Saddam's WMDs and Russia / Part II
The Russian scenario for the Iraqi WMD withdrawal in 2003
Just five days after the beginning of the 2nd war in Iraq (after March 19-20,2003), the Russia’s Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, declared that Washington could fabricate evidence of Iraq allegedly hiding WMDs (…) to justify the US-led attack on Baghdad. Speaking before the Federation Council (Russian Upper House), Ivanov said: "Even if the American-British forces report that they have found weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the final assessment may be given only by international inspectors". [Times of India, Wednesday, March 26, 2006].
It seems like Mr. Ivanov knew that the Coalition forces could not find any WMDs in Iraq, during or after the military operations. However, this is no proof.
Almost to the "last minute", before the Coalition invaded Saddam’s Iraq, the Russian Government tried to prevent the war and to stop the US-led attack on the Iraqi regime. The Russians could have blocked the United States, if the USG would put the final decision about the war into the hands of the members of the UN Security Council. But the USG decided to bypass the UN and strike first. President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military leaders decided to take preventive measures to avoid the blame in case the Coalition forces run into big depos of Russian-produced WMDs or components for their production, stored in Iraq. At the same time, saving their own face, they could accuse the Americans of "fabricating" WMD evidence as a "casus bellum".
The carefully planned Russian "cleaning up" operation was confided to the GRU (Military Intelligence), Spetsnaz (Special Troops) and Russian military and civilian logistic personnel in Iraq, under the command of two experienced ex-Soviet generals, Col.Gen. Vladislav Achalov and Col.Gen. Igor Maltsev, both retired and posing as civilian commercial consultants (see the bios of the generals and the pictures in the Appendix ).
From the original Russian report (Gazeta.ru, April 2,2003):
"The photos show Achalov and Maltsev receiving awards from Iraqi Defence Minister Sultan Hashim Akhmed. Another photo commemorating the event features the Russian generals in the company of the head of the General Staff of the Iraqi Army Izzat Ibragim and his deputies. On the photo published above the Iraqi official is standing between Achalov and Maltsev."
The ceremony was held ''less than 10 days before the beginning of the war'' in a building that was destroyed by US cruise missiles in the first few hours of air raids on Baghdad. What exactly the Soviet generals received their awards for, our source would not say.
(…) As to why the two Soviet generals received the top military awards of the Iraqi Republic on the eve of war, Vladislav Achalov would not say. He did remark, however, that he ''didn’t fly to Baghdad to drink coffee''.
Thus, one can only conjecture what role the Soviet generals have played in preparing the Iraqi army for the war. That their role was important is proved at least by the fact that both Achalov and Maltsev, as Gazeta.Ru has learnt, have visited Iraq no less than 20 times in the past 5-6 years.
(… ) Perhaps it is mere coincidence, but namely Igor Maltsev is rated as one of the best Russian experts in the sphere of operating air-defence systems, while Vladislav Achalov has extensive experience in the field of using rapid-reaction forces.
(…) Yet, Russia’s indirect participation in the training of the Iraqi army to repulse the US-led invasion (in effect, Iraq is using the unique experience of Russia’s top, albeit retired officers) is likely to significantly complicate relations between Moscow and Washington."
Several experts doubted whether the mission of the two Russian generals was to "prepare the Iraqi Army for the upcoming war". Saddam’s army was still shattered after the 1991 First Gulf War, and the Russians were selling to Iraq their routine military equipment, which proved inferior to the U.S. military gear.
They could offer a more modern anti-aircraft radar, which played its role during the 2nd war. But perhaps the only way to defeat the Coalition forces in 2003 would be to use WMDs against them (chemical, biological, nuclear). No such weapons have been used during the 2003 Spring campaign and after. Russia wouldn’t risk her reputation by providing Saddam’s regime with the weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, it is very likely that the Russian generals and their military and civilian personnel were engaged in "cleaning operations", rather than in the "defense-building" military planning. When President Bush decided to go to war against Saddam Hussein, President Putin and his Government and Military Establishment must have realized that the war was to be lost for Saddam and for Russia, as his ally. A logical step to be taken was to deprive Saddam’s military forces of the WMD potential, which was truly useless as a part of the war machine.
