is the utmost danger to the whole world. It is still possible to control the nuclear proliferation done by states.
But how to control the spread of the nuclear know-how by individuals, motivated by greed or ideology? The most dangerous scenario is passing of miniature nuclear weapons, like the Russian-made small neutron bombs based on a special high-pressure technology product, to terrorists for some political reason. I don't think the nuclear proliferation could be fully controlled any more. It slipped out of control completely.
Q: Do you think that Russian-made small neutron bombs are not safe and already slipped in the hands of under world or terrorists?
A: These Russian miniature neutron devices have been first described by the American inventor of the neutron bomb - Dr Samuel Cohen. He has confirmed to me the formula of the main component of this device, on a technical specification I have gotten from a Russian military laboratory. These devices are in the possession of Russian special services and -- so far they seem to be safe.
I think that the Russians are keeping them for a "special occasion". A small bomb of this type, size of a baseball ball, can destroy a ship. My research of a few last years didn't prove that Russians had given or sold these devices to terrorists. But, in the past, they were selling the nuclear product (a powerful explosive), which is the component of these neutron devices. This product was used in nuclear warheads and probably had been sold to Pakistan in 1992, in Vienna.
Q: Who tried to assassinate you and why?
A: There had been several attempts on my life in the 1980s and 1990s, in Poland, in Hungary and also in Russia. I was lucky to survive them, thank to my intel protection and good luck. But probably they (a post-Soviet intelligence or Russian mafia) had poisoned my only son, Olaf Dastych, 24, in England in 1996.
Hamid Mir, the author of this article, is a top Pakistani reporter, head of the Geo TV Bureau in Islamabad. He has won a world-wide acclaim for his interviews with Osama bin Laden and Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, before and following 9/11. His new book about OBL is due to appear in Britain, later this year.
David Dastych is a former Polish intelligence operative, who served in the 1960s-1980s and was a double agent for the CIA from 1973 until his arrest in 1987 by then-communist Poland on charges of espionage. Now he is an international journalist, who writes for Poland's acclaimed weekly, WPROST, Canada Free Press, and The Polish Panorama (Canada), Ocnus Net (Britain), FrontPageMagazine and The New Media Journal (USA), Axis Information and Analysis (international), Nachrichten Heute (Switzerland), Agentura.ru (Russia), and runs his own David’s Media Agency.
This article was first published at Dhaka, Bagladesh
He said some corrupt officials of the US defence and state departments were involved in the theft of US nuclear secrets which were sold to many countries including Israel and Pakistan.
In an exclusive interview with Hamid Mir, he said questioning Pakistani scientist Dr A Q Khan is not of any high value now. He said Russian-made small neutron bombs are a real threat to world peace. David Dastych (66) was recruited to Polish intelligence in 1961. He joined CIA in 1973 and became a double agent. He served in the USA, Europe, Vietnam, and China and in other countries. He was arrested by Polish counterintelligence in 1987 on charges of espionage for American and Japanese secret services. He was released from prison in 1990, after the fall of communist regime in Poland.
In the following years he worked for several western intelligence services for the monitoring of illegal nuclear trade. He survived two assassination attempts. His son died mysteriously [in poland, after returning from] in the UK in 1996. He is living in Poland these days and writing for some local and international magazines. This interview was done via email.
Q: For how long you worked with the CIA and in which countries you performed your duties? (Also mention about your arrest and then release from prison)
A: I had first informal contacts with the CIA in North Vietnam, when working for the International Supervision and Control Commission (ICSC) and the Polish Intelligence in 1967. Canadian officers enabled them. But I was blocked from going to South Vietnam and I was expulsed from that Communist country (and was) declared "persona non grata."
I went to China then. A formal CIA recruitment was my own initiative and it happened in summer of 1973 in Saigon, Republic of Vietnam. Then, in August 1973, I passed lie-detector tests and interrogation by CIA teams in Paris. In Poland I reported my CIA recruitment and I became a covert agent, in loose contact with the Agency and targeted against the Soviet Union, from 1973 until my arrest in March 1987.
In fact, I became sort of a double agent for the CIA in the Polish Intelligence and Counterintelligence and that lasted fourteen years. I worked in Poland, USSR, Hungary, East Germany and other countries of Eastern and Central Europe - in the countries of the Warsaw Pact. In result of a "sting operation" I was arrested under false accusations of spying for the Japanese Intelligence. Following a secret military trial I got a sentence of 8 years in 1988, but the Communist regime in Poland collapsed in 1989 and I was released by general amnesty in February 1990.
Q: Is it correct that you tried to break up a Soviet Nuclear spy ring in Europe in the 70's?
A: Yes, my information to the CIA about Soviet spies in Western Europe helped the NATO to break up a multinational organisation of Soviet agents (planted in Germany, France, Italy and other countries). This organisation consisted of nuclear scientists, engineers and technicians, working in sensitive places. Most of the members of that intelligence network were arrested in a sweeping operation but some escaped. It happened in the second half of the 1970s.