But at the time of the 2nd Gulf War (2003), most of the WMDs and materials for their production have been already removed from Iraq to Syria and Lebanon (and earlier to Sudan, Libya and Algeria), either by the Iraqis themselves (with the help of Syria) or by the Russians.
The Russians probably did not participate in the evacuation of a greater part of the Iraqi WMD arsenal to Sudan, Libya and Algeria (via Jordan, by sea), as these evacuations were made by secret decisions of Saddam in the 1990s. But certainly they carried out the final cleaning, just weeks before the outbreak of the 2nd war against the Iraqi regime. The windfall from this Russian operation was mainly political (to undercut the U.S. Government’s rationale for going to the war to remove the Iraqi WMD threat).
But the Russians also secured gains for themselves: loosing their grip over Iraq, they moved their influence to Syria, a state hostile to Israel and a regime supporting armed guerilla in Iraq, after the war. In view of many military and intelligence experts, the Russian WMD-cleaning operation in Iraq was a "masterpiece" of the military camouflage and political deception.
The Russian-led rivalry by proxies
Some high-ranking former Communist spymasters and/or spy defectors, like the former Romanian Intelligence chief, General Ion Pacepa, a Russian spy, Colonel Stanislav Lunev, and the former chief of the KGB bio-war program, Dr. Alexander Kouzminov, warned that the dismantling of the communist USSR in the early 1990s did not remove the military and political threats, which present-day Russia poses to the national security and to the global policy of the United States.
Not able to discuss this matter in full now, let me focus on the Russian WMD-cleaning operations in Iraq and its consequences:
Russia lost ground in Iraq, after the collapse of the Saddam Hussain regime, caused by the 2nd Gulf War, but it gained new strongholds in Syria and Iran.
Russia is able to destabilize the situation in Iraq by secretly supporting and arming post-Saddam guerillas and terrorist groups, to oppose the American policy and the American interests in Iraq and in the Middle East Region.
Russia can exert political and military pressure on Israel by supporting the Syrian regime, the Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Hamas in the Palestinian Autonomy.
Russia is helping the regime in Iran to become a regional political and military power (with an ever stronger influence in Iraq, too), and eventually a nuclear power threatening Israel, a large part of Europe and the American military bases in the entire Middle East Region and in Central Asia.
Most of the fighting is done by proxies. Russia has learned from its Afghanistan war not to engage her military forces abroad, apart from the sphere of her close neighborhood (called "near foreign lands").
The United States should not seek their motives for invading the Iraqi regime in the WMD question alone. The Iraqi WMD secrets are to be found in Russia, in the first place. But it is not substantial for the Government of the United States to prove its true intentions for the past, victorious war in Iraq. It’s very important to observe the development of Russia’s new "imperial" policy, which is threatening the U.S.A. and its world-wide interests.
Saddam's WMDs and Russia / Part I
This Article was first published at Canada Free Press in February 28, 2006
We didn't fly to Baghdad to drink coffee
Achalov Vladislav Alekseevich
Maltsev Igor Mikhailovich
Author’s Credentials
The author of this paper is a veteran international journalist and a former intelligence operative (of the Polish Intelligence and the CIA). In the 1970’s and 1980’s, he had frequent contacts with Palestinian terrorist groups, with the Saddam Hussein regime’s diplomatic, intelligence and commercial personnel, as well as with Soviet officials, diplomats and intelligence operatives(some of them serving in Iraq and other Arab countries). Arrested by the then Polish Communist Security Service (SB) in 1987, condemned by a secret Communist Military Court to 8 years in special prison wards for allegedly working for the CIA, Japanese Prime Minister’s Intelligence Service and for conspiring against the Warsaw Pact, he was released by virtue of general amnesty on February 28, 1990, after the regime change in Poland. Soon after the release, he resumed his journalist and business activity, cooperating with American diplomacy and intelligence and with Israeli diplomats and nuclear experts. Traveling extensively under the cover of businessman and tour-operator, he collected ample evidence of the illegal trade in nuclear materials, weapon parts and technology between Russia and other post-USSR states and Arab and Muslim countries, through a variety of intelligence, military and mafia channels. His activity covered Central and Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Russia, China, Israel and several Middle East countries.