Q: Did you monitor the illegal trade in nuclear materials, weapons parts and technology in 1990's and which particular countries were involved in illegal proliferation?
A: Yes, I did. For me it was a voluntary mission and I worked under many covers in Europe and Asia. Since the beginning of 1992, following a meeting in Jerusalem's "King David Hotel" with a prominent Israeli and international nuclear expert, the late Shalheveth Freier, I performed many special tasks. The purpose of my mission was to penetrate organised crime and intelligence groups trading in nuclear materials, weapons parts and technology. Most of these products originated in Russia and in other states of the former USSR, some also from China.
In my work, I had contacts with several intelligence agencies but I was not employed by any of them. My work lasted until December 16, 1994. At this stage, the countries (or rather their intelligence services and various criminal groups) involved in the nuclear proliferation were mainly Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Baltic states (Latvia and Lithuania), and Kazakhstan. Chinese and Mongolian private groups traded in post-Soviet nuclear materials via Hong Kong.
The countries searching for nuclear materials, weapons and technology were (among other) Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Pakistan, Iran, Libya, Iraq, North Korea and some terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. Palestinians from several political-military organisations (al Fatah, Abu Nidal Organisation) often served as intermediaries for Arab and other states. Chechen rebels, fighting against Russia and cooperating with the Russian and other mafias, were an important source of materials and weapons for al-Qaeda.
Several countries, including Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, as well as Germany, France, Switzerland, Italy, Greece, Turkey and Israel were "transit" places for shipments of nuclear materials and products from Russia or other post-Soviet states to "end users" in other countries. Specialised laboratories in Switzerland, Germany, Austria, France and other states tested illegally imported nuclear products.
American, Australian, Canadian, and also Mexican businessmen or intelligence "front companies" participated in the illegal nuclear trade and in the proliferation of nuclear technology.
Q: How safe are the Russian and American nuclear weapons.
A: I have no direct access to the Russian and American nuclear secrets but I know from many sources that the main nuclear arsenals of these big nuclear powers, as well as other nuclear states like Britain, France, China, India and Pakistan, are safe and under strict control. In the early 1990s, tactical nuclear weapons from Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine were offered on international nuclear black markets.
Most of these weapons were offered and sometimes sold by military-business groups, some via organised crime groups. A few transactions of very expensive nuclear materials and products were organised by specialised Russian military enterprises. Technical descriptions of these materials and products were available from Russian military laboratories.
Q: Do you know anything about the nuclear purchases made by Pakistan in the past?
A: Yes, I think I could trace some purchases of nuclear materials and products by Pakistan from Russia on black market. In fact, there was no other way to get them. Saudi Arabia and Brunei financed some of these transactions. I remember a shipment of special nuclear products from Russia to Austria in late 1992, which went to Pakistan then. It was perfectly organised from both sides -- the seller and the buyer.
The products were shipped by Russian military plane, delivered to a Russian diplomatic mission, inspected by experts and sold and shipped to the buyer. The end user was Pakistan but the products went there through a third party. No Pakistani officials or other people took part in the transaction carried out in Austria, near Vienna. Money was paid through banks, not in cash. But there were also cash-goods exchanges in Germany, Switzerland, Luxemburg and Liechtenstein.
Q: Do you know anything about some US officials selling nuclear secrets to others?
A: I do, but only through my American contacts in the Intelligence and the FBI. Some corrupt US officials of the Department of Defence and State Department facilitated the theft of US nuclear secrets (technology) from American national laboratories -- Los Alamos and Sandia -- to customers in several countries, including Pakistan. This procedure involved Israeli and Turkish intelligence and also Pakistan's ISI.
Dr A Q Khan's laboratories were brokers for nuclear proliferation to other countries, including Algeria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Myanmar and other states looking for nuclear technology. This information first surfaced five years ago through reports of a Turkish-American FBI translator, Ms Sibel Edmonds. She was gagged by US court decision and only recently she disclosed more information, which is still being blocked by the Bush Administration. It was revealed in part by three articles, published by "The Sunday Times" in London on the 6th, 20th and 26th of January 2008 (with my contribution).
Q: Is it correct that US officials sold nuclear secrets not only to Pakistan but also to Israel and some Arab countries?
A: Of course, they did. The main recipient of the most of the US nuclear information was always Israel, specifically after the capture, sentencing and jailing of their main spy in the USA. Jonathan Pollard, whose handler was a former top Israeli intelligence officer Rafi Eitan (now member of the Israeli government and chairman of the Pensioners Party).
An informal group in the Mossad composed of right-wing operatives and working hand-in-hand with the Turkish and Pakistani Intelligence was offering US nuclear technology to some Arab countries and to other countries. They did this for profit and, in some cases also for political motives, for example, to get direct proof of some foreign states illegally purchasing nuclear materials or technology. At present, this might be used as a justification to prove that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.