Just five days after the beginning of the 2nd war in Iraq (after March 19-20,2003), the Russia’s Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, declared that Washington could fabricate evidence of Iraq allegedly hiding WMDs (…) to justify the US-led attack on Baghdad. Speaking before the Federation Council (Russian Upper House), Ivanov said: "Even if the American-British forces report that they have found weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the final assessment may be given only by international inspectors". [Times of India, Wednesday, March 26, 2006].
It seems like Mr. Ivanov knew that the Coalition forces could not find any WMDs in Iraq, during or after the military operations. However, this is no proof.
Almost to the "last minute", before the Coalition invaded Saddam’s Iraq, the Russian Government tried to prevent the war and to stop the US-led attack on the Iraqi regime. The Russians could have blocked the United States, if the USG would put the final decision about the war into the hands of the members of the UN Security Council. But the USG decided to bypass the UN and strike first. President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military leaders decided to take preventive measures to avoid the blame in case the Coalition forces run into big depos of Russian-produced WMDs or components for their production, stored in Iraq. At the same time, saving their own face, they could accuse the Americans of "fabricating" WMD evidence as a "casus bellum".
The carefully planned Russian "cleaning up" operation was confided to the GRU (Military Intelligence), Spetsnaz (Special Troops) and Russian military and civilian logistic personnel in Iraq, under the command of two experienced ex-Soviet generals, Col.Gen. Vladislav Achalov and Col.Gen. Igor Maltsev, both retired and posing as civilian commercial consultants (see the bios of the generals and the pictures in the Appendix ).
From the original Russian report (Gazeta.ru, April 2,2003):
"The photos show Achalov and Maltsev receiving awards from Iraqi Defence Minister Sultan Hashim Akhmed. Another photo commemorating the event features the Russian generals in the company of the head of the General Staff of the Iraqi Army Izzat Ibragim and his deputies. On the photo published above the Iraqi official is standing between Achalov and Maltsev."
The ceremony was held ''less than 10 days before the beginning of the war'' in a building that was destroyed by US cruise missiles in the first few hours of air raids on Baghdad. What exactly the Soviet generals received their awards for, our source would not say.
(…) As to why the two Soviet generals received the top military awards of the Iraqi Republic on the eve of war, Vladislav Achalov would not say. He did remark, however, that he ''didn’t fly to Baghdad to drink coffee''.
Thus, one can only conjecture what role the Soviet generals have played in preparing the Iraqi army for the war. That their role was important is proved at least by the fact that both Achalov and Maltsev, as Gazeta.Ru has learnt, have visited Iraq no less than 20 times in the past 5-6 years.
(… ) Perhaps it is mere coincidence, but namely Igor Maltsev is rated as one of the best Russian experts in the sphere of operating air-defence systems, while Vladislav Achalov has extensive experience in the field of using rapid-reaction forces.
(…) Yet, Russia’s indirect participation in the training of the Iraqi army to repulse the US-led invasion (in effect, Iraq is using the unique experience of Russia’s top, albeit retired officers) is likely to significantly complicate relations between Moscow and Washington."
Several experts doubted whether the mission of the two Russian generals was to "prepare the Iraqi Army for the upcoming war". Saddam’s army was still shattered after the 1991 First Gulf War, and the Russians were selling to Iraq their routine military equipment, which proved inferior to the U.S. military gear.
They could offer a more modern anti-aircraft radar, which played its role during the 2nd war. But perhaps the only way to defeat the Coalition forces in 2003 would be to use WMDs against them (chemical, biological, nuclear). No such weapons have been used during the 2003 Spring campaign and after. Russia wouldn’t risk her reputation by providing Saddam’s regime with the weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, it is very likely that the Russian generals and their military and civilian personnel were engaged in "cleaning operations", rather than in the "defense-building" military planning. When President Bush decided to go to war against Saddam Hussein, President Putin and his Government and Military Establishment must have realized that the war was to be lost for Saddam and for Russia, as his ally. A logical step to be taken was to deprive Saddam’s military forces of the WMD potential, which was truly useless as a part of the war machine.
But at the time of the 2nd Gulf War (2003), most of the WMDs and materials for their production have been already removed from Iraq to Syria and Lebanon (and earlier to Sudan, Libya and Algeria), either by the Iraqis themselves (with the help of Syria) or by the Russians.
The Russians probably did not participate in the evacuation of a greater part of the Iraqi WMD arsenal to Sudan, Libya and Algeria (via Jordan, by sea), as these evacuations were made by secret decisions of Saddam in the 1990s. But certainly they carried out the final cleaning, just weeks before the outbreak of the 2nd war against the Iraqi regime. The windfall from this Russian operation was mainly political (to undercut the U.S. Government’s rationale for going to the war to remove the Iraqi WMD threat).
But the Russians also secured gains for themselves: loosing their grip over Iraq, they moved their influence to Syria, a state hostile to Israel and a regime supporting armed guerilla in Iraq, after the war. In view of many military and intelligence experts, the Russian WMD-cleaning operation in Iraq was a "masterpiece" of the military camouflage and political deception.
The Russian-led rivalry by proxies
Some high-ranking former Communist spymasters and/or spy defectors, like the former Romanian Intelligence chief, General Ion Pacepa, a Russian spy, Colonel Stanislav Lunev, and the former chief of the KGB bio-war program, Dr. Alexander Kouzminov, warned that the dismantling of the communist USSR in the early 1990s did not remove the military and political threats, which present-day Russia poses to the national security and to the global policy of the United States.
Not able to discuss this matter in full now, let me focus on the Russian WMD-cleaning operations in Iraq and its consequences:
Russia lost ground in Iraq, after the collapse of the Saddam Hussain regime, caused by the 2nd Gulf War, but it gained new strongholds in Syria and Iran. Russia is able to destabilize the situation in Iraq by secretly supporting and arming post-Saddam guerillas and terrorist groups, to oppose the American policy and the American interests in Iraq and in the Middle East Region. Russia can exert political and military pressure on Israel by supporting the Syrian regime, the Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Hamas in the Palestinian Autonomy. Russia is helping the regime in Iran to become a regional political and military power (with an ever stronger influence in Iraq, too), and eventually a nuclear power threatening Israel, a large part of Europe and the American military bases in the entire Middle East Region and in Central Asia. Most of the fighting is done by proxies. Russia has learned from its Afghanistan war not to engage her military forces abroad, apart from the sphere of her close neighborhood (called "near foreign lands").
The United States should not seek their motives for invading the Iraqi regime in the WMD question alone. The Iraqi WMD secrets are to be found in Russia, in the first place. But it is not substantial for the Government of the United States to prove its true intentions for the past, victorious war in Iraq. It’s very important to observe the development of Russia’s new "imperial" policy, which is threatening the U.S.A. and its world-wide interests.
Saddam's WMDs and Russia / Part IThis Article was first published at Canada Free Press in February 28, 2006We didn't fly to Baghdad to drink coffeeAchalov Vladislav Alekseevich Maltsev Igor Mikhailovich Author’s CredentialsThe author of this paper is a veteran international journalist and a former intelligence operative (of the Polish Intelligence and the CIA). In the 1970’s and 1980’s, he had frequent contacts with Palestinian terrorist groups, with the Saddam Hussein regime’s diplomatic, intelligence and commercial personnel, as well as with Soviet officials, diplomats and intelligence operatives(some of them serving in Iraq and other Arab countries). Arrested by the then Polish Communist Security Service (SB) in 1987, condemned by a secret Communist Military Court to 8 years in special prison wards for allegedly working for the CIA, Japanese Prime Minister’s Intelligence Service and for conspiring against the Warsaw Pact, he was released by virtue of general amnesty on February 28, 1990, after the regime change in Poland. Soon after the release, he resumed his journalist and business activity, cooperating with American diplomacy and intelligence and with Israeli diplomats and nuclear experts. Traveling extensively under the cover of businessman and tour-operator, he collected ample evidence of the illegal trade in nuclear materials, weapon parts and technology between Russia and other post-USSR states and Arab and Muslim countries, through a variety of intelligence, military and mafia channels. His activity covered Central and Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Russia, China, Israel and several Middle East countries.
sfux - 11. Okt, 08:03 Article 2476x read