Q: How Israeli intelligence helped China to break into American nuclear laboratories. Why Israel is still a trusted friend of USA?
A: It's a long story, going back to the 1980s, when the Mossad sold PROMIS software to the Chinese Military Intelligence (PLA-2) via its top agent and business operative, the late British publisher and billionaire Robert Maxwell. Since then Chinese intelligence developed highly effective "hackers teams" which use modernised versions of PROMIS to break into American nuclear labs. But this is only one of many methods of spying by the Chinese, who are extremely numerous and active in the United States. Israel, as a state, was and still is a trusted friend and political and military ally of the United States.
But in Israel itself, there are several political groups, which have divergent goals. The present alliance of the Bush II Administration and their "neocon" advisers in particular, is with the Israeli right wing Likud coalition, which is in conflict with the Palestinians and with Arab and Muslim states. Israel is a nuclear power, the biggest in the Middle East, though it officially does not admit to the possession of the nuclear weapons.
Q: Dr A Q Khan is under a lot of restrictions from many years in Pakistan but why he is still very important for the Western media and Western governments?
A: It is important to the West and to the USA in particular to question Dr AQ Khan about his nuclear proliferation activities, which did a lot of harm to the world's efforts to stop the spread of the nuclear weaponry and technology. Dr Khan is not a nuclear scientist himself and his contribution to the development of the nuclear arsenal by Pakistan was by theft of the blueprints of uranium enrichment technology from Holland's Urenco and by his organisational skills to develop the massive centrifuge uranium enrichment systems in Pakistan.
But Dr Khan and his collaborators have also organised a profit-based, semi-official system to sell Pakistan's nuclear technology to other countries. Western media are simply looking for a "scoop", trying to approach Dr AQ Khan and to interview him. Western governments would like to know more about the ways of spreading nuclear technology to the countries, like Iran, Syria and several other to stop that procedure.
But I am sure that it isn't Dr Khan but other Pakistani nuclear scientists who were sharing their knowledge with other countries, such as Saudi Arabia and also with al-Qaeda. Therefore, the questioning of Dr Khan himself is not of any high value now.
Q: Do you think that nuclear terrorism is a real threat and if yes then how to control nuclear proliferation?
A: Sure, nuclear terrorism is the ugliest nightmare of our times and the most dreaded threat to humanity. The all-over proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, especially of simple methods of producing radiation weapons, "dirty bombs" and other devices is the utmost danger to the whole world. It is still possible to control the nuclear proliferation done by states.
But how to control the spread of the nuclear know-how by individuals, motivated by greed or ideology? The most dangerous scenario is passing of miniature nuclear weapons, like the Russian-made small neutron bombs based on a special high-pressure technology product, to terrorists for some political reason. I don't think the nuclear proliferation could be fully controlled any more. It slipped out of control completely.
Q: Do you think that Russian-made small neutron bombs are not safe and already slipped in the hands of under world or terrorists?
A: These Russian miniature neutron devices have been first described by the American inventor of the neutron bomb - Dr Samuel Cohen. He has confirmed to me the formula of the main component of this device, on a technical specification I have gotten from a Russian military laboratory. These devices are in the possession of Russian special services and -- so far they seem to be safe.
I think that the Russians are keeping them for a "special occasion". A small bomb of this type, size of a baseball ball, can destroy a ship. My research of a few last years didn't prove that Russians had given or sold these devices to terrorists. But, in the past, they were selling the nuclear product (a powerful explosive), which is the component of these neutron devices. This product was used in nuclear warheads and probably had been sold to Pakistan in 1992, in Vienna.
Q: Who tried to assassinate you and why?
A: There had been several attempts on my life in the 1980s and 1990s, in Poland, in Hungary and also in Russia. I was lucky to survive them, thank to my intel protection and good luck. But probably they (a post-Soviet intelligence or Russian mafia) had poisoned my only son, Olaf Dastych, 24, in England in 1996.
Hamid Mir, the author of this article, is a top Pakistani reporter, head of the Geo TV Bureau in Islamabad. He has won a world-wide acclaim for his interviews with Osama bin Laden and Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, before and following 9/11. His new book about OBL is due to appear in Britain, later this year.
David Dastych is a former Polish intelligence operative, who served in the 1960s-1980s and was a double agent for the CIA from 1973 until his arrest in 1987 by then-communist Poland on charges of espionage. Now he is an international journalist, who writes for Poland's acclaimed weekly, WPROST, Canada Free Press, and The Polish Panorama (Canada), Ocnus Net (Britain), FrontPageMagazine and The New Media Journal (USA), Axis Information and Analysis (international), Nachrichten Heute (Switzerland), Agentura.ru (Russia), and runs his own David’s Media Agency.
This article was first published at Dhaka, Bagladesh
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